

News from behind the IRON CURTAIN

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FEATURES

- The Hungarian Course
- Sovroms
- The Egg of the Troglodytes
- The Architecture of Empire
- Coal, Harvest and Production Surveys



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September 1954 — Vol. 3 — No. 9

Free Europe Committee, Inc.

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ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION . . .

NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, published monthly by the Free Europe Press of the Free Europe Committee, is circulated to those with a specific interest in events and developments in Communist-dominated Europe. This bulletin is made available to representatives of the press and other media, to universities, churches, libraries, and research centers, and to other groups of citizens who want to know more about "Communism in practice." The magazine is not an organ of editorial policy; wherever possible direct quotation is used to provide source material and to document commentary. The Committee believes that accurate information contributes to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist system, and hence to the ability of the free nations to combat this system.

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The Month in Review



THERE has been increasing evidence this past month that the Communists are experiencing acute difficulties in crucial sectors of their economies. Mid-summer regime reviews of the coal situation indicate that unless radical improvements take place within the next few weeks, a **serious fuel and power crisis** can be expected this winter throughout the area. Harvest reports show that though on the whole the crop is expected to be fairly good, **bad weather, Party disorganization** and continued, **fierce peasant resistance** have combined to reduce total production below regime expectations while at the same time substantially lowering forced State deliveries. Finally, the statistical surveys released by the Communists on production efforts for the first six months of the year all show that important regime-set targets have not been fulfilled. The combined picture shows that at present the New Course measures aimed at raising agricultural and consumer goods production are not bearing fruit and have **adversely affected other sectors**, including heavy industry.

In Czechoslovakia, coal production took a dip starting in June and went further into debt to the State in July. A conference to discuss this emergency was convened July 3-4. The discussions and press comments reveal that the Czechoslovak coal industry is suffering from **lack of organization**, shortcomings in the use of available machinery, **labor shortage**, a high rate of **labor turnover** and **chronic absenteeism**.

In Poland, while plans call for an increase in the rate of coal production, all indications are that the regime is now desperately struggling to maintain past production levels. **Wastefulness** in the use of coal by major production centers has further aggravated the situation, and on July 7 a national conference on coal saving was held in Warsaw. Official comments trace many of the present difficulties to insufficient care for the miners' welfare. As a result of this negligence, labor turnover is high and worker productivity inadequate. References to the importance of **coal as an export product** indicate that shipments of coal abroad may have to be curtailed in the future.

By the end of July the debt of the Hungarian coal mining industry amounted to 300,000 metric tons. This lack in Plan fulfillment occurred in spite of the fact that targets were considerably lowered at the beginning of the year. In trying to explain the present crisis, the regime press has revealed the following shortcomings: **lack of stress on "pioneer work methods," disregard of rules for labor protection, bureaucracy, uneconomic use of available manpower** and an inability to recruit new miners.

Existing disproportions between coal production and the "needs of the national economy" were lately discussed in the Bulgarian press. Stress was put on the fact that the methods of work were inefficient and led to poor coordination in the exploitation of mines. It was also revealed that Bulgaria lacks the necessary number of specialists, that training was proceeding very slowly and that academic standards were very poor.

The lack of Party efficiency in organizing and supervising coal production was scored in Romania. Miners were also called upon to "intensify the struggle" for more coal and

were directed to engage in numerous "Socialist competitions." Party organizations and enterprise committees were instructed to study more seriously the "systematic expansion of advanced experience and methods, especially the cyclographic method." They were also ordered to do away with **bureaucratic and formalistic methods** in order to make full use of available facilities.

Two countries—Hungary and Czechoslovakia—have recently accepted **United States relief** help for flood victims. Though the inclement weather no doubt affected the harvest, it appears that the much-advertised Danubian floods covered only an insignificant portion of the total area of arable land. Hungarian Communist leaders used the flood news to mobilize the country in an effort to bolster a sagging agricultural sector. Industrial workers were made to contribute money, to work night and Sunday shifts and to go out to the countryside and whenever possible help with the harvest. It seems that the regime is particularly worried about the peasants' failure to respond positively to its concessions. There has been a continued and very **vigorous resistance to forced State deliveries** and the Communists have had to stress time and time again that no more concessions with respect to delivery quotas would be forthcoming. Further, a recent Supreme Court decision indicates that the Hungarian regime is now attempting to call a halt to kolkhoz dissolution.

Harvest news from the other countries reveal the same basic trends: continued and ever **more effective peasant resistance** and continued and ever **more pronounced regime ineptitude**. In Czechoslovakia the stress was put on the duty of National Committees to set an example in handing over to the State the full quota of forced deliveries. "Kulaks" were accused of demoralizing National Committee members as well as small and medium peasants in general. In Poland, much was made of the fact that machinery was not being used wisely and to full working capacity. In Bulgaria, the official complaint was that work was badly synchronized and that threshing was lagging. In Romania, the main handicap to a smooth harvest was said to be the organizational inefficiency of local councils and the apathy of local Party functionaries in general.

Production results for the first six months of the year were **below regime expectations** in major economic sectors in every Satellite country. Romanian production sectors that failed to reach the 100 percent mark included the important oil industry, as well as wood, paper and cellulose, the communal economy and social industry, industrial enterprises of the Ministry of Construction and industrial enterprises of the Central Union of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives. In Poland, failures were admitted for the Ministry of Meat and Milk, for hard coal and the production of a variety of items, including some types of automobiles, fertilizers, cement and bricks, wool fabrics and leather shoes and many other goods. The Czechoslovak statistical report admitted the non-fulfillment of specific tasks in all sectors of the economy and stated that the ministries for food, and that for foundries and ores did not meet their targets. While in Hungary the greatest failure was scored by the Building Ministry, many important separate items were listed as having been produced in insufficient quantities. In Bulgaria, every important ministry fell short of the set goals, including the Ministry of Electrification, the Ministry of Heavy Industry and the Ministry of Light and Food Industry.

Other events in the area included a **Party-State organizational change** in Albania. The move involved Hoxha's taking over the duties of First Secretary and Mehmet Shehu's elevation to Premier. In Romania, at a Plenum of the Central Committee, changes to the Party rules were adopted. The new draft introduces stricter admittance rules, increases members' duties, and is partly intended to strengthen Party control over local production centers. Also, at a meeting of the Romanian National Assembly, a law on pardon and amnesty was approved. The law provides for pardon for all persons sentenced to up to five years' deprivation of freedom and entails a reduction of two-thirds of the punishment for sentences exceeding five years. The measure does not affect persons sentenced for "crimes" related to "State security."

The Hungarian Course

"... With Communist frankness and sincere self-criticism, it [the Party] has disclosed before everyone the mistakes committed and outlined a path through which the failures and mistakes can be liquidated. The disproportions in the people's economy have occurred and been intensified primarily because the rhythm outlined in the Five Year Plan for industrialization has been over-exaggerated. . . . This was due not only to our inexperience . . . and was not only a simple child's disease, but was the mistake of our entire policy."

Matyas Rakosi, May 24, 1954

THE HUNGARIAN Communist Party Congress, held in May, provided a significant commentary on the political and economic repercussions of the New Course, introduced slightly less than a year before. As the second Satellite to launch the new policy of raising the living standard and gaining popular support, the Hungarian regime's program has been the most extensive and revealing in the area. When Premier Imre Nagy presented the new policy on July 4, 1953, he promised more to the people than other Satellite leaders pledged subsequently, and he therefore incurred a more violent reaction. Partly repudiating his government's past policies, Nagy announced his plan to slow down the pace of industrialization, expand agriculture and the consumer goods industry, develop internal and foreign trade, and to issue private trade licenses to certain industries. Even more startling, he promised to end internal deportations, to stop forcible collectivization and persecution of kulaks, to give more consideration to intellectuals, more aid to private artisans, and to punish officials who mistreated workers. An integral part of the new program was Nagy's emphasis on the importance of the independent peasantry and his promise to peasants that they could leave kolkhozes if they wished.

It seemed at first that the entire policy was designed to guarantee better living conditions and more freedom and "legality" to almost all strata of society. Nagy's speech therefore gave rise to the belief that a new "liberal" era had been introduced. The effect of the announcement on the people seems to have been electrifying: hardly had the words been spoken than a spontaneous popular move-

ment developed aimed at invoking democratic freedoms. But the regime did not countenance complete relaxation, and to end the chaos that seems to have developed in the first few days of July 1953, the Communists were forced to "clarify" their position only a week after the original New Course announcement had been made. They had to point out that the New Course had definite limits: these limits have been increasingly stressed within the past year and constitute a yardstick against which the results of the new program can best be measured.

One of the chief reasons for launching the New Course was the failure of the Five Year Plan and the growing imbalance in the economy. The point of diminishing returns had been reached: workers no longer could be forced to fulfill set targets and expressed their resistance in a mounting slow-down strike; farm production lagged seriously, and peasant sabotage and opposition to collectivization aggravated the critical food shortage in urban centers. The regime had reached the limits of its ability to push heavy industrialization profitably in terms of its human and economic resources, and any further development necessitated a reorientation of plans. By drafting a program to appease a discontented population through promises of a higher living standard and immediate concessions, the regime hoped to persuade people to cooperate in production and thus overcome shortcomings. The people's reaction to Nagy's speech, however, did not augur well for Communist expectations.

Instead of accepting the New Course as a "logical development" in a "People's Democracy," Hungarian citizens considered it a sign of regime weakness and uncer-

tainty, and began to voice their demands and opposition more loudly than before.

Large numbers of farmers began to leave kolkhozes immediately, and refused to wait, as instructed, until fall. Factory workers demanded that norms be lowered, harsh labor discipline abolished, and slave drivers dismissed. For several days, industry almost came to a standstill, while in the countryside peasant resistance flared up and numerous kolkhozes were on the verge of disintegration. Even worse, panic apparently developed within the Party: it seems that lower and middle functionaries assumed that there had been a split between the Party and government and did not know which side to take; among top Party echelons there were signs of a controversy between orthodox Stalinists and advocates of the new program. To allay widespread confusion, Rakosi convened a conference of Party activists one week after the New Course was announced. He assured Party members that unity existed between the Party and Government, and he comforted fear-ridden officials by stating that no purge was in the offing. Rakosi also made it clear that the New Course did not mean lawlessness or abandonment of Communist goals. He pointed out that the regime still adhered to the kolkhoz system and sharply attacked kulaks for provoking peasant resistance. Bewilderment continued to prevail, however, and the Communist leadership was forced to make further efforts to stabilize its position and relate its new program—especially in agriculture—to “Marxist-Leninist” tradition.

The first theoretical explanation of the new program appeared as late as September 1953, in the Party review *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), which alluded to a similarity between the New Course and the NEP period in the Soviet Union. In an October 31 meeting of the Party Central Committee, Rakosi developed this theory, and applied Lenin's triple slogan to the Hungarian situation.* Calling the new farm program the “Leninist link, which leads us to the next link in the chain of development,” Rakosi said: “[Developing agriculture] is our most important task now and in the next few years; we must concentrate all our efforts in carrying out this task.” The tortured effort to reconcile theory with the new practice was most apparent in an article by chief Party theoretician Jozsef Revai. Writing in the October issue of *Társadalmi Szemle*, Revai insisted that the “NEP policy” had been applied in Hungary ever since the end of the war. Past errors, he said, were due to the fact that the policy had been incorrectly applied: “We have been applying the NEP ever since the year of change [1948-49]; however, it is evident that ever since . . . and especially since 1951, we have been distorting the new economic policy to an ever-increasing degree. Consequently, the significance of the NEP gradually has grown weaker. The mistake was that we wanted to replace free market trade by Socialist trade too rapidly.” Specifically,

* “The fact that the building of Socialism has started in the rural areas too has not changed the basic Leninist policy according to which, under circumstances such as those prevailing at present, we must ‘fully rely on the poor peasants, enter into alliance with the middle peasants and fight against the kulaks.’” [From Rakosi's speech, on October 31, 1954. *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), November 10, 1954.]

as Rakosi explained on October 31: “The main task in correctly applying the NEP would have been to support and encourage agricultural production by all means, and to induce independent peasants, constituting the large majority, . . . to deliver as much produce to the market as possible. . . . Instead of doing this, we wanted to take care of increasing needs by raising delivery obligations; we thereby reduced the quantity of goods which peasants could have sold on the free market.”

These theoretical deliberations continued into February. After the regime had stemmed the peasant exodus from kolkhozes, theoretician Gyorgy Nemes, writing in the February 9, 1954, issue of *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), reiterated the Party's policy: “Excessive emphasis was put on one aspect of the NEP—on restricting private trade and eliminating capitalist elements; on the other hand, the establishment of free trade relations and support of independent peasants was neglected.”

In other words, one of the chief aims of the New Course program was to woo the middle peasantry, and the various comparisons with the Soviet NEP were made for the purpose of assuring anxious Party members that the new policy was no denial of Communist economic goals, no “rebirth of capitalism,” and no attempt to “betray the working class in favor of the peasantry.” For the rank and file citizen, however, these assurances were neither important nor comforting. As the New Course progressed it became apparent that peasants, workers and technicians were consistently blocking Communist efforts to boost production and were unconcerned with Communist theory. At the Third Party Congress on May 24-30, 1954, the Communist leadership revealed innumerable difficulties in industry and agriculture, as well as in the Party, mass organizations and other sectors. Complaints about rising production costs, low productivity, farm shortcomings, bureaucracy and incompetence, as well as indications of ideological conflicts within the Party and alleged mounting “enemy” activity, all pointed to acute difficulties in all spheres of national life.

The Party and the Political Front


Immediately after launching the New Course, Party chiefs initiated a campaign to install collective leadership,* eliminate the petty despotism of local leaders, and ensure “speedy and complete elimination of all mistakes.” The aim of this drive was to strengthen the “Party's ties with the masses” and to instill life into a moribund organization. The method was calculated to arouse criticism and enthusiasm from below, and to create a vigorous local leadership by stressing mass participation in the new program. Local Party functionaries were supposed to adhere to top Party commands, but at the same time were expected to exercise more initiative and authority in carrying out the new policy in their respective areas. That this campaign to mobilize the Party has largely failed, was indirectly admitted by Matyas Rakosi in his Congress speech. The

* See July 1954 issue, pp. 21-33.


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
Hungarian-Soviet Friendship Society membership meeting.



Freedom Fighters Activist meeting.



Trade Union meeting.



Party emergency meeting

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), April 1, 1954

First Party Secretary bitterly condemned bureaucracy, complacency, "rightist and leftist sectarianism" and violation of top-Party orders. According to Rakosi, petty tyranny still exists and ineptitude and division permeate the entire Party organization.

In discussing weaknesses, Rakosi reiterated complaints made many times in the past year. He denounced in particular those Party functionaries who, secure in their power and smugly self-satisfied, "ignore the voice of the people and turn against those who criticize. We must create an atmosphere within the Party," he said,* "in which the rank and file member is able to criticize, complain or state his case without fear of retribution. . . . Those comrades who suppress criticism and seek to stifle the refreshing and invigorating atmosphere of Party democracy must not be permitted to hold responsible positions." Even more significant were the complaints about overcentralization—a situation which has resulted in inertia, ineffectuality, and slow implementation of top Party decisions. Rakosi put the matter in a nutshell when he said:

"Bureaucracy is the twin sister of centralization. Bureaucracy and excessive centralization begin to be stumbling blocks in our development. It is a result of excessive centralization that an ever-increasing number of people wait for decisions from above, take every little problem to their superiors and do not dare to take steps or make decisions. This intolerable situation must be eliminated without delay."

What Rakosi failed to acknowledge is that bureaucracy and centralization are inherent in the Communist system itself, which is based on rigid centralized control. To eliminate such weaknesses, a fundamental change would have to take place within the Party structure. The leaders, however, cannot allow such drastic changes to take place. Even the present, more restricted emphasis on greater initiative and freer criticism may upset regime plans: instead of leading to greater competence and better fulfillment of the new program, the new "liberalism" may have the opposite effect—that is, it may breed confusion and uncontrollable centralization. Thus, in recent months difficulties within the Party have increased rather than diminished and, according to press reports, economic conditions in some sectors have grown progressively worse since last July.

* *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), May 25.

All during the summer and fall, complaints about opposition to the new program appeared in the Party press. *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), November 10, 1953, wrote: "There are comrades who have come to a sudden stop now, when as a result of the new regrouping, they are faced with new tasks. Often they rigidly cling to their old conceptions. . . . There is reluctance and resistance in our Party . . . even in the central apparatus of our Party, such as the Planning and Financial departments. We must take severe measures against this." The following day, *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), November 11, reiterated the criticism, stating that the stubborn refusal to accept the new program must be eliminated: "Party organizations must fight wrong conceptions and lack of understanding within our Party. They must also overcome certain resistance which hinders implementation of Central Committee resolutions and the government program."

Subsequent developments have shown that the Party is facing even more serious trouble; going to the opposite extreme, many Party officials have "overimplemented" the New Course—that is, they have been too "liberal" and permitted deviations and lack of discipline:

"There are some who believe that the policy of the new period means laxer state and labor discipline. . . . These conceptions are wrong, and the fact that we have not fought them persistently has caused serious damage. . . . These facts prove that in connection with the new policy, the danger of right-wing tendencies has increased. . . . We must protect the proper policy of our Party from right-wing as well as left-wing dangers and distortions. We do not stand up properly to the treacherous two-faced attitude if we permit certain Party and State functionaries to agree with Party and government resolutions in words only and actually fail to carry them out. Too often in the field of Party activity we notice the great difference between words and deeds."*

In effect, Rakosi's criticism is a confession that the regime's attempt to steer a middle course—to ration freedom and reconcile initiative with strict adherence to Party orders—has proved impracticable. As a result, the New Course has increased ideological deviations, as was confirmed by Politburo member Mihaly Farkas, who said at the Congress that false views and wrong methods had been spread throughout the Party and that Party function-

* Matyas Rakosi speech to the Third Congress, *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), May 25, 1954.

aries could not just sit back and expect the people to fulfill the new program without their (the Communists) active leadership. "Leadership in the Communist manner," he said, "does not mean that people should stay petty-bourgeois and backward in their thinking. . . . On the contrary, proper leadership must fight such tendencies while it supports progressive thinking . . . and everything which assists our country in its advance on the road to Socialist building."*

A similar statement was made by Central Committee member Marton Horvath, who pointed out to the Congress that it was wrong to assume that "the possibilities provided by the New Course will be accepted automatically on the ideological front without a struggle." Referring, as Rakosi did, to "right-wing tendencies," Horvath elaborated on farm problems. "Nothing," he said, "could be worse than to provide material for a new Narodnik discussion, mainly because our present state of development calls for closer cooperation with the peasant intelligentsia—not for separation. . . . Undoubtedly, the trend of closer cooperation will win the upper hand among the working peasants, as well as among the intelligentsia. For this reason, it would be wrong to overestimate right-wing tendencies, and for this reason we must primarily exercise patience and friendly persuasion. The consolidation of the worker-peasant alliance, the strengthening of national unity, will have a beneficial effect on every phase of our ideology."

The above quotations show that the New Course policy has ricocheted, and that the Party has not been able to confine the reactions of either functionaries or rank and file members within the narrow bounds it had prescribed. The New Course has failed not only to mobilize the Party, but also to appease the "class enemy" whom the regime promised to treat more leniently last July. Rakosi issued a severe warning to the Congress that the enemy had not forgotten the past nor given up the hope that "with foreign help they will eventually regain their former power":

"Experience gained in the class struggle shows that the enemy defends their diminished possessions with growing determination and will try to recover their losses. In this effort they are assisted by the imperialists who hurry to the aid of their agents, encourage them to seek to improve their position even by exerting pressure on our society. This is what happened last year when benevolent measures, such as the amnesty, ending of deportations, cancellation of delivery and tax arrears, were interpreted by the enemy as a sign of our weakening power. . . . The enemy's underground activity has caused considerable damage to the political and economic life of our people's democracy. . . . Therefore, in the present phase of our development, vigilance must increase. . . . We must make certain that in our Party the enemy not only should find no gap but not even the tiniest crack."**

* *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), May 26, 1954.

** In October 1953, the regime released many deportees who had been deprived of all their possessions in 1951 and removed from urban centers. However, after their release, the deportees were not actually permitted to return to the cities, and from private reports, it appears that they are now living in extreme poverty in rural areas.

The Administration

Other indications of failure, disunity and confusion were contained in the severe criticism of work by mass organizations and economic ministries and agencies. Although numerous attacks have been directed against economic managers in the past few months, the first all-out assault against economic ministries was made by Rakosi at the Congress. His condemnation of the administration indicated that not only lower agencies but also top government organs were infected by the diseases of bureaucracy, apathy, inefficiency and deviation. According to Rakosi, the Ministry of Agriculture was overstaffed and bureaucratic; the Ministry for Crop Collection displayed no system and "a lot of flurry," and failed to take measures against people who did not meet delivery norms; the Ministry of Finance did not fight consistently for more economical plant management; the Ministry for Smelting and Machine Industry did not enforce up-to-date production methods, nor did it stress improved quality, elimination of rejects or reduction of production costs:

"[Similarly,] the Ministry for Heavy Industry lagged behind for several months in introducing the proper system of power distribution. . . . It bears heavy responsibility in coal mining for neglecting to enforce wage discipline. . . . A certain improvement can be seen in the work of our National Planning Bureau. However, it is undoubtedly true that economic planning is one of the weakest points in our economic work. . . . We see here resistance to the new policy . . . and this resistance has not ceased to exist. We have to declare that such an attitude is unworthy of a Communist and of a responsible State functionary. No one can be in a responsible State or Party position who is a Pato Pal [literary character who spent his life dreaming and postponed all important tasks for the morrow] or has a reluctant attitude towards executing resolutions which have as their aim raising the living standard. . . . There are also functionaries, fortunately small in number, who give vocal support to the policy of our Party and government but, who, in practice, try to do the exact opposite. These two-faced individuals are either inimical elements . . . or under the influence of the enemy, and therefore have to be made to account for themselves. Such elements have no place in the Party or in the State machine."

The Local Councils

Premier Imre Nagy announced that in the future the council's work will be controlled by the National Assembly and Presidium instead of by administrative agencies and, in the highest instance, the Council of Ministers, as hitherto. The probable reason for this change is to improve the councils' efficiency by increasing their authority and preventing confusion in their work as a result of interference by various ministries and government offices. Further, Party organizations will be established within the councils to supervise their activity and ensure fulfillment of the new program.

Complaints about council work were similar to the criti-

cisms of Party organizations. Regime spokesmen accused the councils of overcentralization, bureaucracy and lax ties with the masses. Imre Nagy emphasized that economic restrictions on the councils must be lifted and that they must assume responsibility for directing the work of local industrial plants, and for carrying out farm decrees. Nagy also rebuked council officials for disregarding government resolutions, and failing to follow instructions for crop deliveries and payment of taxes. "Can there be any legality," he asked, "when discipline is so lax? No, there cannot. There can only be lawlessness either in the form of laxity or excess. Only strict state discipline can protect leaders and workers of our local councils from errors, laxities and excesses. There is no wonder drug. Therefore, in the work of our local councils and other state agencies, we have a very important task on our agenda: to consolidate state discipline." A further attempt to improve council work will be made in the fall. Elections to the People's Councils are due to be held in October under the aegis of the People's Front;* at this time, the Party will attempt to eliminate "difficult" or incompetent officials and replace them by officers who will carry out Party orders.

Mass Organizations

Declining membership in mass organizations formed the basis of other sharp rebukes at the Congress. According to Rakosi, membership in the Youth League, DISZ, now totals 577,000—which means a decrease of 82,000 since 1952, when membership totalled 659,000.** In other words, many young people who were forced to join the organization failed to pay membership dues, did not attend meetings and conferences, and left the League at the first opportunity. Rakosi placed the chief blame for DISZ shortcomings on the Party which, he said, had not given the organization enough help: "The DISZ, this militant organ of working youth," he said, "is the Party's own child, and should be made to understand that the Party helps it, supports it, takes care of it, and is constantly concerned about it." Other speakers at the Congress also discussed low DISZ membership. Geza Kassai, Director of the Lenin Institute, said that the number of Youth League members was far below the number of Party members, and that in some districts, the disproportionately small number of DISZ members was frightening.*** First Secretary of DISZ, Jozsef Szakali, said that the organization includes only 30-35 percent of Hungarian youth, and that educational work was far below requirements.**** "Militant revolutionary romanticism is often missing in our educational work. We have not paid proper attention to the patriotic feelings of young people in the course of our nationalistic education and we have not properly cele-

brated certain anniversaries of national importance. . . . In many places, our national songs are not sung at festivals and no patriotic poems are recited. Our schools and cultural institutes are not adorned with our national colors." This complaint is an admission that the Party has not won over young people with Communist slogans and has now found it necessary to appeal to their sense of national tradition.

Szakali also made other revealing complaints about the attitude of youth. He spoke about the alarming signs of "licentious behavior," lack of work discipline and indifference towards political problems. He also said that "sectarianism" was the greatest danger in DISZ organizations, implying that youth has also failed to follow New Course prescriptions.

Membership also has declined in the Hungarian Women's Democratic League. In contrast to 1,000,000 members in May 1952, the organization now numbers 560,000*—which means that within two years membership has decreased by almost 50 percent. This fact is especially significant since in 1952 Communist leaders spoke about increasing membership to 1.5 million. In discussing present efforts to expand the organization, Mrs. Istvan Vas, President of the League, declared:**

"We could not properly fulfill our mass organizational task because we failed to establish political and organizational forms which would have helped us keep in contact with the broadest masses of women. . . . In accordance with the Central Leadership decree issued on political work among women . . . we have started establishing organizations within plants; so far MND SZ organizations have been set up in 400 plants, 140 offices and 60 State Farms."

Membership in Trade Unions has increased from 1,800,000 in December 1953 to 1,913,000 in May 1954. The Pioneer organization now numbers 1,000,000 members as compared with 906,648 in June 1952, and the Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Society totals 1,302,514 members as compared with 798,325 in February 1951.*** However, complaints about work in Trade Unions and Pioneer organizations revealed that, despite increased membership, conditions remained highly unsatisfactory.

Party Changes

On June 28, 1953, prior to the announcement of the New Course, the Central Committee instituted several changes in Party structure in accordance with the Soviet "principle of collective leadership." A three-member Secretariat and a nine-member Politburo were appointed to take over Party leadership, and the post of Secretary Gen-

* *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), May 28, 1954.

** *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), May 29, 1954.

*** *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, Dec. 1953, *Szabad Nep*, June 19, 1952, *Szabad Ifjusag*, May 20, 1954, *Szabad Nep*, Feb. 26, 1951 and *Magyar Nemzet*, Feb. 15, 1954. After the Congress, on June 26, leadership of the Trade Unions was changed. Istvan Kristof, formerly head of the organization, was replaced by Jozsef Mekis, a candidate member of the Politburo. Kristof was appointed at the Congress to head the Supervision Committee of the Party.

* The People's Front is composed of all Communist mass organizations. Previously it also included allied political parties but now they have been eliminated.

** *Szabad Nep*, July 1, 1952.

*** *Szabad Nep*, May 26, 1954.

**** *Szabad Nep*, May 27, 1954.

eral was abolished. Matyas Rakosi, who had held this position, became First Secretary of the Central Committee. At the time these changes were made, some of Rakosi's closest associates lost their Party posts, and it seemed possible that the Rakosi clique was on the way out. But within a few weeks it became evident that Rakosi still was number one man in the Party. This was confirmed by the fact that on August 16, his colleague, Mihaly Farkas, was made a Politburo member and fourth member of the Secretariat. On October 31, Antal Apro was also added to the Politburo, and the press referred to Rakosi as First Party Secretary. In December, Jozsef Revai, another of Rakosi's friends, was made chief editor of the Party ideological review, *Tarsadalmi Szemle*. Aside from these changes, the principle of collective leadership was applied by removing Party leaders from chief government posts. Thus, on July 3, Imre Nagy took over the post of Premier, previously held by Rakosi, and it was Nagy who introduced the New Course.

On May 30, the last day of the Party Congress, the Politburo and Secretariat were again reorganized, favoring the original members of the Rakosi clique. The number of Politburo members was again reduced to nine, while the Secretariat was increased to five. Politburo members Istvan Kristof, Rudolf Foldvari and Mihaly Zsofinyecz were dropped and Bela Szalai was added as a new member. Janos Matolcsi was added to the Secretariat, and Matyas Rakosi was officially elected First Secretary of the Party. At the end of the Congress, the most important posts were held by the following persons:

First Secretary of the Central Committee: Matyas Rakosi; Politburo Members: Matyas Rakosi, Imre Nagy, Erno Gero, Mihaly Farkas, Lajos Acs, Istvan Hidas, Antal Apro, Andras Hegedus and Bela Szalai; Secretariat: Matyas Rakosi, Mihaly Farkas, Lajos Acs, Bela Veg, Janos Matolcsi; Chairman of the Central Control Committee: Karoly Kiss; Chairman of the Central Supervisory Committee: Istvan Kristof.

In the period between the Second and Third Party Congress—that is, between March 1951 and May 1954—26 members of the 71-member Central Committee were replaced. Party membership, including candidates, has increased by 2,493, although in proportion to the population it has decreased by 0.3 percent.* At present, there are 864,607 Party members (54,380 are candidates) as compared with 862,114 members (162,426 candidates) in 1951. The number of Party organizations has increased from 12,933 to 21,551; of these, 4,250 are basic agricultural associations as compared with 2,429 in 1951; kolkhoz basic organizations have increased from 1,681 to 3,122. Despite these increases, however, Party activity in rural areas has been very unsatisfactory, and the actual number of members of peasant origin has decreased since 1951.**

* In 1951, 9.4 percent of the population belonged to the party; in 1954, only 9.1 percent.

** From 15.4 percent in 1951, the percentage of peasants now members of the Party has decreased to 14.45. Workers have increased from 56.9 to 60.5. [Information derived from *Szabad Nep*, February 26, 28, 1951; and *Szabad Nep*, May 25, 28, 1954.]

As for Party purges, Rakosi said that between the two Congresses 20,000 candidates had been removed from Party ranks. On May 29, Karoly Kiss stated that the Control Committee had conducted investigations in the case of 2,187 members which had resulted in the expulsion of 1,128. Since this purge has taken place over a three year period, it cannot be called extensive, especially since it included the liquidation of the so-called Debrecen group (Gyula Kallai, Sandor Zold, Janos Kadar) in April-May 1951, and Gabor Peter, former head of the political Police (AVH), and his associates, in March 1954. However, in middle and lower party levels, a great number of functionaries lost their posts and became rank and file members in the 1954 spring elections. In certain instances, 50 percent of the officials were changed. Through these reorganizations, the Party hoped to re-establish order, put an end to the excesses of "petty kings" and establish collective leadership on lower and middle levels.

The Economic Front

The Hungarian New Course program has involved reduction of total investment funds and their redistribution based on increased allocations for light industry and agriculture. Chairman of the Planning Bureau Bela Szalai recently stated that the original 1953 investments were cut by two billion *forints*.* However, the yearly report by the Bureau of Statistics, published in *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), January 27, showed that the reduction actually amounted to 2.7 billion—that is, investments were reduced from 19,019,000,000 *forints* to 16,300,000,000. Of the total investments, 43.3 percent were originally allocated to heavy industry; in the New Course this figure was cut by two percent, and the 380 million *forints* released were allegedly used for "popular investments" and so-called labor protection. This small reduction did not represent any startling change.

Revisions for 1954 were more radical. On January 22, Bela Szalai, presenting the new plan to the National Assembly, stated that investments for the last year of the Five Year Plan would be reduced to 14 billion *forints* of which 24 percent—or more than 3.75 billion *forints*—would be devoted to agriculture. Szalai also said that compared with 1953, farm investments in 1954 will increase by 41.4 percent, social and cultural investments by 16-17 percent and housing projects by 45-46 percent. In contrast, last year's industrial investments are to be cut by 4 percent.

Industry

The 1954 plan also entails a rescaling of production targets: as compared with 1953, heavy industrial output will be cut by two percent, while production in the light and food industries will be increased by 16 percent. In specific

* Szalai's speech was printed in *Szabad Nep*, January 23, 1954. Other statistics given by Szalai appeared in the January 1954 *Tarsadalmi Szemle*.

sectors of heavy industry, however, increases are called for: coal production is expected to rise by 6.4 percent, electric power by 10.7 percent, aluminum by 19.2 percent and rolled steel by 5.9 percent. Production in the machine industry, on the other hand, is to be reduced by 3.1 percent.

On the basis of both Matyas Rakosi's speech to the Congress and the 1953 plan report, the following chart shows both announced production figures and plans for the most important manufactured goods.*

Goods	1949	1953	1953 Plan	Reduced 1954 Plan
Coal (million tons)	11.8	21.3	23.3	22.65
Electric power (billion kw)	2.5	4.6	5.6	5.1
Unrefined steel (thousand tons)	860	1,500	1,659	1,678
Pig iron (thousand tons)	398	760	918	861.4
Rolled steel (thousand tons)	471	840	—	891
Mineral oil (thousand tons)	497	830	—	1,118
Aluminum (thousand tons)	16.82	30	—	32
Cement (thousand tons)	552	1,100	1,800	1,100
Cotton fabric (million sq. meters)	167	209	270	220
Shoes (million pairs)	4.6	8.4	—	12.3
Sugar (thousand tons)	144.4	335	250	287
Tractors (thousands)	2.6	1.7	—	5.0

Further insight into Communist plans and achievements was provided by Rakosi when he stated that, as compared with 1938, industrial production in 1949 had increased by 137.5 percent, and that at the end of 1954 it will have increased threefold. Using 1949 as a base,** Rakosi said that 1954 industrial production will be 180 percent higher, with the following specific increases: mining by 109 percent, metallurgy by 140 percent, the chemical industry by as much as 200 percent and electric power by 120 percent. Increases in the food industry are expected to reach 160 percent and those of light industry 92 percent—a considerably lower rate of acceleration.

* *Szabad Nep*, January 27, 1954, and May 25, 1954.

** Rakosi also claimed that in 1951-53 industrial production increased by 73 percent and that the value of production increases was 37 billion forints—22.5 percent higher than the value of 1938 production. In this period, heavy industrial output increased by 118.8 percent, light industry by 40.7 percent, and the food industry by 63.2 percent. In the first four years of the accelerated Five Year Plan (1950-53), Hungarian industry produced almost 700,000 bicycles, 50,000 motorcycles, almost 600,000 radio receivers, 100,000 sewing machines, 11,000 tractors, 3,000 busses and 2,500 harvesting-threshing machines.



Title: Oh, Quality!

Caption: "And how do you like this pattern, Ma'am?"

"Why it's all lopsided!"

"So what. This will be the fashion... I have 10,000 bolts of it."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), May 6, 1954

Rakosi cited other proof of alleged regime accomplishments. He said that, in the last five years, Hungary had started producing transportation, mining, and construction machines as well as cranes, trucks, busses and machine tools never before produced in the country. Further, the chemical industry is supposedly growing rapidly and penicillin production has apparently been started. Within the past five years, Rakosi pointed out, 65 new, large-scale industrial enterprises have been established and 84 enterprises expanded, in addition to smaller reconstruction and modernization projects. Included among the regime's claims with respect to recent construction projects are two bauxite plants, a dairy plant, two cold storage plants, a modern bakery and a huge sports stadium in Budapest. In 1954, the regime expects to put into operation a huge blast furnace at the Stalin Iron Works, and to complete the Tisza-lök Dam, which will make possible the irrigation of almost 22-25,000 acres of rice fields in the Hungarian Great Plains. The Communists also hope to expand the Petu Nitrogen Works, which are an important factor in war production, and to start work at the Szolnok straw-cellulose factory to improve the paper supply.

In terms of quantity, Communist industrial achievements

appear to be impressive, particularly the gains in mineral oil, aluminum and sugar production. These accomplishments, however, were achieved at a high human and economic price: the entire economy became seriously unbalanced, agriculture deteriorated, the living standard took a sharp drop, and, as a result, worker and peasant resistance mounted. Sabotage in agriculture was frequent and in industry, job-hopping, absenteeism, waste and poor quality production hampered regime plans. Further, rapid industrialization led to near exhaustion of the raw material base. At the Party Congress, Minister of Heavy Industry Istvan Hidas emphasized that there was an insufficient supply of electric power and coal. "Coal mining," he said, "is now one of the most backward branches of our industry."* The present coal crisis has forced the regime to declare cuts in power consumption and, for the past nine months, the extremely poor quality of the coal mined has been the subject of constant press complaints.

A revealing clue to regime problems is the current campaign to increase productivity and cut production costs. In view of raw material shortages and limited investment funds, the Communists need improved production to meet plan targets. Many speakers at the Congress underscored the importance of eliminating waste and deplored "excessive" wage expenditures, extravagant use of men, money and materials and the high percentage of production rejects. Even more striking were complaints that productivity had taken a sudden drop in the first months of 1954.

This trend obviously indicates that the New Course has not produced the expected psychological spur for either workers or managers. Probably for this reason, Matyas Rakosi saw fit to warn the Congress that further price reductions will depend chiefly on increased work and wage discipline. He said that the economy was characterized by overcentralization, and that many workers found it more lucrative to produce large quantities of defective items than small quantities of high quality goods. Obviously, the blame for both these shortcomings must be attributed to Communist planning, and it is difficult to see how the situation can be remedied unless the Communists revise their wage and incentive systems.**

Wasteful production was also bitterly condemned by First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Erno Gero, who was economic dictator of Hungary until 1953. Gero claimed that in 1953 productivity in the manufacturing industry hardly showed any increase and that in the light and food industries it actually decreased. He also stated that in the first quarter of 1954 productivity showed a drop when compared to the same period in 1953:***

"... During the first quarter of 1954 the value of production per worker was 6.6 percent lower than during the same period in 1953, while the average wage in-

creased by 15.6 percent. . . . During the second half of 1953 and the first quarter of 1954—that is, in the past nine months—the wage base was exceeded by 830 million *forints*. In the same period, production costs in industry were not lowered; in fact, they increased slightly."

Gero also urged greater economy in the use of imported materials, stating that "for the time being we import 30 percent of the coke used in our foundries, 95 percent of our cotton, 70 percent of our woollens and 60-65 percent of rawhide, 75 percent of our pinewood and all of our rubber and ferrous metals. Planning Bureau Chairman Bela Szalai also denounced rising production costs in a pre-Congress article in the May 9 *Szabad Nep*, reporting that in 1953 actual production savings amounted to only 0.9 percent instead of the proposed 2.9 percent, and that in the first quarter of 1954 State enterprises had incurred a debt of 400 million *forints*, having failed to meet goals for cutting manufacturing costs.

"In the iron smelting industry, production costs exceeded the plan by 13.2 percent and in the coal industry by seven percent. . . . Irresponsible handling of raw materials causes serious damage. . . . There is waste in rolled metals and steel at a time when there is a serious shortage of rolled steel. . . . State funds are handled in a shockingly wasteful manner in various industrial, transportation and commercial enterprises, as well as State farms. . . . In 1953, the industrial inventory was short by about 100 million *forints*, and in various other economic branches by about 250 million *forints*. . . . Inventories are particularly short on State farms. . . . In addition to the cost of material . . . another significant factor is wages. . . . During the first quarter of 1954, the percentage of industrial wages increased as compared with production value. One serious reason for this is that productivity has not increased sufficiently. . . . In addition, industrial enterprises paid out in wages 121 million *forints* in January, 111 million *forints* in February, and 42 million *forints* in March, for work actually not performed."

That high production costs have become a serious problem is evident from statements by numerous Communist leaders. Not least among the difficulties created by hasty production, worker apathy, managerial negligence and "liberalism" is the fact that, as Szalai pointed out, "expensively produced goods must be sold at a loss on foreign markets." Whether the regime will succeed in its campaign to cut production costs remains to be seen; at present it is clear, however, that the New Course has not stimulated Hungarian workers to raise individual productivity to the Party's satisfaction.

Agriculture

The discussion on agricultural problems at the Third Party Congress revealed a far from satisfactory situation, despite the series of New Course measures and plans devised to overcome seriously inadequate farm output. Although it probably would be premature to state conclusively that the New Course program has boomeranged,

* *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), May 27, 1954.

** *Szabad Nep*, May 25, 1954. Rakosi also said that in the three years since the Second Congress productivity had increased by 27 percent, while production costs had been cut by only eight percent.

*** *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), May 27, 1954.

continued and growing difficulties show that so far it has met with little, if any, success. The Congress confirmed earlier reports of failures in livestock breeding, deficient crop cultivation and the reluctance of small and middle peasants to fulfill delivery quotas or pay taxes. It also provided insight into the extent of last year's hurried kolkhoz dissolution and confirmed once again that neither "kulak" activity nor friction between collectives and independent farms had ceased.

These problems can be understood more clearly when seen against the background of New Course policies and aims.* In its broad outlines, the regime's program has been to permit but discourage decollectivization, to denounce forcible collectivization and to win over the middle peasantry. Concessions have included a new delivery system which established certain quota reductions and set norms for several years in advance so that peasants would not be discouraged by sudden shifts in regime demands. The new policy also has included a new contract purchase system for industrial crops, which allegedly will increase the income of working peasants by 81 million *forints*. In addition, the regime has passed several decrees to stimulate animal breeding,** has granted credits to kolkhozes and kolkhoz members for construction of homes and purchase of livestock, and has cancelled delivery arrears for the economic year 1952-53. Aside from the bonuses, delivery exemptions and other incentives given contract producers, the Communists have continued to permit the sale of surplus produce on the free market, probably with the aim of insuring a supply of foodstuffs to urban centers.

In implementing their new farm policy the Communists have tried to draw a sharp line between middle peasants and kulaks*** with the aim of isolating the latter. While the new policy towards the independent peasantry appears to be more liberal in Hungary than elsewhere in the orbit, the attitude towards kulaks seems to be slightly more restrictive—as evidenced by a decree making kulak quota deliveries higher than those of other independent peasants. The reasons for this comparative harshness may be that the Hungarian program of conciliating middle peasants increases the threat of their "kulakization." In any event, the regime has acknowledged that the middle peasant is the central factor in farm production. On November 3, 1953, Radio Budapest pointed out that nearly 50 percent of individually-owned land was in middle peasant hands, and that in 1952 they delivered 60 percent of all marketed cereals.

* For a detailed discussion of Hungarian agriculture see April 1954 issue, pp. 23-25.

** See April 1954 issue, p. 31; August 1953 issue, p. 48; September 1953 issue, p. 23; October 1953 issue, pp. 13-16; and November 1953 issue, p. 6.

*** See April 1954 issue, pp. 27-29. Technically, a middle peasant is a non-collectivized farmer owning 10-25 cadastral acres and employing no help outside of his immediate family. In Hungary, a kulak is, roughly speaking, an independent farmer owning more than 25 cadastral acres and/or employing workers other than his immediate family. Recently, however, some attempt has been made to raise the 25 cadastral acre limit so that some farmers who previously were considered kulaks can now be considered middle peasants.



Title: Where Tractor Drivers Are Not Well-Trained.

Caption: "Why do you drive zigzag?"

"Because I was trained in one of those lightning training schools."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), March 25, 1954

Even more significant are regime figures* showing that, for the past few years, independent farms have produced more, proportionately, than kolkhozes. The New Course concessions, however, have favored collectives over private farms, in an effort to make kolkhoz farming more attractive to the peasantry; further, despite the regime's present tolerance of independent farming, it has been emphasized that collectivization remains the Party's permanent goal.

With regard to farm investments, *Szabad Fold* (Budapest), December 27, 1953, claimed that within the next three years some 12-13 billion *forints* would be spent on developing agriculture, and Chairman of the Planning Office Bela Szalai announced on January 22 that: "Agricultural investments will be increased to 24 percent of total investment allocations—that is, twice that of last year's percentage." Although these measures show that greater emphasis is being placed on agriculture, it should be pointed out that the farm budget amounts to slightly less than six percent of the total budgetary expenditure, and that this percentage includes substantial investments in agricultural industry.

Taking into account regime concessions and increased investments, reports at the Congress indicated that results so far have been disappointing. Speakers Andras Hegedus, Rudolf Kovacs and Mihaly Komocsin complained that animal breeding and fodder production were lagging behind schedule, and that poor fodder prospects meant that increasing consumer demands could not be met.** The meat shortage was discussed extensively, and even First Deputy Prime Minister Erno Gero, who devoted only a small part of his speech to agriculture, underscored the importance of increasing meat supplies, particularly those of

* April 1954 issue, p. 25.

** *Szabad Nep*, May 28, 29, 1954.

pork and lard. District Party Committee Secretary Laszlo Torok blamed the pork shortage on speculators who had bought up available supplies to sell on the black market, and announced that a number of middlemen had been arrested.* Other speakers urged peasants to intensify hog breeding and improve low milk yields. These complaints indicated that the New Course measures to boost livestock production have not improved conditions to the degree anticipated.

That independent peasants have not been won over by the regime was revealed by admissions of failures in compulsory deliveries. Matyas Rakosi complained that the "peasantry's citizenship is lax," and Mihaly Farkas, taking the same line, said that "the duties of citizens are not observed in rural areas." While Laszlo Torok explained that peasants can purchase much more in the New Course than they could previously and therefore should have no difficulties in meeting their tax and delivery obligations, Mihaly Komocsin outlined methods of encouraging peasants to pay taxes and meet deliveries. Minister of Agriculture Andras Hegedus blamed the peasantry's unsatisfactory attitude on "harmful kulak influence," and kolkhoz President Pal Losonczi complained that often collective peasants retained for their private use plots which were larger than the size permitted in kolkhoz by-laws.

These difficulties assume even greater significance in the light of both attacks against kulaks and assertions about future collectivization. Matyas Rakosi made Party plans crystal-clear when he said that "sooner or later the middle peasantry will join kolkhozes."** Minister of Light Industry Arpad Kiss declared that kolkhozes had by no means lost their significance and were even more important than hitherto, while Andras Hegedus pointed out that small farms hampered intensive production. "We cannot," he

said, "give up the idea of the Socialist reorganization of agriculture," and in so far as collective farming is concerned, "we must follow a road which assures not only partial but complete implementation of our Party's policy."

With regard to kulaks, the Congress adopted a sharper tone than that used earlier in the New Course. Prime Minister Nagy took exception to the "uncertain attitude concerning the kulak issue," and delegate Mrs. Imre Juhasz complained that "the authority of the proletarian dictatorship has not made itself felt. As a result kulaks have become impertinent."* Similar remarks were made by other speakers who implied that kulaks were responsible for peasant resistance and failures in the New Course program. It seems clear that the regime will now deal more harshly with "rich" peasants.

Peasant Resistance

The extent of peasant resistance can be estimated partly by regime figures on the extent of kolkhoz dissolution. According to statistics made public by Minister of Agriculture Hegedus and published in *Szabad Nep*, December 30, 1953, there were then 4,677 kolkhozes in the country, comprising a total of 263,070 members: "Some 20 percent of the nation's arable land is in kolkhoz hands. In addition, some 500 State farms have been formed and 13 percent of the arable land belongs to them." Thus, at the end of 1953, six months after the New Course was announced, 33 percent of Hungarian arable land belonged to the collectivized sector. If these figures are compared with statistics quoted by Matyas Rakosi on December 15, 1952 and May 16, 1953, it appears that 43 percent of the kolkhoz members have quit since the New Course was announced and that 12 percent of the existing kolkhozes have been dissolved.** Rakosi maintained in his pre-New Course speeches that there were 457,000 kolkhozniks; thus, on the basis of Hegedus' subsequent figures, it seems that 193,930 farmers have abandoned the kolkhozes. The striking disproportion between the percentage of farms dissolved and the percentage of departing kolkhozniks may be explained by the fact that the majority of members who quit were poor peasants who had contributed small plots; for this reason, the regime was more willing to release them. Further, the property of many peasants leaving kolkhozes was forcibly withheld, a situation which, according to press reports, has created much friction in rural areas.

The latest figures on collectivization were furnished by Matyas Rakosi at the Party Congress. According to *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), May 25, he said: "At present 18 percent of the country's arable land is united in kolkhozes. Thus the total area of their arable lands exceeds 1.7 million cadastral acres. A total of 200,000 families belong to kolkhozes and the number of members exceeds 250,000. At present, some 30 percent of the kolkhozniks are middle

* *Szabad Nep*, May 26, 1954.

** These statements were printed in *Szabad Nep*, May 25, 26, and 30.



Title: Perhaps This Will Make It Go.

Caption: "Hey, sonny, go to the pharmacy and get us some castor oil. Maybe that will make this thing go."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), March 25, 1954

* *Szabad Nep*, May 29 and 30.

** In the October-November *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), Rakosi said that only 10 percent of the kolkhozes had been dissolved. Either the number increased after his report or his figures were inaccurate. The other Rakosi figures were reported in *Szabad Nep*, December 16, 1952 and May 16, 1953.

peasants." These figures are illuminating in view of the fact that the Party press recently has reported that there are more than 20,000 new kolkhoz members. This would indicate that the number of members who quit was larger than Hegedus admitted last December. If 20,000 new members are added to the 263,000 mentioned by Hegedus, it would seem that there are some 30,000 more kolkhoz members than Rakosi stated on May 24. It seems likely, therefore, that about 50 percent—and not 43 percent—of collective farmers left the kolkhozes in the past year.

Other information made public by Leonard Gabor on April 12 and Andras Hegedus on May 29, showed that 50 percent of the country's arable land is in the hands of independent small and middle peasants. The percentage of gardens and vineyards owned by the independent peasant is undoubtedly even larger. Further, the 50 percent does not include kulak farms which, according to *Szabad Nep*, November 13, 1953, occupy about seven percent of the nation's arable land. From these reports it is clear that more than two-thirds of the nation's cultivated land is owned by independent peasants and, judging from their recent activities, inducing them to join collectives will be a difficult process. The collectivized area is now about 18 percent as compared with the pre-New Course figure of 26.6 percent—a substantial decrease in the "Socialized" sector.

Surprisingly little was said at the Congress about farm mechanization. No new figures were given on the number of tractors and other farm machines produced, so it is probable that New Course achievements have been nothing to brag about. Rudolf Kovacs enthusiastically announced that "in the first quarter of the year peasants in one county bought 278 farm machines which, in former years, had not aroused their interest." These machines were most likely small farm tools, and in any event, the figure given by Kovacs hardly warrants mention. As for other aspects of the farm problem, Minister of Agriculture Hegedus practiced self-criticism at the Congress with respect to work done in his ministry. He said that bureaucracy prevailed and the work standard was low. Mrs. Imre Juhasz confirmed this by stating that the ministry was "over-bureaucratized" and that it was necessary for agricultural experts to participate directly in guiding farm production. For the past year the regime has conducted a campaign to transfer technicians to rural areas. According to Rakosi, 800 farm experts have already been transferred and by the end of June the Party hopes that the number will reach 1,000.

Living Standard

Concessions in the living standard have involved both price reductions and pay rises. The first price reduction was decreed on September 5, 1953, resulting in about a ten percent decrease in the cost of such items as sugar, coffee, bread, flour, beef, pork, lard, rice, milk, butter, eggs, sugar, coffee, potatoes, dried beans and cabbage.* Another reduction, decreed on March 14, lowered the prices of meat and fat by 10-15 percent. The items af-

Versenytársak



Tyúk: Nézze Juliska néni, ha én ülök a tojásán, abból csirke lesz, de ha maga ül rá, abból lemaradás lesz...

Title: Competitors.

Caption: The hen: "Look here, Julie, when I sit on the eggs, there are chicks to show for it. But when you sit on them, then you fail to deliver your quotas."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), May 6, 1954

affected included cooking fat, margarine, pork cutlets, beef-steak, stewing beef, veal, various kinds of sausages, cooked ham, bacon, salami and canned meat. The yearly savings to the people was estimated at 500 million *forints*.^{*} Actual improvements in the living standard, however, will depend chiefly on the quantity and quality of goods made available to the public. Many of the items listed above are reported to be scarce, and the majority of citizens have been unable to purchase them for some time. It is likely that in order to boost popular morale, the regime will release some of its food stockpiles, although these supplies cannot be expected to last indefinitely. Further, even with the price cuts, food is still considerably more expensive than it was in 1949. The average worker with a salary of about 800 *forints* still must pay 26-27 *forints* for a kilo of pork and a kilo of rice costs 22-26 *forints*, while in 1949 the same amount could be purchased for 8.6 *forints*.

With regard to salaries, the regime raised the wages of coal miners by 10 percent in July 1953, and in February 1954 decreed a general wage increase of 10 percent which, according to *Szabad Nep*, February 25, affected workers in blast furnaces, rolling mills and the electric power industry, as well as janitors, watchmen, cleaning women, etc. About 350,000 workers, especially those in low income brackets, benefited from these measures. Earlier, in September 1953, the regime took another step to raise the living standard by decreasing the amount workers had to pledge for the compulsory Peace Loan. Prior to the New Course, a worker had to contribute one month's wages, which was a large levy on his income. With the New Course this amount has been cut in half. Erno Gero, in his speech to the Congress, estimated that workers' wages had been raised by 15.6 percent under the new program, which means that concessions with respect to the Peace Loan amounted to about five percent.

* See October 1953 issue, pp. 19-20.

* See May 1954 issue, p. 54. Radio Budapest, March 13, 1954.

Taking into account both wage increases and price cuts, the Hungarian living standard is still far from satisfactory. The following table, for example, shows what percentage of their salaries various categories of workers must pay for food per month if they purchase a weekly food basket costing 91.53 *forints* and containing 2.80 kg. of bread, .50 kg. of flour, .17 kg. of butter, .45 kg. of veal, .20 kg. each of beef, rice and noodles, 1.50 kg. of potatoes, .45 kg. of sugar, .10 kg. each of cheese, peas and beans, and 2.4 litres of milk and 3.5 egg: (The price of the food basket for a 31 day month is 405.33 *forints*)

Food and Wage Scales

Type of Wage Earner	Average Monthly Wages	Percentage of Salary for Monthly Food Basket
Unskilled Day Laborer	750	53.57
Average Industrial Worker...	800	50.66
Semi-skilled Worker	850	47.68
Semi-skilled Iron and Metal Worker	850	47.68
Skilled Iron and Metal Worker	1200	33.77
Miner	1250	32.42
Stakhanovite	2000	20.26
Privileged Functionary	3000	13.51

In September 1953, the regime also decreed a 10-15 percent decrease in the prices of clothing. On the basis of these reductions, a man's shirt now costs 70 *forints*, a man's suit (factory-made) 650 *forints* and the cheapest quality men's shoes 200 *forints*. Handsome shoes cost 460 *forints* and a tailored suit about 1,350 *forints*.* In other words, prices are still exorbitantly high.

Patterns and Prospects

The Third Party Congress was both clue to and confirmation of the blackspots on the Communist horizon. It supplied detailed information showing that workers, peasants, Party members and economic officials had neither been appeased nor inspired by the New Course and that the concrete goals of mobilizing the Party, and attaining a sharp upswing in farm production and a more efficient, better quality production had not been reached. It was therefore not surprising that the Communists struck sharper notes at the Congress than at any time in the past year.

The conclusions to be drawn from Congress speeches are that the Party will assume a more powerful role than hitherto and that attempts to achieve discipline within the Party and State administration will be intensified. As Rakosi put it, "He who does not understand the Party's program, who does not carry out Party resolutions, has no place within the Party or State machine," emphasizing that

* On the official rate of exchange 11.80 *forints* are equivalent to \$1. On the black market, 50 *forints* are equivalent to \$1. Another interesting point with respect to the above statistics is that according to the "Family Statistical Returns" of the 1949 Population Census, the average worker's family consists of three members, and every wage earner has 1.4 dependents.



Title: What Is Missing in This Picture?

Caption: The stove! However, not only in the picture, but also in the hardware stores.

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), April 29, 1954

the regime will no longer tolerate lax discipline and "sec-tarianism" within Party and government ranks. Further, the establishment of Party groups within local councils, the Women's League, railroad agencies and other sectors point to greater Party influence over production and mass organizational work.

Perhaps one of the chief reasons for the sterner tone of regime leaders is the failure of the New Course farm program—a fact amply documented at the Congress and in the regime press. Despite the numerous concessions granted to the independent peasantry, the past year has brought no upsurge in farm production. The middle peasant has not been induced to bring more goods to market, and no improvement is discernible with regard to deliveries and tax fulfillments. Moreover, peasant resistance is still intense, and dissolution of kolkhozes has disrupted the agricultural sector. While the Communists gave sufficient proof at the Congress that they still intend to pursue the main lines of what they choose to call the NEP policy—that is, to woo the middle peasantry, ostensibly promote freer marketing and increase farm investments—the Congress witnessed greater severity towards "rich farmers" and a renewed emphasis on the goal of collectivization. It therefore seems doubtful that within its present limits the New Course farm program will remedy conditions to the

degree the Party requires: in terms of their long-range goals, the Communists will not permit any extensive degree of liberalization and probably have gone about as far as they intend to go in order to appease farmers; further, adequate mechanization will take some time, and it is unlikely that the amount of farm investments—even with the present increases—will be sufficient to accomplish regime plans.

With regard to industry, the New Course program has proved no more successful. Production targets are still high, and continued emphasis on "Socialist competitions," adherence to the wage base and intensified labor discipline probably has had the effect of making the worker no more cooperative than hitherto. By lowering production targets the regime could probably have raised worker productivity and obtained better quality goods; however, within the scope of its present plans, there is little evidence to show that radical improvement can be expected in the near future.

For the next year and a half the Communists apparently plan to devote all their energies to eliminating weak spots. Although the Five Year Plan ends in December 1954, a new Five Year Plan will not be launched until 1956, and the year 1955 will be used for "preparations." According to Rakosi, the new Five Year Plan will be placed under the supervision of Moscow's Komekon (Council for Mu-

tual Economic Aid), which will coordinate all the Satellite economies. The key feature of the new Five Year Plan will be "greater emphasis on consumer goods and foods." Previous to the Congress, Rakosi, Hegedus and other Communist leaders had indicated that the new program would be followed for only two or three years. This latest decision suggests that the Communists have realized that restoring their economy will be a long, slow process.

The harsher tone of the Congress indicates that the fear of "liberalization" and the snowball tendency of the new policies are things which haunt the Hungarian Politburo. In this regard, the campaign against bureaucracy is the key: for it must become a campaign against the *bureaucracy* if the New Course is to be effective, just as the New Course must become a campaign against Communist authoritarianism if it is to achieve what the Party leadership dictates, but no Communist State power will submit itself to any such thorough-going changes. Further, after a year of concessions, whether the Party leadership can, at will, either channel, restrict, or reverse the new economic, political and social forces released by the New Course remains the major question; that it is the Communist desire is obvious.

No Applause

Following the example set by their Moscow masters, the Hungarian Communist leaders promptly introduced the "fight against the cult of personality." The audience of one Communist speaker interpreted this literally by observing a deathlike silence after the lecture. When one Party bigwig called upon the audience to applaud, he got the following answer: "We are not going to pursue the personality cult."

This led *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), April 24, to warn audiences at Communist Party meetings not to exaggerate the situation. The paper stated that "it is too bad for Party members not to dare to applaud at Party meetings for fear of being accused of 'pursuing the personality cult.'"

Sovroms

"The Sovroms represent one of the most direct forms of the immense and multilateral aid which the Soviet Union and Comrade Stalin personally are granting us for the liquidation of our economic backwardness and the building of a powerful Socialist industry—the foundation of our national independence and the growth of the material and cultural well being of our workers. . . . Through the Sovroms, the Soviet economy—the most advanced in the world—passes to all our enterprises its victorious experience in the superior organization of production and in the wise management of enterprises."

Scinteia (Bucharest), May 22, 1951

ONE OF the cleverest and most insidious methods of Soviet conquest and one of the most barefaced examples—even by Leninist definition—of imperialism in practice is the Soviet system of "joint stock" or "mixed enterprises" introduced by the USSR into the captive countries of Eastern Europe immediately following World War II. Taking advantage of the Red Army's presence in the area, and using some of these nations' participation as Axis partners for a pretext, the Soviet Union seized assets which permitted it to become overtly half-owner of various important companies in Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, and covertly gave it complete control of these companies, their operation and production. At first, it appeared that this was a temporary, if rough-and-ready, expedient for extorting materials to help repair Soviet war damages, but the system has been continued and provided the USSR with not only another method of revenge and economic exploitation of its empire—under the guises of "reparations" and "brotherly concern"—but with still another method of political control of the countries in its grip.

The first "joint stock" companies made their appearance in these three countries following broad agreements of economic collaboration signed with the USSR in 1945. The "mixed enterprises" supposedly were to be run on a fifty-fifty basis, with each partner making equal contributions and having an equal share in management and profits. The Soviets, however, assumed complete charge of the joint companies and conducted operations for their own particular benefit. The USSR's "contributions" to the enterprises consisted of former German or Satellite properties it had acquired as requisitions, reparations, or as a result of the Potsdam Agreement—liberally interpreted and arbitrarily enforced by the Soviet Union. At the Potsdam meeting in July-August 1945, it had been agreed that the US and Great Britain would renounce their claims to German and Italian assets in former enemy countries in Eastern

Europe in favor of the USSR.* These assets, however, were to remain the legal property of the Allied Control Council, which would decide what constituted "German assets" and transfer them to the Soviet Union. No such transfers have been made to date, and consequently the US has not recognized Soviet legal title to the assets seized. Nevertheless, the Soviets took possession of them and, through the establishment of "joint enterprises," managed to acquire holdings in Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria exceeding by far the value of former German assets.

In order to increase the value of its holdings, the Soviet Union developed a system of overestimating the worth of its own contributions to the joint enterprises and under assessing those of the local partner.** Further, the Soviet authorities refused to recognize liabilities incurred by former German owners, while demanding payment of accounts receivable. For example, Hungary had to pay the USSR \$45 million in settlement of the clearing debt to Germany, despite the fact that German debts to Hungary—which were waived by the latter under the terms of the Peace Treaty—were far greater than Hungarian debts to Germany. A large proportion of these payments was utilized by the USSR to obtain control over the huge "joint enterprises" in Eastern Europe.

Special Status

Immediately after the establishment of the "joint companies" it became obvious that they enjoyed a privileged position and that "part" Soviet ownership carried with it extraordinary rights which permitted the USSR to take

* In return, the Soviet Union relinquished its claims to German and Italian assets in West Germany and other enemy countries not occupied by the Red Army.

** Soviet experts were responsible for all evaluations.

the cream off the Satellite economies. Not only were the "mixed enterprises" managed and staffed by Soviet personnel subject to orders from Moscow, but they also were exempted from taxes and customs and granted extra-territorial status. The nationalization decrees passed by the Satellite governments, for instance, did not affect companies in which the USSR shared ownership. According to Article 5 of the 1948 Romanian nationalization law, the properties of a state "which is a member of the United Nations and which has acquired property as a result of the execution of the Peace Treaty or through payment of some of the obligations resulting from a state of war," could not be expropriated. Under this definition, applicable only to the Soviet Union, a situation was created whereby the only remaining un-nationalized foreign interests in Romania were owned by the USSR.

At present, the joint companies exercise a quasi-monopoly in major economic fields. Wherever domestic companies still exist alongside joint enterprises, special clauses in Soviet-Satellite agreements effectively throttle their operations and assure a dominant position to Soviet-operated organizations. On the domestic market, price concessions permit "joint companies" to sell at high prices and purchase at low prices. They also enjoy highly advantageous privileges with regard to labor regulations, organization, supply and all matters affecting their efficiency. It is not surprising that under such conditions Soviet-dominated companies have been able to out-produce domestic enterprises, which are hampered by lack of equipment as well as by bureaucratic red tape.

Ever since the end of the Second World War, Soviet "assistance" to Eastern Europe in the form of capital goods and raw materials has been widely publicized by Communist spokesmen. What Satellite propagandists have failed to mention is that a large proportion of Soviet exports to Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria go to the joint enterprises. While these supplies are paid for in commodities by the importing country, the goods produced by the joint companies are controlled by the USSR and, in many instances, are sold abroad on Soviet account. Regardless of the stringent foreign exchange control regulations in effect in all Satellite countries, "joint enterprises" are given authorization for virtually limitless exports to free currency markets and are free to use the proceeds for importing equipment. Furthermore, the local government concerned in the "joint enterprises" must assure them allocations of raw materials on a highly preferential basis. In cases where imports of materials from free currency areas are required, the local governments must deposit equivalent sums in their national currencies to the Soviet account. Under such conditions, Soviet "aid" not only has reduced the local government's revenue by removing a large sector of the economy from taxation, but it also has deprived the countries thus "helped" of badly-needed foreign exchange.

Yugoslavia

A clear picture of the Soviet role in the "joint stock companies" was provided by the Yugoslav government after Tito's break with the Cominform in 1948. Prior to this

time, two "joint companies" had made their appearance in Yugoslavia—the *Juspad* for river navigation, and the *Justa* for civil aviation. Both companies were liquidated after the split and the Titoist press then issued a barrage of complaints against these enterprises. The Yugoslav government declared, for instance, that the two companies, instead of being joint ventures, were completely dominated by the USSR. The director of *Justa* was to be a Soviet citizen responsible only to an administrative committee set up by the two countries. This body, however, convened only once a year and the Soviet director was, in fact, free to make and enforce decisions dictated by Moscow. The Soviet version of "equality" also was introduced in the evaluation of contributions. Soviet contributions were assessed far above their actual worth, while those of Yugoslavia were greatly undervalued. Thus, old LI-2 aircraft contributed by the Soviets were valued at 4.5 million *dinars* although they were worth less even when new. When the company was liquidated, the USSR demanded seven million *dinars* for the same planes. An airfield to be built by the Yugoslavs, on the other hand, was valued by the Soviets at 71 million *dinars*, although the Yugoslavs estimated that it would cost them at least one billion *dinars* to construct it.

The Yugoslav press also complained that the "mixed company" *Justa* had appropriated the most profitable air lines, including air connections with foreign countries, while the least profitable lines were assigned to the domestic Yugoslav aviation company, *Jat*. *Justa* not only collected airport taxes rightfully claimed by the Yugoslav government but also insisted that *Jat* pay such taxes for the use of Yugoslav airports. Further, the Yugoslav government claimed that *Juspad* charged high prices for shipping Yugoslav goods and low prices for those of the USSR and Soviet-operated organizations. The Yugoslavs further stated that after the company was liquidated Soviet officials dismantled and carried away machinery and shipyard equipment which had been contributed by the Yugoslavs.

Sovroms in the Orbit

The same tactics have been applied by the Soviet Union in Hungary, Bulgaria, and especially Romania, where "joint companies," or Sovroms, are firmly entrenched in all key sectors of the economy. With vital areas of production removed from its jurisdiction and a large amount of personnel primarily responsible to Moscow, the Romanian government's authority has been greatly circumscribed in the years since the Communists took power. To date, sixteen joint companies are known to have been established in Romania: *Sovrompetrol* in the oil industry; *Sovromtransport* for river transportation and shipbuilding; *Tars* for civil aviation; *Sovrombanc* in finance; *Sovromlemn* in forestry; *Sovromgaz* in the methane gas industry; *Sovromcarbune* in the coal industry; *Sovromchim* in the chemical industry; *Sovromconstructie* in the building industry; *Sovrommetal* and *Sovromtractor* in heavy industry; *Sovromfilm* in the movie industry; *Sovromasigurare* in insurance; *Sovrom Utilaj Petrolifer* and *Sovromnaval* for crude oil processing and shipbuilding and repairs, respectively; and *Sovromquartz* for uranium.

The Groundwork

The groundwork for the establishment of Sovroms was prepared by Nazi Germany, which, during the Second World War, took over stocks and shares in Romanian oil companies owned by the French, Dutch and Belgians. Probably with an eye on these assets, the Soviet Union began economic "negotiations" with Romania even before the Potsdam Conference opened. On May 8, 1945, the new Romanian Minister of Finance in the Groza government, installed by Vishinsky, signed a treaty for economic collaboration with the USSR—a treaty concluded at a time when Romania was still technically at war with the Allied Powers and subject to the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Commission set up by the Armistice Convention. The treaty was formulated with the aim of "promoting and developing the possibilities of Romanian production on the one hand, and the commercial interests of the USSR on the other."*

It provided for the use of "USSR technical services and capital" to increase "Romanian activities in the fields of agriculture, industry, transport and banking." The treaty also contained provisions which indicated the Soviet Union's interest in Romanian mineral deposits and forests, as well as in its Danubian and maritime commercial fleet. The participation of the USSR was to take the form of "machinery and goods likely to increase the output of the various branches of Romanian economy and methods of payment which would permit the acquisition of such machinery and goods wherever they can be acquired." The treaty was said to have been drafted on the basis of "Romania's present economic situation and the extraordinary obligations with which [she] will be confronted for some time to come"—that is economic obligations imposed by the Soviet Union through the Armistice Convention.

The protocol signed in Moscow on May 8, 1945, stipulated that Soviet-Romanian "cooperation" would be expressed through the establishment of "joint companies" in which both governments allegedly would have an equal share in management. The Romanian government was to put up 50 percent of the capital according to estimates made by Soviet experts, and the Kremlin would join the companies with its recently acquired war assets.** Further, the Romanian government pledged to waive its right to taxes, assessments, customs or duties, and to give the mixed companies preferential treatment.

On the basis of this agreement, a convention was signed in Bucharest on July 17, 1945 (the opening day of the Potsdam Conference) setting up the first Sovrom.*** The

* This treaty was never published officially either in the USSR or Romania though it was referred to in *Monitorul Oficial* of June 15, 1945. The text was made public by Romanian emigres.

** In a September 23, 1946, statement W. M. Thorp, US delegate at the Paris Peace Conference, said that the assets located in Romania and awarded to Russia by the Potsdam Agreement were estimated at \$300 million, or about 35 percent of the country's industrial and financial companies. The loss to Romania was even greater as she still had more than \$350 million of outstanding accounts which the Nazi government had not paid.

*** *Monitorul Oficial* (Bucharest) # 186, August 17, 1945, and # 243, December 24, 1945.

new company was called *Sovrompetrol* and its capital was established at five billion *lei*. The Soviet contribution consisted of 740,300,000 *lei* worth of equipment and supplies, and eleven oil companies valued at 1,759,700,000 *lei*. Most of the equipment was taken from the Romano-Americana company, a subsidiary of Standard Oil, whose supplies were confiscated by the Soviets as war booty. At least two of the oil companies, valued by the Soviets at 1,080,000,000 *lei* and producing about 23.21 percent of Romanian oil in 1939, were claimed by the French, Belgian and Dutch governments as property of their nationals whose stock was forcibly sold to or confiscated by the Nazis during the war. Despite repeated protests, however, neither the Soviet nor the Romanian government took any steps to examine these claims.

The Romanian contribution to the company consisted partly of two oil companies, *Creditul Minier* and *Rede-venta*, valued by the Soviets at 700 million and 400 million *lei* respectively. Both companies were forced to join the Sovrom without their shareholders being consulted, that is, through the arbitrary procedure of having a government-appointed representative sign the agreement for them. The remainder of the Romanian contribution was composed of oil fields which the regime had appropriated, and 50 percent of the government's royalties in crude oil which it exacted from private owners. According to *Monitorul Oficial* of March 18, 1948, this percentage was raised to 100 percent in February 1948 on the basis of new estimates compiled by Soviet experts, who had been sent to Romania to survey the oil industry and to establish measures necessary for obtaining the greatest possible output of crude oil.

At the time of the nationalization of Romanian industry on June 11, 1948, the Soviets controlled about one-third of Romanian oil production through *Sovrompetrol* and the Administration of Soviet Enterprises and Properties.* The balance was produced by the State-owned Muntenia and Moldova Petroleum Centrals (into which the large, privately owned oil companies had been absorbed) as well as independent producers responsible for one percent of production. By September 1, 1950, *Sovrompetrol* had taken over both the Muntenia and Moldova Petroleum Centrals, so that oil production and marketing became a Sovrom monopoly.

The organizational structure of *Sovrompetrol* set the pattern for the administration of other mixed enterprises which were established subsequently. The company had its headquarters in Bucharest, with departments for planning and statistics, oil fields, refineries, finance and general accounting, and administration and control. The planning and statistics department supervised the work of all other

* In 1947, prior to nationalization, *Sovrompetrol* produced one third of Romanian oil production—that is 1,138,368 metric tons out of a total of 3,808,000 metric tons, and it controlled about 36.5 percent of the nation's refining capacity—that is 1,376,566 metric tons out of 3,769,000 metric tons. Even before the official nationalization act, the regime had taken over most of the private oil companies and arrested numerous oil executives. In the much-publicized trials that followed, they were sentenced to long prison terms on trumped-up charges such as economic sabotage or espionage for the West. Information on the *Sovrompetrol* production was published in *Probleme Economice* (Bucharest), April 1948, pp. 23-27.

departments, while the offices for oil fields and refineries were in charge of actual production—the former managing prospecting, drilling, extracting and supplies, and the latter supervising research laboratories, transportation and the refineries themselves. The company was divided into various regional units called *trests* and subdivisions called “services.” *Trest 1* is in Campina, *trest 2* in Moldavia at Moinesti, *trest 3* in Ploesti, while the fourth manages the wells of Moreni and Suta Seaca. Recently another *trest* was set up to supervise the new oil fields discovered in the Targu-Jiu region. The main office of *Sovrompetrol* is directed by a Soviet “expert” and his Romanian assistant, and each *trest* and service is managed by a Russian and staffed with Soviet “technicians.”

Technically, as a monopoly *Sovrompetrol* has both advantages and disadvantages. The management of all Romanian oil companies by one administration has facilitated development of the oil industry and eliminated duplication in research and prospecting. At the same time, however, the *Sovrompetrol* monopoly has given rise to a huge bureaucratic machine which serves Soviet interests. Despite increases in oil production, gasoline sold within the country is still rationed, and kerosene, which is widely used by Romanians for lighting, cooking and heating, only recently was taken off the rationed market. In other words, much of the nation's oil production has gone to the USSR, and the remainder has been used chiefly for exports and for heavy industry.

Transportation

On July 19, 1945, two days after the protocol establishing *Sovrompetrol* was signed, Soviet and Romanian officials signed an agreement to organize *Sovromtransport*—a mixed company for river and maritime transportation.* The initial capital was fixed at three billion *lei*. The Soviet share, valued at 1.5 billion *lei*, was composed of ten tugs, four motor barges, 23 oil barges (19,552 tons) and 40 regular barges (4,447 tons). All these ships were war prizes captured after the Armistice Convention was signed. The Romanian contribution was composed of about 200 ships weighing 120,000 tons. Included were 19 passenger vessels, 19 tugs, 101 barges (81,626 tons) and 43 oil barges (30,724 tons). In addition to this, Romania pledged to give the newly-created *Sovrom* a thirty year lease on all harbor installations in Danubian and maritime ports at a nominal fee. Further, the government was obliged to lease private craft for a period of thirty years. In return, owners of these requisitioned craft were to receive 50 percent of the net profits after deduction of repairs, overhauling and maintenance costs. Since the average life of a Danubian craft is estimated at twenty years, it is obvious that private owners could make no profit because they were responsible automatically for the complete overhauling of their craft. After the nationalization of industry in 1948, the Romanian government, as the new owner of the ships leased by *Sovrom*-

transport, had to assume this burden. At present, all naval transportation, both on the Danube and the Black Sea, is a *Sovromtransport* monopoly.

Operations of *Sovromtransport* were divided into two chief sections, the Danubian and the Maritime Directorates, with each Directorate maintaining separate headquarters—the former in Galati and the latter in Constanta. *Sovromtransport* now has eight ocean-going vessels: the *Transilvania*, a passenger transport of about 6,000 tons; the *Berezina*, *Plehanov* and *Gheorghe Dimitrov*, Russian-rebuilt transports of about 5,000 tons; and the *Mangalia*, *Constanta*, *Sulina* and *Midia*, Romanian ships of about 600-800 tons which were built in 1950-1951. Until 1953 the *Transilvania* was used to transport Jews emigrating from Romania to Israel; this operation brought the company about \$30-36 million because each emigrant was charged about \$250 to \$300 for the voyage.

Air Transport

On August 8, 1945, another convention was signed between the Soviet and Romanian governments for the establishment of a joint air transportation company known as *Tars*.* The initial capital was fixed at 1.8 billion *lei*, or about \$8.5 million. The Soviet contribution consisted of 16 DC-3s of Soviet manufacture, about 20 two-seaters of the PO-2 type, and a number of spare parts and engines which the Soviets estimated at 650 million *lei*. The remaining 250 million *lei* was set down to the use of airports (Ismail, Odessa, Nicolaev, Kerson, Eupatorya and Simferopol), buildings and repair shops on the Black Sea. The Romanian contribution consisted of all planes belonging to the airline *Lares*—valued by Soviet experts at 300 million *lei*—as well as all present and future airports, weather and radio stations to be used for a duration of thirty years. This contribution was estimated at 600 million *lei*. Like the other joint companies, *Tars* was given preferential treatment and exempted from Romanian taxes and customs on imports of planes, spare parts and other equipment. In February 1948, at the instigation of the USSR, the two governments signed an agreement whereby the Soviet Union withdrew the six airports it had previously placed at Romania's disposal, and Romania, in turn, withdrew some of her planes. This agreement made it clear that although *Tars* supposedly was established for “joint exploitation of air transportation in the Black Sea area,”** the company actually was formed so that the Soviets could gain control over Romanian air transportation in exchange for some 36 antiquated planes.

Finance

The *Sovrombanc*, set up on August 14, 1945, with an initial capital of 1.2 billion *lei*, or 5.6 million dollars, was created to clear all *Sovrom* accounts and transactions and to finance commerce between the Soviet Union and Romania. The Soviet contribution was made partly in cash

* Information on *Sovromtransport* was published in *Comunicari Statistice* (Bucharest) #13, June 15, 1946, pp. 6-7; *Monitorul Oficial* #188, August 18, 1945 and #67, March, 1946.

* *Monitorul Oficial* (Bucharest), #245, October 26, 1945; #38, February 14, 1946; and #65, March 18, 1946.

** *Monitorul Oficial* (Bucharest), October 26, 1945.

and partly in shares, as follows: 533,426 shares of the Romanian Commercial Bank; 189,943 shares of the Romanian Banking Society; and 143,764,000 *lei* in cash.* The shares probably were those acquired by the Germans during the Second World War, and the cash may have been *lei* which the Soviets themselves printed and used in Romania when the Red Army entered the country. The Romanian contribution consisted of shares of various banks, two-thirds of which came from the Romanian Credit Bank. The *Sovrombanc's* fiscal statement for 1947 listed the following funds: deposits in the value of 1,052,000,000 *lei*; letters of credit in the value of 3,887,400,000 *lei*; and rediscounts in the value of 4,483,000,000 *lei*. This voluminous amount of business was transacted at a time when Romanian banks had not yet been nationalized and when the Romanian budget was no higher than 50 billion *lei*. The scope of *Sovrombanc's* present activities is even broader considering the fact that more than 58 percent of all Romanian foreign trade is with the Soviet Union.**

Lumber

Sovromlemn,*** established on March 20, 1946, for the exploitation of Romanian forests, was the fifth and last "mixed company" in the first group of Sovroms organized. Its capital was fixed at 425 million *lei* at the 1938 rate of 143 *lei* to the dollar. The Soviet share included equipment such as locomotives, flatcars, narrow gauge rails, sawmills and four machines for crating lumber—all valued at \$1,385,000—as well as \$100,000 worth of shares in Romanian lumber companies formerly owned by Germans. The Romanian contribution was 660,000 cubic meters of lumber, from various forests in the country, valued at \$2.25 per cubic meter.

By 1947, *Sovromlemn* was operating 37 sawmills; in 1948 it supplied 35 percent of the nation's round wood and exported forty percent of Romanian lumber production.**** In mid-1948, all the sawmills in the country were nationalized and *Sovromlemn* operations were expanded. Although no official information on the percentage of lumber production controlled by *Sovromlemn* is available, it is apparent that the mixed company owns the lion's share—as much as 94 percent according to exiles' reports. All reports indicate that, with the development of *Sovromlemn* activities, Romanian lumber exports to the USSR increased substantially.

Deforestation reached such serious proportions as a result of *Sovromlemn* operations that in 1951 the Ministry of Forestry was obliged to initiate a drive for reforestation. Not only had too many trees been cut down, but in certain parts of the country transportation facilities were inadequate

to remove the large number of felled trunks. Wood was left to rot, creating fertile ground for the growth of insects, which multiplied so rapidly that, according to numerous regime accounts, the Soviet Union eventually sent spraying planes to Romania to help exterminate them. Soviet-Romanian "cooperation" in forestry has created serious problems in erosion and humidity due to indiscriminate felling of trees and has considerably reduced the forested area which, in 1946, covered almost one-fourth of the nation's surface.

Gas and Insurance

After the organization of the first five Sovroms—*Sovrompetrol*, *Sovromtransport*, *Tars*, *Sovrombanc* and *Sovromlemn*—no new "mixed companies" were created for about three years. In 1949, when the original Sovroms had consolidated their operations, a second group was established covering such important sectors of the economy as mining, construction, gas and metal production. The creation of these Sovroms coincided with the rapid industrialization of Romania and the nation's stepped-up economic activity in the First Five Year Plan. A brief decree in the March 1949 issue of the *Official Gazette* (Bucharest) announced the formation of *Sovromgaz*, a company for exploitation of natural gas deposits in Transylvania. Its activities were to include mining, storage and marketing of natural gas for industrial and private use, as well as the manufacture of basic products. The enterprises took over the network of pipelines connecting various industrial centers with Transylvania, and the pipeline running from Copsa Mica to Bucharest which has a daily capacity of 41,800,000 cubic meters. Since the establishment of *Sovromgaz*, natural gas production has increased steadily and, according to regime plans, it is to be twice that of 1939 by 1955:*

Year	Cubic Meters
1939	1,860,000,000
1947	1,176,000,000
1950	1,539,000,000
1951	1,911,000,000
1952	2,507,000,000
1953	2,660,000,000
1955 planned	3,800,000,000

Several months later, in August 1949, the *Sovromasigurare* for commercial insurance was set up.** At the time, the Soviets requested that the Romanian government make wide use of the company's services, but it appears that despite these efforts the project was unsuccessful. On January 12, 1954 the Yugoslav Newspaper *Vjesnik* (Zagreb) announced that *Sovromasigurare* had been liquidated; this seems likely in view of the fact that in the past year the Romanian government took steps to nationalize insurance through the creation of ADAS (Administration for State Insurance) and ordered compulsory insurance of privately-owned buildings, goods, crops, etc. Further, *Sovromasig-*

* *Monitorul Oficial* (Bucharest) #245, October 26, 1945; #193, August 27, 1945; #281, December 7, 1945; #38, February 14, 1946; #55, March 6, 1946. The accounts of the *Sovrombanc* are kept in dollars and Sovrom transactions are cleared every three months.

** *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya* (Moscow), November, 1953.

*** *Monitorul Oficial* (Bucharest) #154, July 6, 1946; #196, August 26, 1946; #150, July 2, 1946; #65, March 18, 1948.

**** Round wood is wood cut from saplings, usually cut about one yard long.

* See July 1954 issue, p. 8 and *Scinteia* (Bucharest), August 23, 1953 and December 16, 1950.

** *Buletinul Oficial* (Bucharest) #54, August 20, 1949.

rare has not been mentioned in the Party press for some time. It is probable that the Soviets found it simpler to let the Romanian government administer insurance on its own and decided to accumulate profits by re-insuring the Romanian government in its various commercial enterprises.

Coal, Chemicals and Construction

By way of contrast, one of the most "successful" "mixed companies," organized at about the same time as the *Sovromasigare*, is the *Sovromcarbune* for coal exploitation. The company now controls 71 percent of Romanian coal output and undoubtedly has played a leading part in boosting coal production from 2.75 million tons in 1949 to 6.1 million in 1953.* *Sovromcarbune* manages the nation's most important coal deposits in the Jiu Valley, where deliveries of Soviet equipment have enabled the company to mechanize most of its underground operations. Preferential treatment also has been given *Sovromcarbune* with regard to labor, and refugees state that since the company was organized Soviet managers have tried to prevent production lags by assuring workers sufficient government supplies of food and clothing, even though workers in purely Romanian mines have not been given similar incentives.

The *Sovromchim* for converting natural gas into chemical compounds was established at the same time as the *Sovromcarbune*, but was far less successful.** The project was based on a Romanian World War II plan to build a chemical combine. The factory, however, was never finished because the machinery, which had been ordered from Germany, was not delivered. After the war, the Soviets managed to seize the necessary machinery from the East zone of Germany and offered to finish equipping the factory in return for a fifty percent interest in the combine. Although the factory was then partly complete, little information was released about its activities. Communist publications have made no mention of *Sovromchim* for some time, and in the summer of 1952 Romania and Hungary signed an agreement to set up a similar company called *Romagchim****. This involved construction of a chemical plant on Hungarian territory which was to be supplied with raw materials by Romania. In other words, *Sovromchim* having probably failed, Romania was given the green light to use her natural gas in conjunction with Hungarian machinery and electric power supplies.

Sovromconstructie, organized simultaneously with *Sovromcarbune*, also helped to speed up industrialization in the Five Year Plan by taking over the building of important worker housing and industrial projects.**** The company absorbed part of the former German Derubau Company and several Italian firms in the Romanian construction business. Like all the other Sovroms, *Sovromconstructie* has received special treatment. Refugees report that technicians and officials of the company are better paid than

State employees and that *Sovromconstructie* receives priority over State enterprises in shipments of machinery and building supplies. It is also reported that the company has its own school for training technicians and engineers and thereby assures itself a sufficient number of skilled workers. According to refugee reports, each of the company's ten regional offices has a staff of about 100 engineers and architects, 400 planners and technicians, 50 foremen, 1,000 skilled workers and 2,000 unskilled workers. Theoretically, each regional enterprise is supposed to engage in construction of 25 different projects at once, although it seems that no more than fifteen usually are manned.

Steel and Tractor

Sovrommetal and *Sovromtractor*, which also belong to this second group of mixed companies, gave the Soviets an important stake in Romanian steel output and production of farm equipment.* In the case of *Sovrommetal*, the USSR obtained shares in the Romanian Resita Works in return for scrap iron and iron ore taken from the Krivoi-Rog basin during the war. Through participation in *Sovrommetal*, the Soviet Union gained control of one of the largest steel mills in southeast Europe with a monthly production capacity of 18,000 tons. This mill has turned out locomotives, steel parts for bridges, electric motors and weapons (submachine guns, hand grenades and pistols) as well as fireproof bricks for blast furnaces, rolled steel and rails—most of which has been shipped to the USSR under the reparations program and was produced according to Soviet standards. According to *Agerpress*, November 6, 1951, *Sovrommetal* produced in 1950 91.6 percent of the nation's total coke production, 41.8 percent of its pig iron and 46.3 percent of its steel.

The *Sovromtractor* Plant in Brasov was built on the bombed site of the only plane factory in the country. The company made use of a number of machines which had escaped damage and an available labor force of several thousand skilled workers. The USSR bought itself into the plant (which had been reconverted in 1946 to build German-type tractors) by selling the Romanians tractor plans and by equipping the factory with some new machinery. When the "mixed company" was set up, the plant started producing large Soviet-type tractors which were less suitable for Romanian farms than the smaller German type. The *Sovromtractor* Plant monopolized tractor production until the end of 1952, when it was announced that the "August 23 Works" had also started turning out tractors—probably with the aim of speeding up Romanian farm mechanization.

A "mixed company" for importing and distributing films in Romania was formed a short time after the *Sovromtractor*. The company, called *Sovromfilm*, was reported to have been very successful, but it was dissolved in July 1952, after the Romanian government had developed its own movie industry and had signed "cultural agreements" with

* See July 1954 issue, p. 8 and *Buletinul Oficial* (Bucharest), August 20, 1949.

** *Buletinul Oficial* (Bucharest), August 20, 1949.

*** Radio Budapest, June 20, 1952.

**** *Buletinul Oficial* (Bucharest), August 20, 1949.

* *Buletinul Oficial* (Bucharest), August 20, 1949, *Romania Muncitoare* (Paris), October 1952, *Romania Libera* (Bucharest), August 7, 1951, December 20, 1952, and *Viata Sindicala* (Bucharest), September 20, 1951.

the neighboring "People's Democracies" for the exchange of films.* With the liquidation of the *Sovromfilm*, the Romanian film industry was placed on equal footing with those of the other Satellites, and the USSR opened an office in Bucharest called *Sovfilm* for the distribution of Soviet movies.

In August 1952, the last group of "joint companies" was established—the *Sovrom Utilaj Petrolifer* for crude oil processing and production of drilling equipment, and the *Sovromnaval* for shipbuilding and repairs.** The latter took over former Romanian shipyards at Turnu-Severin and Galati, as well as repairshops in the larger harbors on the Danube and in Constanta. *Petrolifer* took over repairshops near the large oil centers and began production of badly-needed oil machinery. The last "mixed company" to be set up was the *Sovromquartz* for uranium prospecting. The company's activities have been kept secret and little is known of its achievements.

The Pattern

The development of "joint companies" in Hungary and Bulgaria has been on a smaller scale, although their structure follows the Romanian pattern. In Hungary, there are four mixed companies: *Maszobal* for exploitation of bauxite and aluminum, *Maszoviet* for civil aviation, *Maszolaj* for oil exploitation, and *Meszhart* for navigation and shipping. Bulgaria has five companies: the Bulgarian-Soviet Mining Company for uranium, *Gorubso* for exploitation of

ores, oil, lead, zinc and silver, *Sovbolstoi* for construction of industrial plants and worker housing projects, *Tabso* for civil aviation, and *Korbso*, with a monopoly of all shipyards in Stalin, Burgas and Russe. Like the *Sovroms*, the Bulgarian and Hungarian joint companies are managed by Russians and have a privileged economic status.

By means of "joint companies," the Soviet Union has assured itself certain profits and commodities and, at the same time, has gained direct, exploitative control over the development of Satellite industry. The creation of joint enterprises for civil aviation and shipbuilding has facilitated Soviet domination of Satellite trade and has given the Russians air and sea bases in Eastern Europe. Soviet control of enterprises for mining, oil and construction has insured the Kremlin heavy industrial equipment and vital raw materials, setting the pace for the over-rapid industrialization of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary.

Within the past two years, little publicity has been given to the *Sovroms* in the official Romanian press, and from time to time Yugoslav newspapers have published rumors of their dissolution. Further, the usual Romanian celebrations on July 17, commemorated as the day when "economic collaboration" was initiated, have not been held. Despite this, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union intends to liquidate the "joint enterprises" completely, considering the advantages these companies have brought to them. It seems more probable that in the New Course program, the role of *Sovroms* will be played down in an effort to lessen anti-Soviet sentiments, but that the USSR will continue nevertheless to reap the harvest it has insured itself through the *Sovrom* system.

* *Scinteia* (Bucharest), July 2, 1952.

** *Scinteia* (Bucharest), August 16, 1952.

Coin of the Realm

The following joke satirizing Czechoslovakia's currency reform is reportedly circulating inside the country:

"Klement Gottwald arrived at Heaven and courageously knocked at the gate. It opened, St. Peter came out and said to Gottwald, 'Oh, no, there is no room for you here,' and closed the gate again. A few minutes later a beggar came along and went right in. Some time later another one arrived and got in too. Gottwald knocked on the gate again and said, 'Dear St. Peter, can I make a call from here?' 'Surely,' said St. Peter with all his charity—and Gottwald called Antonin Zapotocky in Prague. 'Say, Tonda, this is Klement speaking,' said Gottwald. 'Here in Heaven only paupers can get in, so do something.'

"Then came the currency reform."

The Egg of the Troglodytes

The article below appeared in the Polish weekly for university students, Poprostu (Warsaw), on June 8, 1954. It is an excellent example of how the Communists use half-truths, distortions and outright lies to pervert the picture their captive peoples get of the United States. Not only is the article anti-American but it is outright anti-Catholic both in tone and in fact.



FACING each other along a white line, two rows of barbarians dressed in huge steel helmets jump up and down. Suddenly, there is a whistle. With a wild scream such as was probably uttered by the first cave men when they crushed the heads of their enemies with stone axes, the two armored rows crush against each other: one can hear the breaking of bones, the dull thudding of steel helmets, and see how the heavily-soled boots crush the hands and feet of opponents. Again the shrill whistle. Twenty-one armored robots stretch their arms, the twenty-second lies on the ground like a corpse. "OK," the man with the whistle shouts. "Everything is OK. And take Jim off the field. Call a surgeon."

The above scene took place not during the filming of a recent American moving picture about a Martian invasion of Earth, but in the stadium of the famed Catholic university, Notre Dame. The same thing has been taking place for the past several months in the stadiums of schools, colleges and universities all over the United States. For in March of each year, the season of the most popular American sport begins in the US—the so-called "American Football Season."

Brawn Over Brain

American football has as much in common with football as the latter has with ping-pong or with chess. This wild "sport"—whose motto is *Brawn Over Brain*—is nevertheless the most popular national sport of the United States. Last year, the football matches played by some 117 university teams were watched by some 13 million spec-

tators, not including other millions who watched on their television screens. These matches brought over 50 million dollars of pure profit to American schools of higher education. In addition, there are in the US over 350 high school teams and a large number of professional teams, organized in two national leagues. The popularity of football is much greater than that of baseball or rugby.

The first news of football was brought to the US by Harvard and Yale students from Europe, somewhere around 1860. From the very first moment, however, the American students rejected all "unnecessary" rules of the game, thus changing the noble game into a wild melee. When in 1869 the first intercollegiate match was played between Princeton and Rutgers, seven players had to be carried away from the battlefield with broken arms and legs.

"The American football game is not only the most brutal kind of sport I have ever known," writes a Catholic author and publicist, Graham Greene. "It is more of an American phenomenon than the Empire State Building or a cowboy movie. It is a real gold mine for a sociologist."

"Imperialist Football"

American football cannot be considered merely another abnormal, brutal kind of sport. It constitutes a specific sociological problem which throws light on American educational policy. "If it had not been for football," admitted coach Earl Blaik of the highest US military school, West Point, "American youth would not be so well prepared for the great task of ruling the world."

These American "conquerors of the world" have been characterized best in a satirical drawing by an American humorist, Al Capp. The drawing shows a football match between two teams being watched by two men. "Are those troglodytes?" one of them says. "No, it is a university football team." "And what is this huge egg one of the men is holding?" "It is a ball." "And the smaller egg on the shoulders of that man?" "That is his head. A football player has a head smaller by half than other men's. It is big enough though. These young men's heads serve only one purpose, to wear a steel helmet. . . ."

These ironic words fully reflect the reality of American universities. For American universities serve only one purpose: to educate murderers, thoughtless robots, obedient tools of the monopolist clique. *Sovietkiy Sport* writes: "American football damages American youth both physically and morally. And that is why it is so widely cultivated in American universities and colleges: it helps to transform youth into animals."

In an interview granted to the *Saturday Evening Post*, the rector of Georgetown University, Father Hunter Guthrie, stated that in America, a football trainer earns "several times more money than a professor who has written a dozen books and enjoys an international reputation." Very few American scientists can boast of earning a salary equal to that received by a junior assistant to the football coach.

"Patronage"

The prestige of an American university is based not on its scholarly achievements, but on the success of its football teams. Students who belong to such a team do not have to study (even if they wanted to, they couldn't—training takes from 40 to 50 hours a week). The results of their examinations are decided upon in the stadium. This is particularly true of the military academy at West Point and the naval academy at Annapolis, the two rivals whose matches enjoy such a great popularity among the American "elite." It is enough to say here that two such criminals as General Matthew Ridgeway and General James Van Fleet made their careers thanks to their brutality in the stadium, in spite of the fact that their instructors classified them as the worst students at school. Similarly, General Eisenhower, who had been the second worst student in his class, received his diploma thanks only to his "good legs." This was openly admitted by his biographer, John Gunther.

On the results scored by the football teams depends not only "the honor" of the university but also the financial aid given to it by rich patrons. Thus, the universities pay

little attention to the student's intellectual qualifications, trying to acquire the greatest possible number of "muscular" barbarians to ensure their university the highest place on the scoreboard. Special talent scouts travel all over the country and watch the high school games scouting for "talent." Jeff Cravath, former coach of the University of California football team, describes his efforts to "buy" a certain talented football player in the following words (we quote from *Colliers*): "One of our college patrons offered the young athlete a new car, \$150 a month throughout the course of his studies, and a job in his law office. But a patron of our competitors had been quicker. When John (the young athlete) came to see me next day in a new car, I knew we had lost. Some parents of well-known football stars simply sell their sons to those giving the best price."


The team of the Catholic university of Notre Dame, which has for the last several years been first in the national league, is further trained by the highest Church dignitaries in fanatical hatred for their opponents. At the request of Cardinal Spellman, Pope Pius XII sent a special benediction to the Notre Dame team while Spellman himself assured them that "their fight will be watched by the entire Catholic world (!)." The barbarians, trained in the spirit of the medieval Crusader's campaigns, did not fail their shepherds. In the single year of 1953, their opponents "earned" 37 broken legs, 19 broken arms, 7 broken ribs, 2 brain concussions, etc.

How far the fanaticism of these "defenders of Western civilization and Catholic culture" goes can best be seen from the following story of Johnny Lattner, who is a "star" on the Notre Dame team. One day, before the decisive match with the Princeton team, the Notre Dame coach Frank Leahy informed Lattner that his father, who had been ill with cancer for the past several months, would get a free operation (Lattner had been asking for it for some time), but only after Johnny had ensured victory for his team (it seems that the Pope's benediction was not enough for the coach).

The few examples and statements given here eloquently illustrate the degeneracy and depravity of "sportsmen"—students of American universities. And could those "supermen" with the brains of troglodytes, those armor-clad robots rule the world and impose their American style of life on nations with old and established cultures? How comical and nonsensical are the insane dreams of those crusaders of dollars and Coca-cola, paying god-like honors to an ostrich egg and diplomas acquired only with the help of one's legs.

Who Won?

On April 18 in Sofia, in a volley-ball match between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, the Bulgars won by 3-2. *Narodna Mladost*, Sofia daily, commented: "From the Soviet players the Bulgarian volley-ball players and all sportsmen have learned much. . . . To the assimilation of the teaching of invincible Soviet sports, we owe our successes." In fact, as Radio Belgrade observed on May 7, the defeat of the Soviet volley-ball team in Sofia apparently became "a great victory for the Soviet Union because the Bulgarian players used Soviet tactics."



Radio Free Europe

Tonight, in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, men, women and children will gather around radios tuned to the voices of their countrymen in the West, bringing them the news of the free world, the knowledge that they are not forgotten, and the hope of their future liberation. Radio Free Europe, operating as a home service from abroad, broadcasts over a network of 22 transmitters to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, competing directly with all Satellite Communist stations.

This Is the Voice of Free Poland . . .

Letters from Home

A thousand letters! A thousand letters which in the course of the last two years have found their way through the slits in the Iron Curtain! Listen to our jubilee program broadcast on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Voice of Free Poland.

Narrator: Dear friends, do you remember that day two years ago, when on our antennae we erected an air bridge between the emigration and the homeland? On the 3rd of May we sent into the air our first appeal. We waited for an answer from you, straining our ears at the iron grill which encircles the great Polish prison. We waited for your answer as a mother or a brother awaits a secret message from a man held in jail. We knew that such a signal was bound to come, since there is no prison without chinks in its walls. We did not ask each other, therefore, whether a letter would come. We were asking: when will it come?

Days passed, one week followed another. No signal yet. Until a certain morning when the news flashed through all the rooms: It's here! It's here! The first letter from Poland has been delivered! We turned it over in our hands for a long time before someone tore the envelope open. Believe us, first friend with the assumed name "Jurek from Lowicz," that words have never been so full of meaning as the ones in that letter. Before we received your letter we thought we knew a lot about the pain and worry you suffer. Now we realized that there was much to be learned and seen, through imperfect imagination, to support

the span we had established between the homeland and the emigration. All our feelings, however, were eclipsed by the simple joy of this spiritual meeting. Allow us, dear friend, to remember with gratitude the letter you wrote two years ago:

Voice: "Dear countrymen . . . This year, the 3rd of May had a double significance for us. In our hearts we celebrated that day as the anniversary of our national Constitution, and at the same time we were deeply moved by the happy surprise which you, dear brothers, prepared for us by opening a new radio station for Poland. It is hard to describe the joy which overwhelmed us upon hearing your voice. . . ."

Narrator: Other letters began to pour in. They called us:

Voices: "Dearest brothers in freedom!"

"Dear friends!"

"Countrymen!"

"Brothers and sisters!"


Narrator: In those first letters we obtained that for which we had been waiting with so much

impatience. A listener wrote us:

Voice: "What should I call you if not Brothers, since I know and can hear that you are fighting for us out there in the West? Dear Brothers, speak, on our behalf, all that we cannot say in Poland. Your fate is fortunate and your work full of merit! Be assured that we stand firm in our country. We fight for Poland and shall do so until the end. . . ."

Narrator: That letter was your sanction, and our mandate for the future.

While beginning our work, we asked ourselves often where we would find most of our friends. Would they be older people who remembered us from the old days, who know our past and our aims? Or would we find a response



among the younger generation, to whom our names and voices mean nothing? Will they scornfully reject the slanders thrown at us by the school and the youth organization ZMP? They did. Let us recall a few letters of the many hundreds that have reached us. Listener "Jacek" wrote:

Voice: "I am a young worker employed by a Zyrardow factory. I am a ZMP member. But the ZMP is not a youth organization. I consider it a cover which permits one to think for oneself, while keeping the attention of the Communists away from oneself. There are thousands of people like myself. We wait for the moment when we shall chase the Bolsheviks to the other side of the Volga! I hope you will take my letter into your hearts, if only for the reason that it is written in one of the Bolshevik centers, red Zyrardow. . . ."

Narrator: We receive letters from young workers and students, from peasants' sons and the daughters of the working intelligentsia. Let us produce from the folder two similar letters written by 15-year-old "Amazon" and 15-year-old "Jerzy." They were mailed at two opposite ends of Poland. A half year interval separates them.

Voice: "I am barely 15, nevertheless I am disgusted with the 'People's Regime.'"

Voice: "I am only 15, but I understand the present situation in Poland.

"I am studying at a high school where they try to persuade us that the present system is perfect. None of the students believes it. We are all dreaming that a change will come soon. I don't know, and I doubt if this letter will reach you. I am writing just because I would like to be with you and because I admire you."

Narrator: We have had many letters from teachers in the course of the last two years. Among them there must have been those who "praised" Soviet education at the August conference. To us, however, they speak like a certain "Jaroslawek of Lwow":

Voice: "It is agony for me to teach, history—Russified history."

Narrator: Or like the woman teacher in Pomerania:

Voice: "I am a village teacher. I have heard over the radio the voice of a colleague of mine who has found freedom. I envy him that he is no longer forced to lie to children. . . ."

Narrator: We have found friends in all social classes and professions. Silesian miners and railwaymen have responded to our call. The peasants have spoken through listener "Antek of the Wroclaw district":

Voice: "I write to you, Poles of another country, free from repression. All of us farmers have to pay endless contributions. A man has to work from morning till night in order to earn money to cover the surtax. Many of us are ill with tuberculosis. We have border guards, the UB [Secret Police], and plain-clothes men who can impose a fine or a prison sentence at any moment. Sometimes it happens that a hundred people in one community are reported for punishment. . . ."

Narrator: Thus says a peasant of old peasant stock. Not only does he think about his land and his injustice, but he has a clear ideal of the Poland he fought for in the Underground together with us. Dear Antek, if in your honest toil you are sometimes inclined to lose your trust in the effectiveness of peasant resistance, if you think that you will finally have to join a kolkhoz, then listen: your allies are to be found everywhere. Not only are we your allies; the worker who comes to persuade you to join a collective, the soldier into whose hands a Russian gun has been thrust are also your allies. Do you know what non-commissioned officers of Rokossowski's army have written us?

Voice: "Polish soldiers shall turn their arms against their Communist persecutors when the time comes. We shall never fight against the democratic countries. Together with you we believe that Poland must be a free and independent state."

Narrator: Listeners of the Wroclaw district, you may see Border Guard outposts rising on the horizon beyond your green fields. You are haunted by the bitter thought that from the top of those towers, Polishmen are watching for Polishmen who seek freedom. We would like to read you a letter written by one of those whom you consider a traitor and enemy:

Voice: "I am a political officer of the Border Guard. The fact that, like the whole nation, I am being fed on Communist propaganda and that I undergo a course at the Party school does not change my hatred toward Communism. On the contrary—the more I learn about their aims and methods, the more I hate them."

Narrator: Not only written words did we receive from our soldier-friends. We have had their life assurance. The best of them, Franek Jarecki and Zdzis Jazwinski, have told us the thoughts of a Polishman forced into an alien uniform. The wind that turned their propellers brought us afterwards many proud and happy letters.

Voice: "All Poland is overcome with joy that the two heroic pilots are free and are able to speak to their country over the free radio."

Voice: "The news of the escape of the two pilots was heard all over Poland!"

Voice: "Long live our boys! We are glad they are free!"

Narrator: Every letter that reaches our mailbox brings us mixed happiness and pain. The letters written by women are especially tragic. Small, bigger and great worries and deprivations make up the picture of the daily struggle. We marvel at the fact that a woman can bear for so many years her own burden, the worries of her father and husband, and the most acute anxiety for her child. A young mother wrote us:

Voice: "Every day I weep over my baby. It has no decent socks or pinafores. I have nothing more left to turn into clothes for it. It has rubber shoes because I cannot afford anything else. Half my salary would not be enough to buy a pair of shoes for my child."

Narrator: Should we mention all the letters in which our friends express their solidarity with the persecuted Church? Listener "Nightingale" wrote us:

Voice: "In connection with the Cracow trial, we would like to express our sympathy with the priests we love."

Narrator: And another listener assures us:

Voice: "The whole nation is deeply grieved upon hearing the news of the imprisonment of our beloved Shepherd, Primate Cardinal Wyszynski."

Narrator: Dear friends, your letters encourage us to go on. We are far from being carried away by pride or overestimating our role. We simply perform our duty. And if someone's eyes have been opened to the truth because of our words, then it is not our victory but that of all Poles. . . .

We would run out of breath if we were to mention all the letters and messages which have wandered into the world via our mailbox. There were letters addressed to President Eisenhower, there were appeals to the Poles of the USA for help and rescue. The appeals and letters you are sending to us from Poland are a weapon to be used by us to pierce the shield of complacency, indifference or fear.

We have a pile of your letters, you who are so close to us and yet so far away. Pages torn from a school notebook, green, gray and blue envelopes on which with a trembling hand you have written the prohibited address. . . . Amidst these paper envoys there are both complaining and smiling letters. Some of them threaten the enemy as if with a fist, others appeal to us for advice and salvation. . . . Were someone to deny our common truth, that chorus would give him an answer; the chorus of haunted, ill-treated and tormented people:

Voice: "We are with you in spirit!"

Voice: "Nothing shall break and destroy our Polish spirit!"

Voice: "The Polish fist is hard when it falls upon a traitor!"

Voice: "Our Poland is here, we've got it in our hearts!"

All voices: "God be with you, friends!"

Narrator: God be with you!

This Is the Voice of Free Czechoslovakia . . .

The Perversion of Sports

The Voice of Free Czechoslovakia [Radio Free Europe], bringing you unbiased reports from all over the world, recently observed its third anniversary. During these three years, not a day has passed without our reporting sports news, which hardly surprised you since physical culture and sports were always a major national interest. Indeed, in Communist-dominated Czechoslovakia, these disciplines assumed an even more important position. More people are interested in sports now than before. The Communists say so and we cannot but agree with them on this score. Of course, they are not content simply to acknowledge the increasing number of sports lovers; they allege that each jump or vault, each swim or football game, are the results of Communist care and attention to sports and physical culture.

The Communists' part in the growing interest in sports

is only indirect. Anyone going to the sports field cares little whether or not his presence there is going to fulfill the plan of Communist evolution; everybody simply takes refuge in sports because physical exercise offers at least some freedom, sorely lacking in shop, office or school.

The Communists have deprived the youth of a horizon. They have deprived them of the opportunity to study freely, to travel, to practice enterprise, to see things for themselves and to speak of them without fear. Recently a young refugee miner from Ostrava said he had left the country after he had become convinced that no amount of honest work would bring him success of any kind. These accumulated conditions induce the young people to devote themselves more to sports. It is the same as it was during the war. Then too the theaters and cinemas offered a fare seasoned with propaganda and the press was censored. Sports, however, thrived comparatively well.

In clipping the wings of the young people but leaving open the gates to the tracks and gymnasiums, the Communists were hardly concerned with the welfare of the nation. The Communists claim that it is their purpose to provide you with recreation. But you may be sure that were sports and physical culture not an excellent form of pre-military training and an ideal framework to organize the youth politically, then—believe me—the Communists would happily declare sports an obsolete bourgeois vestige and eradicate it from your lives. The fact that games and exercise are wholesome, and promote physical and mental well-being, would have made no difference in the matter.

So for three years now, we have been reporting to you and have analyzed critically the sports situation back home. We are critical because we are concerned with everything that goes on back home. We criticize also because in Czechoslovakia objective criticism is non-existent. It is our acknowledged task to denounce the Communist changes from the day of their promulgation. This we have been doing from the outset. From the very beginning we criticized the megalomaniac way of attaching the sports clubs to Sokol units and the subsequent amalgamation of these units in the individual plants. While as sportsmen we have always been more concerned with sports than with gymnastics and calisthenics, still we felt that the mass desertion of the Sokol physical training traditions would be detrimental to the country. We called for realism in the selection of national representatives, appealing to you to prevent the destruction of the good reputation of Czechoslovak sports abroad by a less than average representation.

The Communists boasted of what they did for our sports. We kept asking them why they didn't release the wrongly imprisoned sportsmen, a great many of whom could have figured as assets in sports and physical culture. We ask again where they are—the hockey players Modry, Kopnasek, Rozinak and Gustav Bubnik, we ask what happened to the football players Vlasta Kopecky or Bradac. Pepik Caska, the Davis Cup player, languishes in prison while the Communists publicly bewail the shortage of tennis trainers. . . .

Has our criticism had any effect back home? Listen to a few interesting facts. In the spring of 1952 we said that

in our opinion the track star Zatopek was a "socialist" but cared little about the Communist Party. We later affirmed this assertion by quoting some of Zatopek's statements which greatly differed from those Emil gets all written out by his political overseers. Another example cited by us was Zatopek's conduct at the Olympic Games, when he proposed to renounce the Gold Medal in favor of Shade, the West German representative, after he had won it in the five kilometers sprint. Only a few days after our comment, Emil filed an application for membership in the Communist Party. Somebody back home wanted to prove at all costs, to you and to us, that Emil was a convicted Communist.

We then criticized the absence of the best ice hockey players from the national team. What happened? The workers sent a group of men to Cepicka, asking that players who obviously belonged on the team be allowed to play on it. Cepicka refused . . . and the workers proceeded to call on higher authorities. Later, Zapotocky and the entire government had to bow to the request. The team that went to Stockholm was reinforced.

The wrongdoings attendant on the reorganization of Czechoslovak sports and physical culture were headed by the slogan: "Soviet physical culture is our model." We never stopped attacking this slogan. What happened? Recently one of the leading members of the State Committee for Sports and Physical Culture called for a return to the good old Czech and Slovak traditions in sports and physical training. Shortly after, in March of this year, a policy of return to Sokol traditions was announced and every Sokol worker who in the years 1948-1952 had been ejected from that organization was asked to come back and work in the new units. We could go on citing examples like these: in the sports columns non-political articles discussing sports in the West are reappearing. Laufer, our foremost sports columnist, again is allowed to broadcast; experienced sports writers are reporting again; on the hockey team in Stockholm there was only one staunch Communist; the emulation of Soviet methods is now more spoken of than carried out.

Undoubtedly we have had some small part in this change of the Communist trend in sports and physical culture. The only way to preserve the sundry advantages achieved in sports is to continue the criticism and to assert more demands based on sound reasoning. It is imperative to oppose: inordinate political influence in sports, the artificially manufactured belief of inferiority in relation to Soviet sportsmen, the imprisonment of our former sports figures, the bureaucratization of sports. In short, you must oppose all the Communist innovations introduced in our physical culture by Comrade Marek of the newspaper *Prace* immediately following the Communist putsch.

This Is the Voice of Free Poland . . .

Holiday Rejects

The regime radio in Warsaw recently broadcast a typical "appeal to workers," an appeal to you, Polish worker. The



Title: The Accurate Diagnosis.

Caption: "Doctor, I don't know what happened to my ears . . ." They'll be normal again if only you stop listening to Radio Free Europe."

Sztandar Ludu (Lublin), May 23, 1954.

radio propagandist wondered why you do not take advantage of the Workers' Holidays Fund Action. The People's Poland has prepared holiday centers for you in lovely places in the mountains and forests and on the seacoast. Why don't you want to go there for vacations? Why is it that such a low percentage of workers takes advantage of all these holiday pleasures advertised by the regime radio?

Communist propaganda tries to explain this in its own way. It says that you, the Polish worker, have not yet got used to taking advantage of your rights in the new system, rights—as the propaganda puts it—to enjoy beautiful scenery. The words are cheap, and with them one can easily erect a building of happiness. Everywhere the Communists try to make everyone believe that homes for workers, theaters, schools and mass holidays are due to Marxists, and that all these things are unknown in the free countries. It would be a waste of words to try to explain that elsewhere the working man has achieved a general prosperity without being shut in the administration-police system of Communism. It would be a waste of time to tell Communists that systems which have nothing to do with Communism have found better solutions for workers' vacations. However, we do not belittle the value of efforts to give the workers a rest, no matter what the system in which this takes place; but the question of workers' holi-

days in the present Poland requires a particular commentary.

Listening to radio appeals to take advantage of the "holidays action," you would doubtless have some bitter retorts which, however, you are not allowed to say aloud. We shall try to do this for you. We know what work you are forced to do, we know about the norms, the overtime hours, the pledges. We know how exhausted you are after a year's work and how much you are in need of a real vacation. The regime calls it a frank name: the social obligation to rest. After all, a tired man will cease working efficiently, and then the Six Year Plan for the exploitation of Poland will not be carried out. To suspect that the worker does not take advantage of the privilege of holidays because he is still not used to such Communist luxury is merely one more sample of regime hypocrisy.

There are various reasons why the workers are reluctant to go on vacation, and the principal one is the general poverty in Poland. The Polish worker earns 820-860 zloty monthly on the average. This income provides a standard of living which would meet with a workers' strike in free countries. Under Communist terror the worker cannot defend his rights. The only thing he can do is to help himself as he does in the case of holidays. Instead of a rest at the mountains or seashore he takes some extra work so as to be able to make ends meet.

Another reason is a wish to spend holidays with the family. It is only seldom that husband, wife and children are permitted to take their holidays together within the "holidays action."

When a worker does find time to go away on vacation, what pleasures are in store for him! He finds that the vacation centers look like barracks. Strangers are crowded into one room. A man on holiday has to defend himself against

"educationalists,"—political overseers whose task is to drag the holiday-makers to various propaganda functions. At the same time everyone knows that the majority of these organizers of dubious holiday attractions are agents of the UB [Political Police]. They nose around, they watch the reactions of their victims, and they register signs of discontent. How is one to enjoy mental rest when, after the holidays are over, a man may begin to wonder if he did not incur the disfavor of the authorities by sneaking off on a solitary walk when he should have taken part in an excursion to, let us say, Lenin's Statue in Poronin?

This in capsule form is what is described by the regime radio as the right to enjoy beautiful scenery. The scenery really is lovely: the sky-high Tatras, the silvery beaches of the Baltic, the forests with a fragrance of resin in the air. But the nightmare of captivity hangs everywhere. On a lovely Tatra path a soldier of the Frontier Guard bars the way with a rifle. On the seacoast any movement may arouse the interest of various watchmen. The regime would like the holiday-maker to "rest" while listening to Soviet music, while laying wreaths at monuments to Russia, while hoisting Communist flags on top of mountains, while sunbathing with a feeling of reverence on places through which the Red Army passed during the war. And most of all the regime would like the holiday-maker to join the collective farmers and help them to gather crops for their master-occupier.

This is what Communist holidaying is like. In principle, holidays for the masses are a good and useful thing. But the curse of some secret intention hovers over every Communist action. That is why the vacation program, which every normal man enjoys, assumes in Communist Poland the aspects of a man-hunt.

Gypsies Corralled

In all Satellite countries the Communist regimes are seeking to concentrate the gypsies in one locality in order to tighten control over them and to utilize them in the national labor force. In Poland, the gypsies have been directed to settle in the locality of Walbrzych (Lower Silesia), and in Klorzko. A work collective has been organized for the gypsies in Walbrzych, together with a Communist active called the Gypsies' Association. The Association is busy moving gypsies from all over Poland into Walbrzych and settling them there. In Kłodzko, a gypsy kolkhoz is being set up. Heretofore, all efforts to settle the gypsies in strictly delimited areas and use them for factory work have met with little success. The Communist police are completing a nation-wide census of gypsies in Poland and trying to keep a close watch on their migrations. The gypsies who have already been enrolled in factories and kolkhozes are subjected to special indoctrination courses.

The Architecture of Empire

IF ARCHITECTURE can be regarded as the external expression of the nature of a society, nothing demonstrates more clearly the reactionary nature of the Soviet regime than its policy in architecture. The change in Soviet Russian building design from the experimental modernism of the pre-1928 period to the imitative classicism of today parallels exactly the change in the nature of Communism from an international revolutionary movement to Stalinist State imperialism. And Soviet ideas on how architecture can be used as a technique of empire-building can readily be seen in her East European Satellites.

All 20th-century dictatorships, regardless of political creed, have subscribed to a common concept of the meaning of architecture. This is the concept that buildings are material symbols of the construction of a wholly new society—in the Soviet case, “the building of Socialism”—and permanent, public statements of the power of the State. As such, buildings must be heroic in scale and conceived in a style which will evoke in the masses feelings of pride and awe on a simple, instinctive level of appreciation.

In the search for a suitable architectural format for their message of unity and power, the Communists have fallen back on the eclectic revivalism of the 19th century. What they are doing, in effect, is attempting to revive a period which in itself was nothing more than a disordered ransacking of architectural history, an era condemned by present-day architects both for its ugliness and its irrationality. The design of most post-war buildings in the Soviet Union is Neo-Classic or Neo-Gothic, incorporating extraneous national or regional “details,” with emphasis on the facade.

A devious theory of Marxist aesthetics is brought to support this policy. “By applying the creative methods of Socialist realism—which consists of the deep, sincere representation of reality in its revolutionary progress—Soviet architecture reshapes the most advanced elements in the

heritage of the past, enriching and developing with new [technical] means the possibilities of expression in the old [forms],” wrote *Contemporanul* (Bucharest), February 20, 1954. Theoretically, architectural design must express the equation “National in form, Socialist in content,” but this is not the final or complete expression. In the belief that dialectically there will evolve a new architectural style which will be a “pure expression of Communism,” the Communists put their hopes in the ideological education of their architects.

The attempt to find a bridge between Marxist ideology and its application in architecture has led to tremendous uncertainty and confusion. *Architektura* (Warsaw), No. 5, 1953, quoted part of a resolution passed by the last All-National Conference of Polish Architects (April 15, 1953), which confessed:

“... our ideological training and awareness are not sufficiently deep and active. Our knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, of Socialist urbanization, of the principles of Marxist aesthetics, is also inadequate. . . . We do not fully understand the importance of theory and how to apply it correctly in practice. We underestimate the value of Soviet architecture in the development of human culture. . . . We overdo the search for national forms, ignoring the Socialist essence of our new national life. . . .”

But the prescription that architecture should be less “national” and more “Socialist” is difficult to fill, since the distinction between the ingredients is left open to any interpretation. In an interview published by *Stolica* (Warsaw), No. 11, 1953, Marcin Weinfeld, chairman of the Department of Architecture at Warsaw University, declared that “the criterion for the delineation between national and Socialist architecture has not yet been found. It is still in a formative state.” “It is a well-known fact,” wrote an architect in *Przegląd Kulturalny* (Warsaw), April 23,



Moscow University, 1953

1953, "that our best theoreticians do not come forth with the best plans; it is obvious that this whole philosophy does not help them too much. I scarcely see the connection between the practical and the theoretical."

The effects of this uncertainty were apparent, for example, in the styling of the Mlynów and Marszałkowska housing projects, built in Warsaw in 1950. The small two and three-story houses are faced with columns and pillars completely out of scale and harmony with the frame constructions. *Stolica*, No. 13, 1954, while praising the project, warned that it should not be a model for the building of other houses. Alina Szapocznikow, a prominent Polish sculptress quoted in *Architektura*, No. 1, 1953, expressed concern with the problem of the dimensions of the sculptures at Marszałkowska. "It is all right to build a huge grocery store, but the sculpture on it does not have to be so big that, when passing by it, one sees only a huge boot. . . ." Marcin Weinfeld said in the same article: "I do not approve of great, splendid-looking columns in front of ordinary residential homes. What should Polish architecture be like? It should be simple and serene, clear and modest; in expression, joyful and serious without severity." On the other hand, *Przegląd Kulturalny*, April 2, 1953, complained that "some architects are reluctant to apply a rich, more profuse composition because they think it gives the building an unnecessarily palatial appearance." Apparently the architect may directly copy the Soviet monumental buildings which are officially sanctioned "So-

cialist-realist" and have the correct number of columns and reliefs. But if he attempts to apply these forms to smaller buildings, he runs into difficulty, because the few samples of "Socialist realism" which he can find in Soviet architecture do not correspond to the size, function, space and surroundings of the projects he is required to build.

The Czechoslovak architects are also conscious of the discrepancy between theory and practice, and have cannily rejected (at least in theory) imitation of Soviet architecture, by constantly invoking the Soviet doctrine of "national" traditions. For instance, *Literarní Noviny* (Prague), April 12, 1952, published an article which asserted: "Considering national character or individual creative signs, we must admit that our artists even in the Twenties and Thirties always found . . . individual Czech characteristics. Precisely because we are Marxists, we must evaluate especially the national features in the work of our artists. Our theoreticians have not sufficiently learned from the Soviets the respect of Russian artists for Russian classical traditions and regional sources."

Two years later, in *Literarní Noviny*, April 24, 1954, the prominent Czech architect Karel Honzik wrote: "It is of course correct to learn most from those who have preceded us on the road of development and who have paved the way for us: Soviet architects and theoreticians. The difficulty for us lies in the fact that, in a specific project for a Czech community, we cannot simply take over the forms created by Soviet architects for their own milieu.

And at this point our architects sometimes feel helpless and wonder which traditions of our own milieu should be continued and to what extent inspirations should be gathered from them."

In this article, Honzik tries to determine the pattern to be followed by Czech architects. Step by step he rejects the Czech Renaissance, Neo-Classic and even folk styles. Finally he decides in favor of the bourgeois Empire style, on the following grounds:

"The bourgeois Empire style, as a result of the bourgeois revolution of the 18th century, had to adjust (just as we must) to the problem of mass production. The customers of the architects of that time were no longer individual aristocrats or governmental offices, but the comparatively numerous middle class who built their houses on squares and along the streets of the rapidly-growing towns. These constructions, built on limited budgets, could not have the stone columns and cornices of the aristocratic Empire style of castles and palaces. The architects, however, created a new instrumentation of classic forms, expressing them in plaster and in bas-relief work. For plastic depth they substituted varying hues of plaster. They were unsurpassed masters at transforming plastic forms into treatment of the surface, and we have to admire their immense skill which treated the classic elements with delicacy and inventiveness, instead of crude simplification . . .

"To continue the creative language of this environment, the modest means of expression with the greatest effect of expression, is the supreme art: and we, the architects are challenged with it!"

Insofar as Honzik's recommendation is based on an objective, professional analysis of the values of 18th century architectural principles—"minimum means with maximum effect"—it appears to be as reasonable a solution to the

problem of architecture as can be found in a situation in which experimentation in style is specifically forbidden.


Architecture or Archeology?

On August 29, 1952, *Contemporanul* (Bucharest) published an article by M. Rzanin, a member of the USSR Academy of Architecture, in which he stated that "Romanian People's Republic scholars, after careful study of the wonderful monuments which were built in Romania throughout the centuries, have unmasked their bourgeois predecessors who disdained or ignored the great treasury of national and popular architecture, who ignored the cultural relations of the Romanian people with the great people of the Soviet Union."

The historic Romanian churches and monasteries, as well as peasant homes, are theoretically the models for the "nationalist in form" part of the Communist architectural policy in Romania. *Contemporanul*, December 19, 1952, wrote:

"The hospitable porches of our peasant homes, with their artistic woodwork and the slender columns and arcades of their verandas, the towers and courtyards of our ancient inns, the proportion of columns and the gracefulness of the gables, the polychromatic richness of ornament characteristic of old Romanian architecture, have been sources of inspiration for the collectives [groups] of architects who have designed various contemporary projects now under construction."


Even assuming this folk cult in design to have some aesthetic or sentimental validity, are the contemporary projects in Romania genuinely derived from traditional Romanian architecture? In an article in *Flacara* (Buch-



Palace of Radio Broadcasting in Bucharest

arest), March 1, 1954, entitled "Old Traditions, New Constructions," M. Papae, a member of the RPR State Commission for Architecture and Constructions, stated that Romanian architects, following the example of their great Soviet colleagues, "now delve into the treasury of the national heritage in order to express the specific creative qualities of the Romanian people." To illustrate his point, the author drew a parallel between several new Communist buildings—under construction or already completed—and their alleged prototypes. He compared the Scinteia Palace (one of the RPR's major architectural undertakings which will be the tallest building—approximately 350 feet—in the country), with the Sucevita monastery, built by Stefan the Great in the 16th century: "The towers of the Scinteia Palace were inspired by the ancient courtyards of our fortress monasteries, particularly Sucevita. Also, in the Scinteia Palace we find once more the colonnade of plain vertical columns alternating with others of a more ornate design which is reminiscent of the portico of the Snagov monastery." Photographs show that the Scinteia Palace's chief resemblance is to the well-known Moscow University facade, and that any similarity between this construction and the Romanian monasteries is apparent only in the detail of the colonnades. (see page 39)

However, USSR academician Rzianin, (in *Contemporanul*, August 29, 1952), cautioned architects against "any attempt at limiting their efforts by using exclusively the treasure of the architectural styles of their own country, and thus falling into the error of developing forms of architecture which illustrate archaism, pseudo-romanticism, restorativism. . . . Some decoration ideas seen in the exterior of buildings are copied mechanically from the national heritage." In a speech on the occasion of the conference for creating a Union of RPR Architects (quoted by Agerpress, December 24, 1952), I. Chisinevski alleged that "while some of the architects have neglected to take into account the traditional national Romanian style, others, on the contrary, have misapplied the traditional character, and certain of the new buildings look more like a monastery than a building of the present era." As an example of this misapplication he cited the facade of the new Music Theater in Bucharest (see cut) adding sternly that "such things are important, for a mistake in architecture cannot be easily and cheaply corrected." He blamed the "misinterpretation" of RPR architects on the fact that some of them were "still under the influence of Western bourgeois architecture" and called for "an intensive ideological work to ensure the development of the country's architectural activity on Socialist lines." *Arhitectura RPR* (Bucharest), February, 1954, complained that "a harmful attitude with respect to the beauty of our city is the fact that, owing to bureaucratic resignation [apathy], many have accepted rigid formulas of decoration which are poorly conceived and even more poorly executed and lead to the mutilation of numerous buildings in the center of our town. Equally harmful is the misinterpretation of the decisions of the people's councils concerning the embellishment of the capital. We have often seen facades or pedestals of statues whitewashed or painted over with



Music Theater, Bucharest

the foundation of brick or stone still showing through; we see colored or carved ornaments mutilated and facades and even whole buildings altered in an unpermissible manner."

The Modern Dilemma

The folklorist cult of the "national heritage" in Satellite architecture stems broadly from the policy of "autonomous nationalities" adopted by the USSR in the late 1930's (and expressed at that time in architecture by, for example, the incorporation of peasant decorations and Moslem themes into the architecture of the Ukraine and the Central Asian Republics). In the Satellites, it may also be seen in a more immediate political context. The examples of contemporary prewar architecture which still stand in these countries are mutely eloquent reminders of the recent ties of these countries with the West. As such, they are bitterly resented and denounced as "cosmopolitan," the Communists' standard term of abuse for the manifestation in their backyard of any influence generated in the West. On June 21, 1952, Czechoslovakia's *Kulturny Zivot* wrote:

"In architecture, cosmopolitanism is demonstrated by underestimating and ignoring all the new forms of life, of national and popular traditions, by a nihilistic relationship to the architecture of the past and to our own national culture. The proponents of cosmopolitan architecture have practiced the disgusting uniformity of the functionalistic and constructivist school of architecture which is the most degenerate expression of the architecture in capitalist countries. Both knowingly and unknowingly, they have been spreading ugliness in our cities and countryside. . . ."

The way in which styles in architecture are associated with the discredited societies of the West is clearly illustrated in a letter written by a group of students at the Bucharest Institute of Constructions (formerly the Academy of Architecture) to *Contemporanul*, April 21, 1950. These students charged that cosmopolitan attitudes were apparent at the Institute "both in the manner in which certain drafts have been conceived and in the behavior of certain students." The letter continued:

"There is a close relationship between [Institute] courses

which amount to nothing more than a slavish copying of rotten imperialist ideology, and the passion of a few students for decadent and formalist architecture, for extravagant buildings in the American manner. . . .

"Out of eighty projects [submitted at the end of the school year] which proved the correct orientation of their authors, two remained conspicuously formalistic in conception. It is not just a coincidence that their designers are students who are well known for their reactionary behavior during the school year.


"We are not surprised to hear these students talk of nothing but American cowboy movies and rugby matches. Students such as * * * who was educated in an aristocratic school in England are present in their classrooms only physically; in mind, they are away, at the side of the Anglo-American capitalists. It is not surprising that such elements can talk for hours on the sports played by British peers, and have no idea, as was shown during the seminar in Marxism-Leninism, of the living conditions of the British working class."

In the February 20, 1954 issue of the same newspaper, Professor M. Locar asserted that "cosmopolitanism penetrated Romanian architecture together with foreign capital. The monarchy, the landowner and bourgeois classes used indiscriminately, in disregard of our people's artistic traditions, the services of foreign architects. These foreign architects have deepened the chaos and contrasts found in our cities through their eclectic and formalist type of architecture." *Contemporanul*, December 19, 1953, commented: "How strange they looked, all the Mexican and Florentine villas of the bourgeois sections of Bucharest, characteristic of reactionary romanticism in architecture, transplanted from foreign countries, servile reproductions of California or Hollywood houses."

The same article attacked modern experimental styles in architecture: "Bourgeois architects, in their desire to conceal the rot which was increasingly infecting their creations—exemplified by striking contrasts between residential and slum areas, by the anarchic growth of cities—resorted to all kinds of decadent currents and styles. Thus there appeared in their work functionalism, which reduced architecture to an expression satisfying a few imperatives such as exposure, proportion and an interior distribution of space according to the needs of living; constructivism, characterized by a fetishist cult of modern materials—steel, concrete and glass; symbolism, Cubism, and other decadent styles of capitalist architecture, all of them aspects of cosmopolitanism and formalism."

Modern vs. Traditional

Before World War II, modern architecture had gained a strong foothold in Central and East European countries. Josef Gocar's House of the Black Madonna, built in Prague in 1912, was the first Cubist building in Europe. Mies van der Rohe's Tugendhadt House, a milestone in modern design, was built in Brno in 1930. Because there were no architectural schools in their own country (two were founded in 1938 and 1942), Bulgarian architects trained in France and Germany between the wars and brought home the ideas and techniques of modern architecture.



FORMALISM

"What is formalism? We can say it in a word; It is these ugly stairs which lead nowhere."

Szpilki (Warsaw), May, 1954

But it is in Hungary that the issue of modern architecture has been most freely and continually explored by the Communists. This is chiefly due to the unique internal situation of that country and to the position of architect Mate Major, a pre-1945 member of the Hungarian Communist Party and a leading cultural policy-maker in the Hungarian Communist regime. In a debate with architect Imre Perenyi at the first Congress of the Association of Hungarian Architects in April 1951, Major argued in favor of the principles of modern architecture. Referring to the debate, Jozsef Revai, then chief editor of *Szabad Nep* and Minister of Culture, wrote in *Társadalmi Szemle*, September 1951:

"This debate on the problems of our architecture is the result of our everyday experiences. We are dissatisfied with most of our houses and buildings. The government is dissatisfied, the Party is dissatisfied, and the people, too, are dissatisfied with these buildings. To put it baldly, we spend too much on our buildings, and under the pretext of modern functional architecture, we build them in an ugly style. We build boxes and name them, for example, MEOSZ (National Trade Union of Hungarian Construction Workers) Headquarters. Matters of expense and beauty arise together. No one feels that these buildings serve their purpose or fulfill their function; nor does anyone feel that they express the new world which our people are building. I believe that at this debate it is not necessary to explain that architectural style is an ideological problem, and as such, a political problem of primary

significance. I have been informed that popular opinion at the Technical University is with Comrade Major. Whoever criticizes Soviet architecture and takes a stand for modern architecture, as Comrade Major has done, advances the cause of architectural reaction."

"Not Every Kind of Discontent Is Revolutionary"

Revai characterized the modern movement in architecture as follows:

"The Bauhaus, the Le Corbusier trends are decadent. Even if there were ever in them a spark of revolt against the order under which miserable slums were built, not every kind of discontent is revolutionary . . . and in the field of architecture the petit-bourgeois rebels were incapable of making any close contact with the masses.

"The modernistic trend in architecture was not born in the age of the steam engine and the Industrial Revolution, as the followers of this school, among them Mate Major, contend. It grew out of the general economic, social and cultural chaos of capitalism after World War I. The 'service of man,' which is claimed as the basic principle of modern architecture, is not essential in the modern bourgeois world, only glass walls, houses built on piles, and meaningless flat surfaces, which make no sense even from the point of view of functionalism. Formalism is the essence of the new architecture."

He then quoted Premier Matyas Rakosi on the subject:

"I would like to inform the participants in this conference that Comrade Rakosi is deeply interested in this debate. I told him that we were having heated arguments about modern architecture and functionalism in architecture. He remarked: 'If only our architecture would at least be genuinely functional!' I think the experts will immediately understand what he meant by this seemingly humorous, but actually serious remark. What he meant was that the students' dormitory in Csepel is built on piles. The Lord only knows why this was necessary for the fulfillment of the specific functions of a students' dormitory. This way of building serves no purpose, it is impractical and expensive."

Revai compared the subways of Western cities with the Moscow Metro:

"In outward appearance the subways of the West are 'functional,' and they arouse a feeling of emptiness, desolation and drudgery in the workers. And the Moscow Metro? With its architectural style and sculptural ornaments, it creates the feeling in the working man that in the Soviet Union every single day is a holiday."

Revai turned again to attacking Major and his followers:

"According to Major, the Soviet architects themselves do not know what line to follow, therefore, [he argues], what can we learn from them? He maintains that we cannot learn from the architecture of a country in which no one can tell whether what is considered right today will still be right tomorrow. This, however, is a falsification of the facts; it gives a distorted picture of Soviet architecture. Even if we assume that Major is right in saying that there is no uniform architectural theory in the Soviet Union, we

must admit that they have architectural experience! Why did not Comrade Major analyze Soviet architectural experience, Soviet architecture in practice? Was there nothing he could learn from the buildings in Tashkent, Erivan, Leningrad or Moscow? From the new skyscrapers under construction in Moscow? From the new university being built on Lenin Mountain? To study these buildings would have been at least as worthwhile a task as to discuss Le Corbusier and the German Bauhaus."

Revai then brought the matter to its inevitable conclusion. "When we think of our Hungarian fatherland, we think of the beautiful classic buildings of Budapest, such as the National Museum, or Eger with its Baroque buildings. . . . We must develop a Hungarian Socialist architectural style; we have very much to learn from the new architecture in the Soviet Union."

Subsequently, the first Congress of Architects adopted the following resolutions, listed in *Magyar Épitőművészet*, January 1952:

"1. The cosmopolitan anti-artistic and anti-people's influence of bourgeois imperialist architecture, which has already been exposed, must be completely eliminated.

"2. The progressive traditions of Hungarian architecture must be cultivated; primarily, the heritage of classicist architecture of the Reform Period (early 19th century).

"3. Provisions must be made for every Hungarian architect to learn to know and make use of the achievements of the Soviet Union's exemplary architectural art."

Despite these rebukes, Major seems to have remained faithful to his controversial views. In 1953 he published an article in *Építészet és Társadalom* which was criticized by *Magyar Épitőművészet* in its November-December 1953 issue:

"The misconceptions of Comrade Major are compounded in every sentence of his exposition on modernism. All his former theories misrepresenting and justifying modernism in architecture, so sharply rejected by Comrade Revai at the time, can be found in his new work."

Nevertheless, Major's word continues to carry weight in the shaping of cultural policies, and the fact that so influential an architect persists in promoting modern architecture;—indeed, the fact that such a controversy still exists and is more or less openly debated in the press—indicates that in Hungary at least the issue of modern design in architecture is still alive. The official Party line on architecture does not, of course, differ from that in the other Satellites, as can be seen from the resolutions adopted at the 1954 Congress of Hungarian Architects (*Magyar Épitőművészet*, February 1954):

"The present standard of our architecture shows a definite improvement over the standard of cosmopolitan architecture of the pre-Congress [pre-Communist] period. Our architecture, particularly our urban architecture, has greatly benefited from the study of Soviet architecture." It was stressed that "Hungarian architects have taken a stand against cosmopolitanism, and openly functionalistic buildings are no longer being built. . . ."

The Congress attacked negative trends still extant: "1. Crypto-modernism, which means a modernistic composition adorned with unsuitable decorations. This is the most reactionary trend in our architecture because it gives the impression that Socialist-realist architecture is based on modernistic principles created by imperialism. This disguised modernism can be found even in our city planning. . . . 2. Eclectic trends, originally proper and well-meant, have slipped into unimaginative copying and bourgeois sentimentality. 3. There are those who arbitrarily use the national traditions without judgment and discipline, thereby creating anarchy and confusion in our architecture." To illustrate this last point the Congress mentioned one of the regime's pet projects, the settlement at the Komlo Coal Mines.

It was further alleged that "the development of architecture is hampered by lack of practical know-how and ideological ignorance, as a result of which the artist fails in one of his most important tasks, that of reflecting the sentiments of his society."

The Congress praised "increased adoption of the folk style," and architects who "use material in a new and individual manner." Concerning the future, the Congress called for greater emphasis of folk style and national traditions, particularly 19th century Hungarian classicism. However, "neither the past, nor any other period, must be copied mechanically. Revolutionary innovations must characterize the new Hungarian architecture."

In the 1951 discussions, Jozsef Revai had singled out one building as the epitome of "decadent functionalism." This building, the MEOSZ, was designed by the studio of Lajos Gadoros. On March 12, 1954, *Szabad Nep* mentioned this same building in a comparison with the more recent works of this studio: "Our architects prove not only that they have turned their backs on modernism but that they want and can produce artistic creations. A notable example of this is the development of Lajos Gadoros' art from the much-discussed MEOSZ building to his latest work, and the development of Gyorgy Srogh (an associate in the Gadoros studio) from the movie theater at Sztalinvaros to his police headquarters building at Csepel."

The February 1954 issue of *Magyar Egitomuveszet* wrote that "the works of Gadoros and his associates show courageous initiative." Gadoros himself expressed his architectural theory in the following way: "I must admit that at the time of the change [Communist takeover] the new classicism represented the basic starting point for all of us. However, I can accept it only as a starting point. We must continue the search and must not shrink from developing new architectural views which, although they deviate from the new classicism, are more suitable for the requirements of our Socialist society."


However, in the same newspaper, a well-known architect, Jozsef Korner, accused the Gadoros group of artistic snobbishness:

"Exhibited plans seem to indicate that the Gadoros studio aims at connoisseurs; it seeks to produce rarities for their taste and not to satisfy the healthy everyday needs of the masses. This attitude fills me with anxiety all the

more because the members of this studio are among the most gifted architects of our country."

The two most discussed works of the Gadoros studio are Bela Pinter's House of Culture at Tolna and Gyorgy Srogh's police headquarters at Csepel. Of the Tolna House of Culture, one critic said: "It is obvious that the designer of this building used old folk traditions and local color. . . . His courageous attempt to express the spirit of the village peasantry in the style of a Hungarian provincial public building was an eminent success." Architect Pal Virag added: "Let us imagine that this building was built somewhere else, for instance in Germany, or Switzerland, or even in a region geographically and scenically more like ours, such as the Russian Plains or among the colonial buildings of New England. It would always be an alien sight; the only place where it really belongs is the territory of Transdanubia. Nowhere else would these pillars be possible but here where they seem to have grown out of the soil; the large low-ceilinged halls would be implausible anywhere but among the peasant homes of Transdanubia." These comments misleadingly suggest the principles—"low, organic, peasant"—followed by modern architects like Frank Lloyd Wright: the actual subject is a typical stereotyped classicist building (below).

The Csepel police headquarters was not so enthusiastically received. The headquarters is on the main square of Csepel, where the Matyas Rakosi steel works, center of the Hungarian war industry, are located. Here in the midst of the working masses, this building has an all too obvious symbolic significance. *Magyar Egitomuveszet*, February 1954, commented that "the lines of the building are somewhat provincial, making it look rather like a South-Ger-



Tolna House of Culture, Hungary

man administration building. Aside from the fact that Csepel is not a small town, we must ask whether it is really expressive of what a Socialist police building represents. . . ." The newspaper declared:

"It is an indisputable fact and one proven anew day after day that our police is different from that of the capitalist states. The relationship between our police and the people is completely different from what it used to be



Police Headquarters, Csepel, Hungary

during the era of the Horthy regime. And this difference should be expressed in the building. It is a soft-contoured creation, projecting a warmth which affects even those not trained in the art of architecture. It gives everybody the sense of ownership, just as today we may also say the police belong to us.

"However, despite all this, we must point out the lack of discipline in the design of the building. If the architect had extended the discipline expressed in the upper part to the lower section of the building he would have attained his goal more efficiently. It is true that the Socialist police is friendly and cheerful—however, discipline, its inner meaning, should be expressed more forcefully."

Master Plan

It is only in the last two or three years that the Communist regimes in Europe have been able to shift their emphasis and to indulge in philosophical speculation about the style of their buildings. Immediate efforts after the war were necessarily directed toward rebuilding living and working quarters in war-devastated cities, and to building up the construction industry itself. The next phase in the Communist schedule was the construction of heavy industry: factories, dams, railroads and entire new industrial cities. This period saw the development of Nowa Huta in Poland, Dimitrovgrad in Bulgaria, Sztalinvaros in Hungary, Ostrava in Czechoslovakia, and Navodari in Romania, the planned new city on the Danube-Black Sea Canal (abandoned in 1953).

When conditions enabled a shift from the strictly economic to the social and ideological aspects of building, the regimes embarked on a giant "bread and circuses" building program of facilities to be used collectively by the masses: squares, stadiums, parks, subways, and in addition, government and Party buildings. This program is focussed on the capital cities of the captive countries which, as administrative and cultural nerve centers, seem intended to play the role of county seats in the Soviet empire. It is in these cities that the facade-building of the Soviet Union is being most literally reproduced.

"In The Mirror of Moscow"

In June 1954, Czechoslovakia's Minister of Culture Václav Kopecký declared at the Tenth Party Congress:


"I would like to state, with regard to our architects, that they did not have real opportunity as artists to assert their art as long as it was urgent, in the course of erecting new housing, to limit our aims to efficiency and economy. Only recently has the development of our building industry allowed us to create, along with standard constructions, individually planned buildings, and with the increasing number of new public buildings we can note a new improvement in our architectural art. We must admit that some of our architects still show traces of constructivist influence, although they attempt to approach the Soviet pattern. However, there can be no doubt that the large-scale and beautiful architecture of the Soviet Union has the admiration of all our architects. Following the Soviet example, which already serves the Polish architects in their reconstruction of Warsaw, our architects also strive for the new creative style distinguished by nobility, delicacy, beauty and harmony of line—the style of new Socialist elegance. It shows in various large and small constructions and projects for many new buildings which will be carried out. . . . We know of the discussions on the general plan of directives for the construction of Prague, as the historic capital of our country, as the capital of our People's Democratic Republic. Moscow is now becoming the most beautiful city in the world. We shall work so that in the mirror of Moscow . . . our beloved Prague shall be one of the shining pearls. . . ."

New projects for these cities generally call for the construction of a city center with the major public and government buildings grouped around a large square. This plan is based on classical Hellenic principles of town-planning, and also resembles Moscow's Red Square with its complex of public buildings.

Reconstruction of Warsaw



Poland emerged from the war as the most devastated country in Europe. 85 percent of Warsaw's buildings were rubble; Gdansk and Wrocław were almost obliterated. Reconstruction was a matter of extreme urgency, and in Warsaw in the first three post-war years, "fifty million cubic meters were rebuilt from the ground up and made available for occupation. This means that every day during these three years, 137 new rooms were added to the capital" (*Stolica*, July 22, 1953). It was not until 1949 that the Communist regime was sufficiently consolidated to take up questions of long-term planning. In July of that year, Premier Bolesław Bierut addressed the first conference of Party architects:

"We must make up for our negligence in the architectural forms of our building construction, where remnants of bourgeois cosmopolitanism prevail. The districts of pre-war Warsaw, chopped up into privately owned lots, could not be utilized for large-scale projects. In our time, however, when our planned economy has laid the basis for a truly harmonious and universal development of our national architecture, large-scale planning is now feasible."



*Moscow:
hotel under construction on Dorogomilovski Quai*

*Warsaw city center
(photograph and model)*





*Palace of Science and Culture
Warsaw, 1953*

At this time, the Six-Year Warsaw Reconstruction Plan was drawn up as the first stage in a twenty-year plan to be completed in 1970. In 1950, the Soviet Union presented Warsaw with the plans and funds for the construction of a Palace of Science and Culture named for Josef Stalin, which compelled a complete revision of the 1949 city plan in order to make the Palace the center of the city. *Trybuna Luna* (Warsaw) wrote on April 15, 1953, that "the Palace settled for once and all the question of ideology, plan and scale of the city center. Its function as a central point for popular demonstrations will help speed the Socialist education of the people." An article in *Przegląd Kulturalny*, April 23, 1953, declared that "the urgency of solving the practical needs of Warsaw's inhabitants handicapped Polish architects in their efforts to work out a clear plan of the whole city's composition. A suitable solution was given to the architects by the presentation of the Joseph Stalin Palace of Science and Culture. That principal, magnificent Socialist capitol will naturally become the center with which the future planning of the city will have to be synchronized."

Warsaw's city center, now nearing completion, covers an area one mile by two and a half miles long, set off from the rest of Warsaw by a wide belt of park. The Palace of Culture, which was finished in 1953, is set in Stalin Square, which will be one of the largest squares in Europe. Woven into the complex of new streets and buildings in this section is the "old city" of Warsaw, with its Baroque palaces, Gothic churches, and Classical landmarks such as the Opera and the National Bank, faithfully restored according to the demands of popular sentiment.

The plan for the rest of the city calls for four main industrial districts radiating from the center, each with its own factories, office buildings and residential sections complete with schools, nurseries, shops and cultural houses. At the end of the Six Year Plan in 1955, three of these districts—Zeran, Mlociny and Kamionek—will be completed.

Budapest city center
model



Prize-winning plans for Matyas Rakosi
University, Budapest



Bucharest

In Romania, new public buildings in Bucharest include the Scinteia Palace, the Music Theatre, the Pavilion of Agriculture, the University City, and the J. V. Stalin Park. For the World Festival of Youth in 1953, an enormous open-air theater and a stadium were erected in the August 23 Park for Culture and Sports. *Architectura RPR*, February, 1954, described the open-air stadium as "an architectonic monumnet to peace and friendship." (It was contrasted with similar structures in the bourgeois countries: "Since the principal preoccupation in the building of stadiums has always been with the material profits which these places can bring, [capitalist] designers mercilessly exploited the seating capacity of these places which are overcrowded and have inadequate exits and entrances.")

Budapest

In Budapest, the regime plans to reconstruct the whole section where the Royal Palace stood, which was badly damaged in 1945 when the Red Army besieged the capital. Opposite this section, on the other side of the Danube, will be the government quarter where military, Party and government offices will be located (above left).

A typical example of regime Classicist architecture is the design for the reconstruction of the Matyas Rakosi University of Technical Sciences in Budapest. The final plans are based on two blueprints which won first and second prize in a contest for its design (above).

Sofia


On November 20, 1951, the Council of Ministers in Bul-



Scinteia Palace
Bucharest
1952



1st Prize project for Central Army Headquarters, Prague



model of Sofia city center

sketch for new Council of Ministers, Sofia

garia issued a decree calling for a complete rebuilding of the center of Sofia, "for the fuller satisfaction of the increasing cultural needs of the working people and for the transformation of the capital into a model Socialist city." The entire city was then redesigned by a commission of Soviet specialists: Professor N. H. Polyakov, Architect Naumov, Academicians A. G. Gegelyo and N. P. Blokhin. It has not one but two major squares; Lenin Square on the site of the former Cathedral Square, and adjacent to it, the Ninth of September Square, formerly Alexander Square. The House of People's Councils, the Central Hotel, Central Universal Stores, Ministry of Heavy Indus-

try and Ministry of Electrification will be in Lenin Square. The Council of Ministers building, the headquarters of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Georgi Dimitrov Mausoleum and the Bulgarian Concert Hall are being built in the Ninth of September Square.

Prague

Technicke Noviny (Prague), May 19, 1954, carried an illustrated article on new projects which have already been built, or are to be built in the future, and "which will transform Prague into a Socialist city." Among the projects mentioned is a new central square which will be built diagonally across the Vltava from the Castle and which will be connected by wide boulevards with other main squares, such as the Old Town Square, the Square of Letna, and the Square of the Builders. New public buildings will be built on these squares. The article emphasizes that old architectural monuments will be carefully preserved and new buildings artistically blended into the picture of Old Prague. The "transformation" of Prague—a city which survived the war relatively undamaged—will apparently be less radical than that of Warsaw and Sofia.



Communist Party headquarters, Sofia



model of hotel under construction in Prague

House of People's Councils (Soviets), Sofia



The Imperial Facade

In spite of the conscious and persistent Soviet effort to export its architectural practice and theory, many problems have arisen in their application to the captive countries. The Soviet export is, in practice, difficult to "blend" with native traditions and, in theory, is impossible to understand or make concrete. "Nationalist in form" has turned out to mean minor details of decoration are done in "native, folklorist style" and "Socialist in content" has turned out to be drab, uniform, uninspired copying of the block-like Soviet buildings with their covering of gingerbread, curleques and columns.

But the failure of the Communists to create an indigenous "new" architecture does not mean that their architecture does not reflect and betray their civilization. Communist architecture is an architecture of empire and facade. Its imperial quality is not only in the pediments, columns and friezes, in the monumental buildings and statuary, but is revealed as well in the way the cities are planned from the center. All the overwhelming power of the State is concentrated in a center of colossal proportions, dwarfing all other sections of the cities. It is

there that the largest towers, the spired "Palaces" replacing the medieval cathedrals as the dominant point in the skyline, and the ponderous government buildings, all crowned with red stars, are to be found.

It is also an architecture of facade in the way it disguises its ugly, traditional reality with decoration, as Communism disguises its ugly, traditional politics with the facade of fine phrases. Is it accident alone that draws all attention to the facade, the decoration, instead of the structure? Is it coincidence that they use so little glass, so little "honesty" in permitting the spectator to see the materials they use, what goes on inside the buildings, and the true proportions and composition of the buildings? In its massiveness, in its drab sameness, in its emphasis on concrete, stone and brick, in its use of the distractions of facade, the Communists once more reaffirm and reinforce the difference between their myth and their reality. And the denial of advancing styles, under whatever label—decadence, cosmopolitanism, Westernism, modernism—is one more example of their turning to the past, and particularly to its imperial forms, which confirms and reveals their reaction.

Trojan Horse

THE citizens of Budapest are reminded every day of the new times that have come to Hungary. Streets which formerly bore the names of loved and revered leaders of the Hungarian people (such as Paul Teleki, who paid with his life for his protest against the German intervention in 1941) now commemorate the Red Terror of 1919 and the unhappiness of today.

The names of the cruelest commissars of Hungary's 1919 Communism—Corvin-Klein, Szamuely—and Communists both Russian and European—Stalin, Lenin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Tolbukhim, Dimitrov, Liebknecht, Marx, Beloyannis—identify the city streets and are forced daily to the people's lips.

Strangely, two who have so far escaped the purge, retaining for unknown reasons some claim on the regime's respect, are commemorated by Roosevelt Square and Montgomery Street.

Coal, Harvest and Production Surveys



Caption: The President of the Communal People's Council speaking: "All's well . . . although there may still be a few minor difficulties here and there in the most essential places. . ."

Rominia Libera (Bucharest), August 5, 1954

NUMEROUS regime reports from all Satellite countries indicate that present coal production is insufficient to meet the demand created by both the continued industrialization of the area and the new, current stress on increasing consumer goods output. Mismangement, lack of coordination, unrealistic planning have all sharply reduced the rate of expansion foreseen by the Communists; inadequate housing, hazardous working conditions, the inhuman working tempo have all given rise to a fantastically high rate of labor turnover, to persistent large-scale absenteeism and an abnormally low rate of productivity.

Coal

Hard coal is of crucial importance in Poland not only for internal consumption but also for export. Having produced 88.7 million tons of hard coal in 1953 (according to *Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw] of March 11), the country is now the fifth biggest coal producer in the world. And yet, the rate of increase has not met planned requirements.

Since the total increase has amounted to 14.5 million tons since 1949, the average yearly increment came to about 3.6 million tons. According to the goals for the Six Year Plan, total production ought to reach the 100 million mark by the end of 1955. In other words, the average yearly production for 1954-55 should amount to about 5.7 million tons. Official regime comments, however, tend to show that far from being able to raise the rate of increase, the Communists are desperately struggling to maintain past production levels. Thus, quoting from the statistical report on plan fulfillment for the first six months of 1954, Radio Warsaw of July 20 announced that the target for hard coal had not been met.

One of the major causes of worry for the regime is the high rate of labor turnover. Referring to this problem, *Trybuna Ludu* of March 15 revealed that "due to negligence and an insufficient care for the miners' living conditions, nearly 83 percent of newly-accepted workers quit their jobs in 1953. . . ." On July 11, 1954, the same paper

reviewed the whole coal situation and came to the following conclusions:

"Our fast growing industry, our fleet and our railroads need more and more coal. . . . Everybody knows that the production of coal does not and cannot increase as fast as the demand for it. Coal is also our basic export product. Many people in Poland are still not aware of the immense advantages given our national economy through the export of coal, and they do not realize the extent of the losses resulting from a curtailment of these exports. A wastage of coal means less wool, iron ores and other raw materials imported from abroad; it represents a reduction of imported consumer goods."

To cope with this situation, a national conference on coal saving was held in Warsaw on July 7. Wastefulness in the use of coal by foundries, the chemical and consumer goods industries as well as pottery production centers was scored. The conferees recommended that greater use be made of lower quality coal and that brown coal be substituted for hard coal whenever possible.

Czechoslovakia

The coal situation in Czechoslovakia became so critical during the winter months that a large part of the passenger traffic was suspended, freight transport curtailed and factories, power stations and other industrial installations were severely affected (see March issue, p. 3). The regime was panicked into drastic action and, if its statistics are to be taken at face value, a short, temporary improvement then took place.

For the first half of the year, according to Minister of Fuel and Power Jonas (*Rude Pravo*, July 4), the planned target was exceeded by 852,000 tons. By August 3, however, *Rude Pravo* admitted that, starting in June, production had once again declined: "The honorable task of providing stocks of coal for the winter period . . . is not being implemented; the debt amounted to 20,000 tons of hard coal in June, and it rose in July." On July 31, Radio Prague commented on a *Rude Pravo* editorial entitled "For

a Higher Coal Output." The paper stressed that "the plan for coal production was fulfilled in the first half of this year, mainly because the output for April and May was high, but for June, and especially now in July, it dropped."

As in Poland, a conference was hurriedly called to discuss measures to be taken to cope with the emergency. Representatives of the government, Party, Trade Unions and other organs took part in the discussions, held in Prague July 3-4. President Zapotocky, First Deputy Premier A. Cepicka and Minister of Fuel and Power Jonas were the main speakers. The conferees had to admit that none of the basic problems had so far been solved. Commenting on the meeting, *Rude Pravo* of July 5 stated that "it would be foolish to conceal . . . that a considerable part of the success of [of recent months] was due to the immediate effect of special aid and preference given to coal output in the form of financial and material help, the establishing of a special construction agency for the mines, priority in machine deliveries, the assignment of an extra labor force . . . and considerable help by the army." This concentrated effort could obviously not be maintained indefinitely. "At present," commented *Rude Pravo* of July 16, "workers are completing terms they signed up for to help the miners. . . ." The paper added that workers should be released from "light industry, the distributive, engineering and other industrial sectors" for immediate transfer to the mines.

Now that the situation is once again officially recognized as critical, some of the underlying causes are discussed at great length almost daily in the regime press. *Mlada Fronta* (Prague) of July 18 scored the unwarranted granting of sick leaves, accusing miners of malingering to shirk work; *Rude Pravo* of July 16 spoke of the administrative "chaos" that permitted absenteeism to exist on a large scale without being either recorded or checked; *Prace* (Prague) of July 6 explained that while Ostrava (producing more than three quarters of total Czechoslovak coal output) had received 549 new miners in May, it had lost 361 men in the same period; and *Prace* on June 24 published a regulation of the Council of Ministers forbidding the indiscriminate granting of bonuses, which henceforth will have to be specifically approved by either the Ministry or the central administration. Comments on this topic show that the universal granting of such bonuses detracted from their incentive effect, thus burdening the regime with added expenses which did not produce the desired effects of more production and higher productivity.

A most revealing article appeared in *Rude Pravo* on August 10, in which complaints were voiced about the lack of energy and efficiency displayed in the application of "progressive methods of work" and the "full use of mechanization." The mines best mechanized, the paper explained, are those of the North Bohemian coal basin. But even there, "the full capacity of machines has been used only 41.24 percent. . . ."

The regime coal dilemma can be summed up by juxtaposing two statements made at the coal conference. Deputy Premier Cepicka stated, "It can be said that the coal

industry received universal financial, material, moral and political help . . . and all reasonable requests have been met" (*Rude Pravo*, July 5). Jonas, on the other hand, admitted that "Ostrava has been below plan since 1951."

Hungary

The original Hungarian Plan for 1954 called for a total production of 27 million metric tons (*Szabad Nep*, May 16, 1951). For 1953, the target was 23.3 million tons and, according to *Szabad Nep* of January 27, 1954, only 21.3 million tons were produced. In view of this failure in plan fulfillment and in line with the somewhat more realistic New Course approach introduced last year, the 1954 target was scaled down. According to *Szabad Nep*, January 23, 1954, Bela Szalai, Chairman of the Planning Office, speaking at a meeting of the National Assembly held the previous day, announced that this year's production goal was to be 22,650,000 tons or 4.5 million tons less than originally called for. And yet, despite the planned reduction, the target is not being met. As reported in *Szabad Nep* of August 1, 1954, Erno Gero, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, stated that:

"Preparations for the next winter require the successful solution of many important tasks. The most important and at the same time the most difficult task is the elimination of the grave lag in coal production. In the second quarter of this year coal mining failed to fulfill the plan: the industry has now contracted a debt to the country. The debt further increased in July, and now amounts to some 300,000 metric tons. . . . We must not permit our coal mining to produce even a tenth of a percent less than the set target."

Almost daily throughout July the regime harped on the seriousness of the coal situation, revealing both the causes for the emergency and the hurried counter measures now being applied. "Too little care is being given to the spreading of pioneer work methods in our coal industry," reported Radio Budapest on July 11. "In the first week of the second half of the year, the country received less coal than before," was the progress report given by the same station on July 18. "In the course of this month coal mining has not fulfilled its target—our miners want to make up for this . . . and help the flood victims by producing more coal" (Radio Budapest, July 30).

In outlining remedies, *Szabad Nep* of August 1 points to the lack of concern for worker welfare as one of the major causes for the present impasse: "Good ventilation and good lighting must be assured and labor protection must be substantially improved. . . . The health and physical safety of mine workers must be much better protected." A second obstacle to efficiency consists in stifling, wasteful bureaucracy and a poor or complete lack of organization. A July 30 *Szabad Nep* article, for instance, referred to the fact that "in some mines the plan for cutting pits has not been fulfilled for months." Referring more specifically to the organization of labor, *Szabad Nep* of August 1 promised that the government would give the industry "substantial support," but added that a reorganization within the industry would have to take place: "There must be an increase

of workers employed directly in coal mining in relation to the total number of workers." The paper also stressed that "the manner in which work is distributed and checked must be improved; work discipline must be strengthened; the reception and breaking in of new workers must be organized."

As is the case in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the high rate of labor turnover has been, and continues to be, a major problem. It seems, however, that this difficulty has been compounded by the New Course accent on increasing agricultural production. "When, at the beginning of the agricultural season, many workers left the mines, the vacancies were filled from the staff of workers who do the preparatory work," commented *Szabad Nep* of July 30, implying that the coal industry had to depend on its own resources now that the agricultural sector needed as many persons as were willing to join it.

Bulgaria

Zemedelsko Zname (Sofia) of July 28 gave the following report from the statistical office: "due to organizational weaknesses . . . the plan for the first six months of the year has not been fulfilled with respect to lignite, anthracite and hard coal." Three days earlier, Radio Sofia broadcast the text of a *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) editorial entitled, "Let us Apply the New Methods of Work in the Coal Industry." The article pointed out that the "disproportions between coal production and the needs of the national economy" had to be "liquidated." Other regime pronouncements, however, indicate that little has been done to achieve this result. On July 1, for instance, *Trud* (Sofia) mentioned that:

"The fulfillment of the enormous tasks for the development of the coal and ore industries during the Second Five Year Plan demands new, speedier methods of work in the mines. One of these methods is the speedy digging of galleries. Its application intensifies the preparatory work in the building of new pits and in the release of manpower."

"Up to now, however, more has been said than done on this topic . . . the speedy digging of galleries is very seldom applied. The building of new pits . . . is seriously lagging behind schedule. . . ."

One of the major handicaps hindering an increase of Bulgarian coal production is the shortage of technicians and trained personnel. The March issue of *Minno Delo* (Sofia), official organ for heavy industry, published the following extract from a report on mining by Deputy Premier Anton Yugov:

"From 1949 to 1952 the increase in the production of coal was 3,149,000 tons. Because of an insufficiency of bituminous coal, we started a mass exploitation of lignite coal. . . . The Ministry of Heavy Industry shows many weaknesses in the organization of work and in supplying of qualified technical cadres. During 1954, 740 mining engineers, 1,870 mining technicians, 420 geological engineers and hydrologists will be trained. . . . For the entire period from September 1944 to 1952 there were only 16 new mining engineers."

The Deputy Minister does not explain how the Communists, who have trained only 16 mining engineers in eight years, will now be able to train 740 of them in one year. However, in the same issue of the magazine an article is devoted to the quality of the personnel that is being trained. Its author, engineer B. Gantchev, writes: "although the number of mining technical schools is growing, the quality of the training is not of a sufficiently high level." He adds:

"... the same is true of our faculty in the Mining and Geological Institute. . . . Most of the lecturers are engineers or technicians who at the same time are working in the mines or somewhere else. They are often absent from class and the students are left without lecturers. They are very badly paid, which is the reason for their lack of interest in their teaching activity. There is a shortage of laboratories, testing instruments, and scientific collections for the practical teaching of students."

Romania

While a *Scinteia* editorial entitled "Miners' Day" (broadcast over Radio Bucharest on August 8) boasts that "as shown by the figures of the Central Board of Statistics, miners have fulfilled the overall planned targets by 102.5 percent," an explanatory section of the same report states that "in the first half of this year the mining industry failed to fulfill its plan with respect to some main categories." The *Scinteia* editorial exhorts mine workers as follows:

"The miners' patriotic duty is to intensify the struggle for more coal and more mine ores, a necessary condition for raising the material and cultural standards of the working people. Achievements obtained by various miners' teams engaged in Socialist competitions fully prove that all workers in mining enterprises have the possibility of exceeding former production figures."

"All mining enterprises are called upon to use organizational-technical measures in order to secure better organization of work and better utilization of equipment and materials. The rapid liquidation of shortcomings is the foremost task facing miners. . . ."

"Party organizations and enterprise committees are called upon to pay greater attention to the organizational and political conduct of Socialist competitions. They must do away with bureaucratic and formalistic methods and study more seriously the systematic expansion of advanced experience and methods, especially the cyclic graph method. They must sponsor sound political activity which will lead to the constant strengthening of work discipline and the full utilization of equipment."

Floods and Harvest

In the past few weeks the Satellite press has been devoting an enormous amount of space to news about the harvest. While such articles are a matter of routine in most years, the present exhortations are indicative of a real emergency. The crisis is partly due to the long spell of bad weather that has disrupted harvesting throughout Europe; but it is also the result of a combination of regime ineptitude and fierce peasant resistance. For the Commu-

Causes and . . . effects



Captions: President of the People's Council—Comrade engineer, please check on the progress of the weeding campaign. I haven't got the time . . .

Engineer to the agricultural agent—Have a look at the weeding campaign.—I've got something else to do . . .

Agricultural agent to the messenger—Tell the people to go out and get the weeding done.—I am busy . . .

The weeds—We are darn lucky. Everybody sent everybody else to do the weeding; that's why we're still here.

Urzica (Bucharest), May 31, 1954.

nists, the threat of a poor harvest or the threat of a decrease in State deliveries would spell a major reverse. It would entail the loss of substantial amounts of extra investments in money, men and materiel allocated to the rural sector since the inception of the New Course. It would mean less and not more food, fewer consumer goods and, in general, a decrease rather than an increase in the people's standard of living. The fact that three Satellite regimes—East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia—have lately accepted United States relief help shows that the situation is indeed critical and that at the moment the Communists cannot afford altogether to ignore the people's plight, even at the expense of the loss of face in accepting food from "capitalist-imperialist" America.

Hungary

From the middle of July to the end of the month about 50 percent of space in the regime press was devoted to floods caused by the fast-rising waters of the Danube. The damage was no doubt considerable—40,000 citizens had to evacuate their homes and 2,500 houses were completely destroyed—but an objective appraisal of the losses sustained by Hungarian agriculture shows that the Communists deliberately dramatized the event by exaggerating its effects.

According to *Szabad Nep* of July 23, the area flooded by the Danube amounted to 39,100 hectares (68,875 cadastral acres); the total area of the country, on the other hand, amounts to some 9,308,000 hectares, and hence only an insignificantly small portion of the land was affected. On July 25, *Szabad Nep* raised somewhat the estimate of the area flooded, claiming that 30,500 hectares of Upper Danubian arable land had been under water. Since there are approximately 5.6 million hectares of arable land in Hungary and since little arable land was affected in the South Danubian area, the total amount of arable land flooded—probably not more than 40,000 hectares—consti-

tutes less than a hundredth of the overall area of Hungarian arable land. In spite of the inflated clamor about the flood damage, Radio Budapest claimed on July 20 that "the harvest promises to be good." On July 27, the same station stated that:

"The unfavorably dry fall, the long and very severe winter and the flood have caused a lot of damage to the grain acreage. Still, we can say now that in most places the crops reach, or even surpass, last year's good crops. This fact is primarily a tribute to the industriousness of the working peasantry. But at the same time it also demonstrates that the villagers' answer to the correct policy of the Party has been industrious work. The good harvest also shows that the entire country rushed to the aid of agriculture. . . ."

To mobilize "the entire country" seems to be at least one explanation for the excessive stress put on the floods. Greater efforts are thereby exacted from all sectors of the economy under the pretext that a "natural" disaster is being fought. On July 20, for instance, *Szabad Nep* reported that workers had "voluntarily" offered to overfulfill their norms by two percent in order to make up for damages caused by the floods. Other regime reports mentioned that workers had volunteered to work special Sunday shifts to help the flood victims. A typical example of such "voluntary" mobilization is a July 29 *Szabad Nep* heading which read: At *Ad Hoc* Meeting of Ganz Factory Workers Promise Forint Aid to Flood Victims. Some workers went so far as to "offer" ten percent of their wages for a three month period. By August 6, according to Radio Budapest, 21,397,000 *forint* had been "collected."

The floods have also been used by the regime to exert ever greater pressure on the peasants to fulfill their delivery quotas. On July 20, Radio Budapest said that "The highest democratic duty of the peasantry has arrived: the quick, exact delivery of grain right from the threshing machines. . . . The improvement of the population's food

supply, the securing of bread for the country, depends decisively on the success of grain collecting. . . ." The broadcast then linked State collection to the floods in the following manner:

"In the past months in many communities social concessions for aged people, invalids and for those doing military service have been issued in great abundance—including to persons who had no right to such concessions. Similar attempts [at obtaining more concessions than justified] were experienced in more than one place when damages from natural disasters were estimated. . . . Our councils and collective offices . . . must reject energetically groundless lawless demands. . . ."

On August 5 *Szabad Nep* returned to the subject of "unlawful" concessions, clearly indicating that the underfulfillment of deliveries has become a subject for acute worry:

"Just as the granting of lawful concessions is compulsory, so one must strictly prohibit anyone from receiving concessions unjustly. In spite of this many village Councils have given social concessions in great quantities since January of this year. This unlawful giving of concessions was promoted by contradictory measures issued by the Ministry of Collection. . . ."

"Families were given double quota booklets, thus illegally reducing the amount of grain due to the State by several thousand car loads. The country-wide data shows that of 100 concessions given, 40 were illegal. *These figures prove that the Councils, organs of State power, closed their eyes and allowed everyone to swindle the State.* The district and county councils did not make the Council President responsible for these incredible measures in a single instance. . . . One of the chief tasks of councils and delivery quota offices is to examine all delivery concessions and to take back all those that are illegal. Now, at the beginning of the harvest in gathering, *in many villages there are farmers who have already threshed all their grain . . . and nevertheless have not fulfilled their deliveries.*

" . . . Those who are intentionally lagging with delivery should be punished by a 20 percent increase of their quota, and those who do not fulfill their obligation after punishment should be made to give an account on the spot.

"The country expects the councils and officials concerned with collection to protect the law of delivery during these days and weeks and to see to it that every farmer deliver grain which belongs to the State straight from the threshing machine." [Italics added].

In conclusion, it seems that this year's harvest will be poorer than last year's but better than that of 1952. In so far as the New Course concessions included a reduction of grain deliveries averaging 20 percent, the State share this year will be appreciably lower. As far as the regime is concerned, therefore, the concessions have not paid off, and it remains to be seen whether in the months ahead the Communists will be willing to release stocks to obviate a food crisis in urban centers.

Czechoslovakia

Two weeks after the June 11-15 Party Congress had resolved "to improve agricultural production immediately,"

torrential rains, hail, floods and insects severely damaged crops awaiting harvest. According to Radio Prague July 18, "streams turned into wild rivers, rivers into lakes flooding areas. . . ." On July 11, while it was still raining, an appeal was made to the entire population to go out into the fields and search for "colorado beetle" threatening to ruin the potato crop. On July 23, Minister of Agriculture Uher declared over Radio Prague, "Experience gained so far with respect to the harvest in Slovakia and Moravia shows that unfavorable weather conditions cannot be made up for even by the best will and effort of kolkhoz, small and middle farmers and MTS and State Farm workers; not even their utmost effort would help."

As in Hungary, the floods were used as a pretext for a dramatic mobilization of the whole country. "In order to ensure sufficient quantity of bread and enough food for all of us," said Uher, "this year's harvest must become the concern of the entire nation." On July 12 *Rude Pravo* said that "heavy work will be required from thousands of people from towns and villages . . . it will be necessary to work regardless of weather, and also Sunday and at night . . . planning so far has been lagging."

That the present situation is only partly attributable to bad weather was made amply plain in a Radio Prague announcement of July 9, which stated that at that time only 12.7 percent of the hay delivery program had been carried out. The commentator added that this was "not alone the fault of the weather . . . organization and agitation are poor."

As far as total production is concerned, an editorial in *Pravda* (Bratislava) July 19, optimistically forecast that "despite unfavorable weather, the harvest promises to be better than last year." In view of the aforementioned comments, this statement is probably unrealistic. The significant point, however, is that the same editorial proceeds to stress that "the problem is carry out the purchase of crops [forced State deliveries] smoothly." The article points out that "agitation" and an understanding of peasants' problems are important and that members of national committees themselves must deliver their quotas, "thus setting a good example." The implication that these members have not complied with their "duty" is inescapable, particularly in view of the denunciation of kulaks that follows the remark: "We must not forget that during harvest . . . the kulak intensifies his activity and tries to influence the morale of small and medium peasants through the spread of hostile theories."

That the regime is not obtaining results commensurate with its investments can be inferred from the following excerpt taken from a July 24 *Rude Pravo* editorial:

"This year's good harvest prospects, the reduction of delivery quotas and the supply of more agricultural machines have created favorable conditions for the grain bulk buying campaign. On the other hand, the reduction of delivery quotas, decreed last December, make their exact implementation absolutely necessary. . . ."

"The political aspect of the campaign involves the persuasion of small and medium farmers that they must fulfill their duty toward the State in return for the favorable conditions created for them by the people's democratic regime."


To lure persons to the land, the regime, has had to make new concessions. On July 31, for instance, the Slovak office for pensions announced that this year's pensions will not be lowered in case pensioners earn more money by helping out in the harvest: "On the contrary, the office appeals to all pensioners to go ahead and help collect the harvest." A *Pravda* (Bratislava) editorial, July 30, admitted that "manpower is a constant problem during this year's harvest," and recommended that agitation be stepped up.

Poland

On June 20, 1954, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) published a resolution of the Party's Central Committee concerning the harvest-threshing campaign. The resolution specified procedures to be followed in the following tasks: 1. preparing machinery, 2. organizing neighborly help, 3. attending to supply, 4. clearing the fields after the harvest. The Party measure also contained work instructions for MTS and collective farms, State farms and mass political organizations. The harvest, which usually starts toward the beginning of July in the Southern provinces, was therefore thoroughly organized, and the first regime reports were optimistic. By the middle of the month, however, the weather was blamed for delays and difficulties.

On July 8, *Trybuna Ludu* reported that "in spite of bad weather, the harvest of basic crops has started throughout the country. Two days later, the paper announced that "there is a good crop in most parts of the country, but the harvest is difficult—storms and rains beat the crops to the ground. . . ." From then on, more and more stress was put on difficulties created by the freakish weather. On July 25, Radio Warsaw announced that "unfavorable weather conditions have caused a serious delay in this year's harvest"; the next day the station declared that "rain is seriously obstructing harvest work"; on the 27th, Radio Warsaw broadcast the text of a Ministerial appeal urging farmers "not to waste a single minute and work on Sundays and holidays in view of the considerable delays in harvesting caused by rain and bad weather"; two days later, on July 29, Deputy Minister of Agriculture Wacław Szyr said that farmers were "in arrears in many areas as regards the overripeness of the grain." He explained that further delay "might result in the grain dropping from the ears."

Szyr also stated that "in view of the fact that a very large part of the grain had been flattened, the gathering has been rendered very difficult." He went on to say that some people therefore recommended that machines be discarded and scythes used instead. "This is completely out of question," the official asserted, particularly with reference to State and collective farms: "even a full mobilization of labor would result in a delay of the harvest. . . ." But reliance on machinery might not prove to be effective either. Thus, on July 16, Radio Warsaw said that "the harvest is hampered to a great extent by the badly-organized machinery at MTS," and on July 24, the regime radio was even more specific, accusing the MTS in the Szczecin, Gdansk and Białystok regions of having "shown neglect in getting their machinery ready." The situation did not improve as harvest reached its peak, for on August 9 Radio



Caption: That is how the management of the Mts at Limanowa calculated the useability of its machines.

Legend reads: Total, 65 percent; in reality, nought.

Szpilki (Warsaw), August 1, 1954.

Warsaw complained once again, "in many State farms and MTS harvesting machines are not adequately used."

A brief announcement over Radio Warsaw the same day indicates that in Poland too, deliveries are not being effected smoothly. The broadcast said, "The Poznan Voievodship is leading in grain deliveries; National Councils are imposing fines on resisting kulaks." On August 14, Radio Warsaw announced that "many kulaks sabotage the deliveries, supplying corn which already begins to sprout." A highly revealing account of peasant resistance in Poland appeared in *Express Poznanski* (Poznan), July 8, 1954. It is significant that the incident should have been reported only in this provincial paper and that the national press ignored it. The paper tells how two young men—Józef Szalkowski, nineteen, and Antoni Szarwark, twenty-six—both allegedly sons of "kulaks" and both from the village of Swoboda of the Chodzież district were hauled before the Poznan Provincial Court. They were charged with having attempted to harm Party propagandists sent to further collectivization of the region. The account read as follows:

"On April 3 of this year, a team of social activists engaged in the promotion of closer relationship between the countryside and town arrived at the village of Swoboda. Their purpose was to acquaint . . . small and medium farmers with [the procedure for] the establishment of a collective farm.

"Having decided to hinder the activists' task, Szalkowski and Szarwark fastened a wire to the fence flanking

the road and placed a telegraphic pole in the way. . . .
 "The Court condemned Szarwark to three years and Szalkowski to twenty months in prison."

The incident is remarkable for what it tells about the strength of peasant resistance and the relative impotence of the regime in attempting to fight it. Based on past Communist performance, the sentence was very light, particularly in view of the fact that the defendants had been typed as "kulaks," a charge which in itself had often warranted long terms of imprisonment in pre-New Course days. It seems therefore that at present the regime is of the opinion that it can ill afford to antagonize the peasantry by the use of arbitrary force. Thus, though the State is obviously worried about the progress of its delivery campaign, it has lately been forced to lower these delivery quotas in some cases in order to achieve a higher level of total production.

According to an ordinance of the Council of Ministers of July 12, 1954, and reported in *Express Wieczorny* of that day, kolkhozes in which the average land per family amounts to more than 10 hectares will henceforth have their delivery quotas reduced by 20 percent. The measure is apparently meant to induce collective farms to cultivate fallow land and thus increase production.

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria, the Southernmost country in the area, the gathering of the harvest was almost completed by the end of July, and in the past few weeks the main regime concern has been for a speedy execution of the threshing. By July 24, according to *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia) on that day, the situation was as follows:

"Harvesting is almost done, while threshing has not yet started. According to information available to the Ministry of Agriculture, by June 21 the plan for harvesting of the whole country had been fulfilled 76.3 percent and that of threshing by only 10 percent. The MTS are even more behind schedule as far as threshing is concerned. At that time . . . they had threshed only three percent of the quantity fixed by the plan. The daily increase of threshing in the last few days has been from .7 to 1 percent.

"What do these figures show? They show that harvesting is seriously lagging behind. The figures also show that there exists a serious danger that so important a task will be prolonged into the fall.

"The lag in harvesting is not accidental. It is due mainly to the fact that the majority of leaders in the rural sector—the executive committees of the people's councils, the managing councils of MTS and kolkhozes are reaping the result of their lack of organization. . . ."

Of course the regime also tries to blame the weather whenever it can. On July 19, *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) reported that the crop "is still being endangered by the elements of nature." The next sentence, however, states that "basic weakness and slowness in organization" is also at fault. As in the other countries, numerous articles encourage day and night work, "volunteer help" and the "punctual fulfillment" of State grain deliveries.

Romania

On August 3, Radio Bucharest gave a preliminary report on the state of the harvest. The broadcast said that the crop had been gathered over an area of 2,512,569 hectares, representing 68.3 percent of the plan. At that time, harvesting had been completed 74.2 percent—barley 79.3 percent, rye 66.5 percent and peas 80 percent. Indications are that the crop will be poor. Earlier in the year the regime had announced that, because of heavy snowfalls and due to the late and short spring, more than 200,000 hectares sown with autumn wheat had to be replowed and sown with corn. On July 28 *Scinteia* referred to the bad weather (without, however, mentioning any Danubian floods) and then came to the crux of the question in the following words:

"No doubt the abundant rainfall has contributed to the delay, but the main reason for this impermissible discrepancy between reaping and threshing and hoeing is the lack of concern of Party organizations, people's councils and agricultural authorities for the mobilization of all resources."

And in Romania too the Communists are most concerned about their share of the harvest:

"In the regions of Galatz, Bucharest and Timisoara, for example, there is a large difference between the quantities of grain threshed and those collected. People's councils . . . are at fault, for they assure the daily transportation of collected crops to the reception bases. This means that political work is inefficiently carried out by district party committees, rural basic organizations and people's councils."

Half-Year Plan Results

The current coal emergency and the difficulties experienced in the agricultural sector are symptomatic of the basic disruptions now plaguing all Satellite regimes. The New Course, which was partly meant to remedy economic imbalance and to effect a rise in the standard of living of the people, appears to have seriously affected—though perhaps only temporarily—the entire productive capacity of these countries. Even in industrial production, which still remains a cornerstone of Communist planning, the results for the first six months of the year are meager both quantitatively and qualitatively. As far as total industrial output is concerned, the table below shows indices for plan-fulfillment released by the statistical offices of the Satellite countries from 1950 to the present:

Percentage Indices of Overall Industrial Production

	1950	1951	1952	1953	First Half 1954
Romania	104	104.5	101.7	101.8	100.14
Bulgaria	100.2	99.8	98.9	100.6	98
Poland	107.4	100.8	98	103.9	102.8
Hungary	109.6	103.4	100.7	101.3	101.1
Czechoslovakia	102.7	99.7	98.5	99	101.4

The table shows that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the indices for the first six months of 1954 are lower

than for 1953. Also, in the case of three countries—Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria—the half year figure is lower than that for any preceding year. These figures are all the more remarkable in view of the fact that generally speaking the tempo of industrial expansion has been reduced lately throughout the area. In fact, in Hungary total industrial output this year is scheduled to be below the 1953 level.

Romania

Departing from their usual practice of publishing results of quarterly plans, the Romanian regime this year did not issue figures on production for the first three months of 1954. On the basis of figures released on July 29 bearing on results for the first half of the year, it seems that the unusual silence was due to a relative failure in meeting set targets. Although many ministries allegedly overfulfilled the plan, in no case was this "success" statistically very impressive and, seen from the point of view of regime qualifications, criticisms and "explanations," it seems that there is very little real relation between the indices of plan fulfillment for entire ministries and the actual results obtained by specific production centers.

The qualification attached to the figure of 102 percent plan fulfillment for coal has already been discussed. In many other instances, the communique scores the lack of attention paid to quality. The claim is made, for instance, that some goods could not be sold because the people did not like them. Considering the desperate shortage of consumer goods, it is very probable that these items were totally unusable. Referring in general to the production of consumer goods, the communique states that "in spite of positive results achieved, consumer goods production has not been developed according to possibilities because some ministries have not given sufficient weight to measures for increasing both quantity and variety. . . ."

Ministries—or main branches of ministries—which did not reach the 100 percent mark were: the oil industry with 97.7 percent, wood, paper and cellulose with 95.9 percent, communal economy and social industry with 96.3 percent, industrial enterprises of the Ministry of Construction with 89.5 percent and industrial enterprises of the Central Union of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives with 90.3 percent.

In many cases ministries which supposedly fulfilled their overall plans were charged with having failed in the attainment of important specific goals. Thus, though the Ministry for Food was credited with having carried out its task 100.7 percent, it failed to meet targets on meat, fish and dairy products. The Ministry of Light Industry, which allegedly overfulfilled its plan by 1.2 percent, did not produce the required amount of footwear and metal consumer goods. The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry was accused, among others, of not having used its capacity to the full—in spite of a recorded 100.6 plan fulfillment.

Production sections that officially fared best were: the industrial enterprises of the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry with 109.8 percent, the industrial enterprises of the Railway Ministry with 106.1 percent and the Central Union of Artisan Cooperatives with 108.5 percent.

Poland

According to the communique issued July 21, only one ministry—that of Meat and Milk Industries—did not fulfill the plan, having reached only 96 percent of the target. Regime figures show that all other ministries exceeded the 100 percent mark in overall production. And yet, the communique mentions that "some ministries did not fulfill the plan with respect to some important items."

The Ministry of Smelting (with an implementation of 104 percent) "did not fulfill the plan with respect to pig iron and some non-ferrous metals"; the Ministry of Mining (with 102 percent) as mentioned above, failed in the crucial field of hard coal production; the Ministry of Machine Industry (with 105 percent) fell short in the production of some types of automobiles, some types of freight and passenger railroad cars, textile machinery and ball bearings; the Ministry of Chemical Industry (with 105 percent) did not produce a sufficient quantity of various kinds of fertilizers; the Ministry of Building Materials (104 percent) failed in the production of cement and bricks; the Ministry of Light Industry (103 percent) did not fulfill the plan with respect to wool fabrics and leather shoes and, as could be expected from the official admission of non-fulfillment for the Ministry of Meat and Milk Industries, the production of both butter and meat was insufficient to meet planned requirements.

Apart from these failures of a quantitative nature, the communique also stresses less tangible shortcomings with respect to poor quality. The statistical bureau reports, for instance, that some ministries did not comply with instructions in that they failed to improve the quality of such products as wool fabrics, women's stockings and shoes, radio sets, bicycle chains, sewing machines, threshing machines and harvesters.

Some of the results achieved have apparently entailed the excessive use of raw materials. Such over-use occurred in the smelting of iron and non-ferrous metals, in the chemical and light industries as well as in the agricultural-consumer goods industry. Furthermore, as openly admitted in the communique, the planned reduction of production costs did not take place, especially in the Ministries of Mining, Foundries and Light Industry.

Although planned investments were supposed to have kept at the 1953 level, a nine percent increase took place. The report explains this rise by stating that "fulfillment of the plan for the first half of 1954 was accelerated." Presumably, an extra amount of pressure—and money—had to be applied in the last few weeks to bring production up to schedule. It is significant that investments for agriculture were 28 percent higher than in 1953, while industry received only seven percent more. Since the gravest failure occurred in the production of meat and milk, this switch so far has not brought about the desired results.

Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovak report is a blatant example of Communist statistical juggling. Ostensibly, the communique lists a variety of separate ministries. In actual fact, some of the categories given are either individual segments of a



Caption: Some enterprises for work-by-assault and so fulfill half the production during the last part of the month. Consequently, there are many rejects in these enterprises.

Signs read (from left to right): First third of month, second third, last third.

Urzica (Bucharest), May 31, 1954.

particular ministry or constitute administrative entities encompassing a variety of productive sectors. Thus, for instance, the list is topped by the Ministry of Fuel and Power (with 102 percent fulfillment) and is then followed by "Fuel" alone (with 104 percent)—apparently indicating that power has been underfulfilled. Many other sectors are likewise statistically camouflaged under the heading of "Other Ministries" and then given credit for an unexplained 106 percent plan fulfillment. The truth of the matter was candidly revealed by *Rude Pravo* on August 4. The paper stated that "It would not be beneficial . . . to be satisfied with the fulfillment of gross production as a whole and not to see that some important tasks . . . have not been fulfilled." The paper added, "shortcomings in the fulfillment of specific tasks, which can be found in all sectors of our economy, cause considerable difficulties and are often a serious brake to a further rise in the standard of living."

An analysis of regime indices, unclear and untrustworthy as they are, shows that two sectors admittedly failed to reach the set target: the Ministry of Foundries and Ores with 99.5 percent and the Ministry of Food with 99.4 percent. Thus, both industry and agriculture encountered difficulties. Furthermore, though the Ministry of Construction reached the 104 percent mark, the statistical survey shows that only 8,000 housing units have been completed in the first half of the year. According to the 1954 State Plan (*Rude Pravo*, January 23), the annual task for housing construction calls for 40,000 units before the end of the year.

The alleged fulfillment in some industrial sectors—light industry, 103 percent; engineering 100 percent; local industry, 111 percent—has admittedly been far too costly. "Economy measures in industrial production," says *Rude Pravo*, "were unsatisfactory" and the "planned reduction of overhead costs has not been reached." Furthermore, "short-

comings and bad quality in export production have led to the curtailment of imports of foodstuffs and raw materials."

A Radio Prague summary of the statistical report gave the following additional details:

"The production plan for iron ore, manganese ore, steam and water turbines, mine-loading machines, farm machinery, razor blades and fruit-preserving equipment has not been entirely fulfilled. In the food industry, we have not reached the planned production of pork and beef, milk and butter. The task of cultivating all arable land has not been fulfilled. . . ."

The agricultural results seem to have been the least satisfactory, as evidenced by non-fulfillment by the Food Ministry. Besides the items listed as underfulfilled by Radio Prague, the communique also refers to a deficiency in the supply of eggs and complains that "bulk purchasing [forced deliveries] . . . ran unsatisfactorily," that animal production was also "unsatisfactory" and that by the middle of the year, the "stock of cattle and pigs was lower than at the same time last year. . . ."

Hungary

Hungary is the only country in the area which did not issue detailed figures for the entire first half of the year. Instead of combining the two quarterly reports into one semi-annual communique, the Hungarian statistical office chose to give a separate account for the second quarter of the year. The only reference for the entire period is as follows: ". . . Our Socialist industry has made good the lag of the first quarter and has fulfilled the plan for the first half of the year by 101 percent." In other words, the indices would be considerably lower if the first quarter's results were to be taken into consideration. It is also important to note that heavy industrial output was scheduled to decrease by two percent as compared with 1953 (*Szabad Nep*, January 23, 1954). Although the Ministry for Heavy Industry is said to have fulfilled its plan for the second quarter by 104.3 percent, "heavy industrial production has fallen by .8 percent as compared with the second quarter of 1953."

The greatest failure was apparently registered in the building industry. The communique attributed a 96.1 plan fulfillment to the Building Ministry, and a 86.9 percent index to the industry as such. The cause for this setback was attributed to a shortage of manpower. In its discussion of the communique, *Szabad Nep* of July 22 listed the following items for which the target had not been reached: "coal, steel, pig iron, hearth steel, alumina, steam engines, combines, buses, baked bricks . . . underwear, children's coats, overalls, cotton stockings, margarine, bacon, sausages, cheese, etc." What this "etcetera" involves is hard to guess in view of the inflated overall ministerial percentages.

It is highly improbable, for instance, that the Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine Industry fulfilled its plan by 102 percent, and that the Ministries of Heavy and Light Industry reached their goals by 104.3 and 106 percent respectively, if the shortages enumerated above did indeed occur. And if these Ministries had overfulfilled plans, it is unlikely that, as announced, exports targets were not met,

particularly with respect to plants of the Smelting and Machine Industry sectors.

The claim of the Food Ministry (105.1 percent fulfillment) is also highly questionable, since a Radio Budapest comment of July 26 plainly stated that "supplies in milk and dairy products are closely related to the situation of livestock breeding, which is not satisfactory. . . ." The same source stated that "as for poultry, the stock has diminished in the last few years, like that of pigs and horned cattle." The optimistic forecasts with respect to gains in the food supply may be highly premature. The communique reveals that the fulfillment of investment plans lagged far behind schedule, particularly in agriculture, health and housing.

Bulgaria

Of all the mid-year plans released by the Satellite regimes, the Bulgarian communique contains the clearest indication of failure on a large scale. As in Hungary, no figures were given for the first quarter of the year. But whereas the Hungarian Communists claim to have made up their losses in the second quarter, and therefore published figures only for that period, no such claim was made by the Bulgarians. This silence seems to indicate that production lagged in both quarters, and probably more so in the second as compared to the first.

The communique is topped by a short paragraph giving results for the broadest production categories. It simply states that "With regard to total production, the plan has been fulfilled by 98 percent during the first six months of 1954. National Industry has fulfilled its plan by 97 percent, Local Industry by 98 percent, and Cooperative Industry by 99.6 percent." The rest of the story is succinctly told by *Rabotnichesko Delo* of July 28:

"According to the announcement [of the statistical office] many Ministries and agencies did not fulfill their plans for the first half of the year because of organizational failures. Among these were the Ministry of Electrification [93 percent], the Ministry of Heavy Industry [97 percent] and the Ministry of Light and Food Industry [95 percent].

"Many industrial enterprises permitted a non-rhythmical fulfillment of the plans, applied sporadic production efforts in order to fulfill the production schedule, allowed overexpenditure in the wage fund, and did not fulfill the plan for lower production costs.

"In spite of improved quality, the Ministry of Heavy Industry, the Ministry of Communal Economy and Public Works, the Central Union of Handicraft Cooperatives, and other ministries and agencies did not fulfill the variety plan for goods in the production of certain consumer items and permitted some low-quality goods to be put on sale. . . .

"Shortcomings were allowed to occur in many construction projects because of errors on the part of the Ministry of Construction and other ministries. The completion and commissioning of many important building projects was delayed. The preparation and building of new coal pits, the completion of the Karl Marx soda plant . . . and other projects have been seriously delayed. . . .

"Our State and cooperative trade organizations continue not to . . . study the needs of the people and do not distribute and allocate goods in the proper manner. . . .

"The measures taken so far to insure the fulfillment of all plans are inadequate. More organizational efforts must be devoted to achieving a satisfactory implementation of the measures prescribed, and new measures must be outlined in order to insure the unflinching fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan in all respects."

Used Nails Requested in Hungary

A HUNGARIAN peasant wrote to thank his relatives in New York for the clothes packages they had sent at his request, saying, "The villagers stop us on our way to church on Sundays to feel the fine fabric of our American clothes." This time, however, he was making a rather different request—for some used nails. He explained:

"We had a very wet June, and the roof leaked badly. We managed to get some shingles but couldn't get any nails. I went to the village council to inquire if it was permitted to have nails sent from America. They laughed at me and sent me to the Communist Party Secretary. Mr. Party Secretary was offended; he thought I was trying to make a fool out of him. He promised to get me some nails himself, and, indeed, the next time he went to Nyiregyhaza, he did get me two packages. I was very grateful and presented his daughter with a pair of the stockings you sent me. But the nails were no good. As soon as I started to hammer them, they bent and then broke off. So I've gone back to my original idea of asking you to send me nails. I don't know if you can send new ones, so used ones will do just as well."

Current Developments

Albania

On July 17, Radio Tirana announced that the Central Committee of the Party had met five days before "to listen to the report of the Politburo on tasks for strengthening the Party . . . delivered by [Premier] Enver Hoxha." The broadcast added that the Plenum had "approved" the report which, among other decisions, contained instructions for a reorganization of the top layer of the State-Party apparatus. In Hoxha's own words (as reported by Radio Tirana on July 20) the following took place:

"In order to strengthen the fundamental role of the Party, the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers Party decided upon certain organizational measures at its plenary session. I requested the Central Committee, and it considered my request just, to relieve me of my functions as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and to give me the opportunity to devote all my energy to leading Party work and . . . together with my comrades of the Central Committee to further strengthen the Party. . . . The Central Committee accepted my request. . . .

"In taking this organizational measure consisting in separating the functions of the First Secretary of the Central Committee from those of the Premier, the Central Committee also aimed at completing and making decisive the guidance, aid and control of the Party and of the Central Committee with respect to State and economic institutions, since it is this guidance and aid which provides the strengthening of our people's regime, the strengthening of the central and local organs of our regime, and the successful accomplishment of all the tasks facing our Party and government.

"The Central Committee of the Albanian Workers Party had charged me to propose to the People's Assembly that it entrust the formation of the new government of the People's Republic of Albania to Comrade Mehmet Shehu, member of the Central Committee and of the Politburo, full of experience in leadership, a loyal son of our Party and people."

In brief, Albania has now abolished the function of Secretary General of the Party, has replaced this post with the more restricted position of First Secretary and has divorced Party functions from those pertaining to government leadership. The move, entailing at least the partial demotion of Hoxha, the man who had held the dual leadership of State and Party for some ten years, is in line with similar moves which have taken place throughout the Satellite area since the beginning of the New Course (see July issue page 21). As in the other countries, the reorganization was effected in the name of "collective leadership." A July 18 *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana) editorial stressed, for example that "constantly following Lenin's policy, the Party always opposed all the attempts of the enemies to weaken the Party, including those [enemies] who tried to obtain personal advantages."

In actual fact, the Albanian Party did not weaken the Hoxha hero-worshipping campaign after Stalin's death as was indeed done with respect to all important leaders in other countries in the orbit. The switch to collective leadership was therefore much more abrupt in Albania and the reorganization included what appears to be but thinly veiled attacks against Hoxha. On July 17, *Zeri i Popullit* pointedly denied the preeminence of the former Premier: "One of the bases of Party organization is that at the head of the Party and government there is not one person but the Committee of the Party, which directs all the activities of the Party."

Assembly Meeting

On July 20, the first session of the third legislature of the People's Assembly was opened. Mehmet Shehu, who was duly "appointed" Premier, "presented" his Cabinet which now contains the following members: First Deputy of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Agriculture Hysni Kapo; First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the People's Defense, Lt. General Beqir Balluku; Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Manush Myftiu; Deputy Chairman of the Council of

Ministers, Tuk Jakova; President of the State Planning Commission, Spiro Koleka; Minister of Industry and Mines, Koco Theodosi; Minister of Interior, Major General Kadri Hasbiu; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Behar Shtylla; Minister of Construction and Communication, Josif Pasko; Minister of Trade, Kico Ngjela; Minister of Finance, Abdyl Kellezi; Minister of Education and Culture, Bedri Spahiu; Minister of Justice, Bilibil Klosi; Minister of Health, Medar Shtylla, and President of the State Control Commission, Shefqet Peci.

At its second meeting, the Assembly approved the following agenda: 1. approval of the regulations for the People's Assembly; 2. election of the People's Assembly commissions: the budget commission, the commission of laws, and the foreign affairs commission; 3. approval of the decrees issued by the Presidium of the People's Assembly and some changes in the Constitution; 4. election of the Presidium of the People's Assembly; 5. approval of a draft law on alterations in some ministries and on the creation of new ones; 6. nomination of the Council of Ministers; 7. alterations and adjustments in the composition of the High Court.

A July 22 Radio Tirana account of the proceedings showed that the first two points on the agenda were dealt with summarily, as a matter of routine. Then came Hoxha's speech. As Radio Tirana phrased it:

"As there was no other discussion, the first proposal of Comrade Enver Hoxha—the resignation of his government—was put to a vote. This proposal was unanimously approved. Afterwards, the second proposal of Hoxha was presented—that Comrade Mehmet Shehu be charged with the formation of the new government. After the voting, Comrade Nushi, chairman of the People's Assembly, announced that Hoxha's proposal for the appointment of Comrade Mehmet Shehu as chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania was unanimously approved."

The third point of the agenda, the important provision that some changes would be effected in the Constitution, was not reported in detail. Radio Tirana merely mentioned that the Assembly approved "in principle, clause by clause and unanimously, the draft law on some modifications in the Constitution of the People's Republic of Albania." The fourth item consisted in a proposal—unanimously adopted—that the Presidium of the People's Assembly consist of 15 members, including Hoxha but not Shehu. The fifth item involved the creation of the Construction-Communication Ministry and the separation of the agricultural collective sector from the Ministry of Agriculture. The part of the agenda dealing with modifications and adjustments in the composition of the Supreme Court entailed the appointment of a new president of the Supreme Court (Aranit Cela) and the election of 33 assistant-judges of the Supreme Court in addition to those elected in 1951.

Party Agitation

As was the case in the other Satellite nations, the government-Party changes were the occasions for open admission

of deficiencies in Party work. A *Zeri i Popullit* editorial of July 25 entitled "Let us Raise the Level of the Party's Ideological and Political Leadership" remarked that "The July 1954 Plenum of the Central Committee pointed out the great need for a further struggle against bourgeois customs and ideas in our people, including Communists." The editorial explained that "When we speak of a higher level of the Party's ideological and political leadership, we mean that the Party's economic, social and cultural matters should be more closely connected with the Party's policy." This close relation, the editorial pointed out, is not properly maintained. There is often a separation between ideological and economic matters:

"This separation is brought about by Party committees in departments and districts which, when analyzing economic matters only see them from the economic point of view, comparing figures and statistics, without taking into consideration the political problems which may arise from this mistake or deviation from the Party line, or without taking into consideration what should be done for the improvement of the Party's leadership and control [in the various sectors]. Party organs, Party bureaus in departments and districts, Party organizations and workers should never separate ideological and political problems from economic ones."

One of the most urgent economic tasks now facing Party activists consists in supervising agricultural work which, according to the latest regime pronouncements, is far from satisfactory. A *Zeri i Popullit* editorial of August 11 entitled "Agricultural Workers are Facing Urgent Tasks in Achieving the Planned Production in all Crops," complains not of rain and floods (as did other countries in the area) but of drought. The editorial points out that "in order to accomplish . . . urgent tasks in time, better mobilization is required." The editorial concludes by stating that the slogan in the countryside should be "Men, women and youth of both sexes should all go to the fields and accomplish all the crop services and thus insure planned production."

Half-Year Plan Results

Further evidence that at the moment the regime is experiencing acute economic difficulties is contained in a report, released July 31, on fulfillment of the plan for the first six months of 1954. The overall industrial target was not reached, having been fulfilled only 98.5 percent. To hide other failures, the greater number of figures are of a comparative nature and merely indicate percentage increases over last year's performance.

Indices referring directly to the first six months of this year are as follows: mines, 96.1 percent; national industry, 103 percent; handicraft cooperatives, 101.6 percent. Other (non-comparative) figures refer to agriculture: cotton, 101.8 percent; sugar beet, 102 percent; tobacco, 98.9 percent; corn 96.3 percent. Indications are that the industrial crops fared best. The report further explains that "as a result of unfavorable weather, sowing was carried out rather late and under difficult agrotechnical conditions. . . . The spring sowing plan was fulfilled by 97.9 percent." This in-

formation is followed by the announcement that, as compared with the corresponding period of last year, the MTS accomplished 47.3 percent more work and that a volume of 24.5 percent more work was done in agriculture collectives while 114.5 percent more was done for individual peasants. This clearly shows a change in regime policy which, temporarily at least, is meant to help private producers. But, as the figures show, results so far have not been satisfactory.

Disorganization, lags and lack of synchronization in carrying out plans can be deduced from the investment plan results. This plan was fulfilled only 75.4 percent—80.2 percent in the national sector and 66.5 percent in the local sector. The Ministry of Industry and Construction fulfilled the investment plan by 82.9 percent, the Ministry of Agriculture and Procurement by 66 percent and the Ministry of Trade and Communications by 88.8 percent. As a result, the following non-fulfillment of plans occurred: construction, 92.7 percent; freight and transport, 91.4; overall turnover of mass consumer goods, 95.7 percent. Finally, in spite of promises for a fast rise in the standard of living, the report also includes this telling admission: "Shoe supplies were 5.9 percent less than in the corresponding period of last year."

Two articles—one on industry, the other on agriculture—both printed the day after the report was made public, indicate some of the difficulties at the root of the whole economic structure. The article on industry is an August 1 *Zeri i Popullit* exhortation entitled "Let Us Rationally Use the Capacity of Machines." The article states that "the fulfillment of the State plan in all aspects—quantity, quality and State standards—depends, among other things, upon the efficient use of the capacity of machines. . . . There are many indications that some of our enterprises are not paying sufficient attention to this problem. . . ." The paper explains, "It should be admitted that the worst thing noted in our economic enterprises is the fact that in the first days of the month they go slowly and then start speeding up work during the last days of the month." The article also points out that in order to keep a machine running it is necessary that it should have all the needed raw materials. "It has happened," the paper comments, "that a factory had to suspend all operations because raw materials were not supplied in time . . . as a result, big gaps seriously harming plan fulfillment were noted." The concluding paragraph shows regime dissatisfaction with results obtained in the period under review:

"It is demanded that the directorates of enterprises, basic Party organizations, and trade union committees—especially those in the industrial sector—strive for better operational work and for a maximum use of machine capacity. Thus they will score better successes than those indicated in the communique on the fulfillment of the first 6-month plan for the current year."

The second article in the same issue of *Zeri i Popullit* draws attention to the fact that the fodder base is not adequate. "Considering livestock a very valuable possession of our country, the Party and government adopted a series of important measures to make livestock a healthy element

in the development of our agriculture. . . . It is well known that the main condition for augmenting and improving livestock and their productivity is to increase and improve the fodder base." The paper comments that "the fact that livestock breeding is in general not being developed with proper rhythm clearly indicates that the strengthening of the fodder base, a major factor, is not being properly considered."

Romania

In a session held on August 2, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party approved the following agenda for the Second Party Congress scheduled for October 30, 1954: 1. Report on the activity of the Central Committee; 2. Report of the Party's Central Revision Commission; 3. Directives of the Second Congress regarding the development of agriculture in the next two or three years; 4. Report concerning amendments to the Party Constitution; 5. Election of the Party Central Committee and of the Commission of Revision. On August 3, Radio Bucharest announced that the Central Committee had approved the "draft of the modified rules of the Romanian CP, and the draft of the directives of the Second Romanian Workers [Communist] Party Congress on the development of agriculture. . . ." The text of the draft of the new Party rules was published in *Scinteia* (Bucharest) on August 8, but so far no details have been given on the agricultural plan.

The draft introduces stricter rules for Party admission. Whereas hitherto there had been a probationary period of six months and only a single category for Party candidature involving two sponsors, the present requirements entail three separate categories. The three groups are defined as follows: 1. industrial workers with more than five years in their trade; 2. other industrial workers, collective farm workers, technicians and engineers working in enterprises; 3. working peasants, clerks and other working people. Applicants of the first group require the sponsorship of two Party members (and three and four respectively for the other two groups). Sponsors must have been Party members for at least three years, and members of the Central Committee are not allowed to act as sponsors. It is further stipulated that applicants of the first group must undergo an apprenticeship of at least one year, while those in the other two groups must remain novices for 18 and 24 months respectively. The new rules stipulate that only exceptionally can a former member of a political party be admitted into the CP, and then only if sponsored by five Party members, all of whom must have had an 8-year membership and two of whom must have been in the Party in 1944.

A comparison with the Party statutes approved in 1948 shows that the new rules increase members' duties while leaving their rights unchanged. A Party member will henceforth have to: 1. "fight actively in the battle for the construction of Socialism"; 2. "defend by all means the unity and purity of the Party ranks"; 3. "fight actively for the implementation of Party policy and the decisions of leading organs . . ."; 4. "be a leader in production . . ."; 5.

"strengthen relations with the working people . . ."; 6. "work incessantly to raise the level of his conscience [sic], to assimilate the basis of Marxism-Leninism"; 7. "strictly comply with Party and State discipline"; 8. "use all his energy in self-criticism and criticism from below to unveil shortcomings and mistakes . . ."; 9. "call attention of the leading Party organs, including the Central Committee, to failings and shortcomings no matter whom it affects"; 10. "be sincere and honest toward the Party"; 11. "keep Party and State secrets . . ."; 12. "strictly implement Party directives concerning the just selection of cadres. . . ."

These rules indicate that the regime has been unable so far to translate into clear instructions its obvious intention of both tightening discipline and at the same time allowing for the development of more flexibility "from below." It is clear, however, that the Party now wishes to see more able people join its ranks, as plainly expressed in *Scinteia* of August 10:

"The Party's strength resides not so much in the size of its membership as, above all, in the quality of its members. The Party member is obliged to participate actively in the fight to build Socialism and serve faithfully the Fatherland—the Romanian People's Republic.

"The ironclad unity of the Party is the guarantee of its irresistible force. That is why the first duty of every member is to defend by all means the unity and purity of the Party ranks. Fractional activity is a crime against the Party and is incompatible with continued membership.

"It is not enough for a Party member to declare himself in agreement with the decisions of the Party: he must fight actively for their realization. A passive and formal attitude toward Party decisions weakens the fighting capacity of the Party and hinders realization of its policy."

Just as the Party has not been able to evolve a clear-cut definition for intra-Party relationships, so too it has failed in resolving the problem of regulating the interaction between technicians and Party agitators on the production level. While for the past few months the tendency has been to free production managers from the burden of control at the factory or workshop level (making them responsible to the Party at higher levels), the new rules seem to indicate that in Romania the local Party organizations will now have more say than before. *Scinteia* of August 10 explains the new relationship in these words: "With a view to raising the role and responsibility of basic organizations attached to production and commercial enterprises, MTS, collective and State farms, they have been granted the right of control over the activities of administration."

National Assembly

On August 5, the Fourth Session of the Grand National Assembly was opened. The agenda, which was unanimously adopted, included: 1. a law on pardon and amnesty; 2. a law on organization and function of State arbitration, and 3. the ratification of decrees issued by the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly between April 20, 1954 and August 5. While the last two named items on the agenda were largely a matter of routine procedure—and were

hardly referred to in the official press reports—the first item, the law on pardon and amnesty, is of major importance and was discussed in great detail. As broadcast over Radio Bucharest on August 5, the law provides for pardon for all persons sentenced to up to five years of deprivation of freedom as well as for persons sentenced to monetary punishment. The law also entails a reduction of two-thirds of the punishment for sentences exceeding five years.

An important qualification, however, restricts the type of persons who may be forgiven for past "crimes." It reads as follows: "The provisions of this bill are not applicable to offenders against the security of the State, to those guilty of embezzlement, of theft exceeding 2,500 lei, of robbery, deliberate arson, murders, bribes, or other offenses of a particularly desperate character."

It seems therefore that while a number of people will be freed, those who were specifically charged with activities involving State "security" will remain in prison. On the other hand, there are probably many persons who, while they resisted various regime policies (such as collectivization) were not specifically charged with "endangering security." Many peasants no doubt come under this category and the law may be partially intended to release manpower urgently needed in the agricultural sector.

In a speech he delivered to the National Assembly, Vice President of the Council of Ministers Chisinevski gave the official regime version of the intent and meaning of the new law. He spoke of the "deep humanity" of the "RPR People's Democratic State," and stressed the "People's legality." In explaining the term "legality," Chisinevski made the significant remark that "it protects small individual property based on individual work against kulak exploitation and impedes capitalist property." It seems therefore that the law is at least partly directed at the small and medium farmers, whose help in production is now required.

The Communist official also said that "Law is law for everybody—nobody, no matter how important, has the right to violate the laws of the State." This statement appears to be an oblique reference to the petty despotism of Party officials who in the past have often been immune to punishment under the law. Chisinevski in fact referred to this question somewhat more specifically when, later in his speech, he said:

"... some local agencies of the State power have manifested tendencies to have a sort of local legality of their own. Some executive committees issue dispositions which are in contradiction with government provisions. We must be vigilant over the strict observance of people's legality in all regions and districts."

The Communist official did not explain how this curb on local illegality was to be enforced now that the basic Party organizations have been given more power than ever before.

Hungary

Latest regime pronouncements on the kolkhoz situation in Hungary indicate that the Communists have called an unofficial halt to the process of dissolution and are trying to consolidate what remains of the collective farm sector

through arbitrary "legal" force, as well as persuasion. The change in policy is clearly apparent from a comparison between pronouncements made at the inception of the New Course and present day comments. Thus, in announcing the new program on July 5, 1953, Prime Minister Imre Nagy declared that "kolkhoz members who want to return to individual farming . . . may quit the kolkhozes." Further, the kolkhoz by-laws published in *Szabad Nep* (Budapest) of September 18, 1953, stipulated that "The member who quits must be allotted land equivalent in value to the land contributed by him when he joined. . . ." By way of contrast, a July 3, 1954, Radio Bucharest broadcast disclosed that a lawyer, Gyula Marosi, had been sentenced to three and a half years imprisonment and five years loss of civic rights for having attempted to sue a collective farm for refusal to return the property of his two clients, both officially described as "kulaks." The Radio Budapest announcement contained a reference to the fact that the land of these two peasants had been "finally and legally" incorporated into the property of collective farms.

That the regime has now come to the conclusion that it has gone far enough in allowing kolkhoz dissolutions, is also apparent from a recent, apparently crucial Supreme Court ruling. The court decision was published in *Szabad Fold* (Budapest) of July 4, 1954. The important paragraph was:

"It has recently frequently happened that individuals sued kolkhozes [for the return of the full value of property originally contributed to collectives] and the courts did not always act correctly. In several instances these law suits were nothing but economic activities aimed at hampering the strengthening of kolkhozes and obstructing production work. Because of this, the Supreme Court . . . has adopted the following resolutions: 'Real estate, farm buildings, agricultural equipment, or any other property which has passed into the possession of, or is used by kolkhozes, State farms or MTS as a result of the action taken by, or with the approval of, a State agency, cannot be reclaimed by a former owner or any other person, nor can anyone file a claim for such property against kolkhozes, State farms or MTS. Such claims must be rejected by courts without passing decision on them.'"

The wording of this decision, particularly the reference to State farm and MTS, seems to indicate that former land owners tried to regain possession of property confiscated by the State. But in so far as the decision also refers to kolkhoz property incorporated in the collective with the mere "approval" of State agencies, it also affects land brought into such organizations by individual peasants. As if to dispel any doubt on this score, *Szabad Nep* of July 7 published an article entitled "The Main Tasks in Strengthening Our Kolkhozes." The article stated:

"In recent months the kulaks and other enemies of the people's democracy, taking advantage of the hesitancy and opportunism of some Council functionaries and authorities, in several instances laid claim upon the property, lands and equipment of kolkhozes with the assistance of corrupt lawyers. Our law courts, by inflicting appropriately strict sentences, have seen to it that the people's enemies should take note once and for all of the fact that our State agencies will call to account anyone

who engages in activities undermining kolkhozes." [Italics in original text].

The article, the court decision and the imprisonment of lawyers are all bound to make it harder for peasants to leave kolkhozes. On the other hand, it is significant that no decision of the Council of Ministers has been passed on the subject. Furthermore, the court decision on kolkhoz disbanding was printed exclusively in the agrarian organ *Szabad Fold*. For the general public, the regime released only the nebulous statement that activities undermining kolkhozes would not be tolerated. The discrepancy between these two versions and the rapid, sharp shifts in regime policies are bound to demoralize further the already confused Party members and local functionaries. It must be remembered that only a few months ago, on January 9, *Szabad Nep* had charged that:

"There have been people who have gone so far as to deprive peasants leaving the kolkhozes of their land or have at least repeatedly put off giving them back their land. . . . In several instances fraudulent methods were applied in appraising the livestock and farm equipment returned to members quitting . . . responsible State and Party agencies did very little to stop or punish the unlawful practices. . . . In several villages the law is not observed: peasants leaving collectives are treated badly and wronged. . . . All this happens because there are still local petty kings, local State and Party functionaries who utterly disregard our Party resolution and State laws. . . ."

Within a matter of months, then, functionaries have been accused of both having been too harsh and too lenient, of having impeded dissolution of collectives and having encouraged it through "hesitancy and opportunism." These twists in policy appear to reflect continued regime failure in enlisting peasant cooperation. It also represents successive, desperate attempts to surmount ever growing difficulties. Dissolution and other concessions did not bring about the expected results: on the contrary, such policy encouraged peasants to demand more and more (see August issue, page 51). While the Communists do not seem to be in a position now to reverse main New Course trends, they do appear to be striving toward a partial "consolidation" of major economic sectors now in the process of gradual disintegration. This attempt at "plugging holes" is illustrated in a decree of the Council of Ministers broadcast over Radio Budapest on August 16. The text read as follows:

"In order to consolidate further the kolkhozes, the Council of Ministers at its latest meeting adopted a decree setting up a network of county representatives of the Producers Cooperative Council. The tasks of county representatives are to insure the healthy development of the producers cooperative movement and its economic and organizational consolidation, and to see to it that kolkhozes carry out their activity in conformity with their statutes. . . . It is the duty of county representatives to organize, in cooperation with agencies of justice, the legal defense and legal representation of kolkhozes. They will work in cooperation with the kolkhoz council members of the respective county." [Italics in original].

Recent and Related

German Marxism and Russian Communism, by John Plamenatz (*Longmans: \$4.25*). The first half of this book is an exposition and a criticism of the basic tenets of Marx and Engels. Through a discussion of Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky in relation to each other and to Marx, the second half explains how and why the Russian Communists have transformed Marxism. The author believes that the "objective conditions" in Russia at the time of the Revolution made it necessary for those who ruled in the name of Marx to create institutions making Marxist socialism impossible and Stalinist oppression inevitable. Marxism, a revolutionary doctrine, lost its revolutionary character in Western Europe, and its Marxist character in Russia.

Soviet National Income and Product 1940-48, by Abram Bergson and Hans Heymann, Jr. (*Columbia: \$5.00*). A compilation of national economic accounts, mainly from Soviet sources, for the years 1940, 1944 and 1948, including comparisons with 1937. Data are given both in terms of prevailing prices and Adjusted Factor Cost. The result is a detailed picture of the Soviet economy during periods of mobilization, war and reconstruction. Analysis of the statistics provides insight into the scope of the budget, sources of finance, price formation, tax burden, and the allocation of resources.

The New Red Anti-Semitism, edited by Elliot E. Cohen (*Beacon: \$1.50*). Six articles from *Commentary* marshal evidence to show that open anti-Semitism is now an established Communist policy. Mass deportations, persecution of "Zionists," the Doctors' Plot, the Slansky trial, and the rising chorus of anti-Semitic propaganda in the Soviet Union and the Satellites all attest to this thesis. Various explanations are advanced: that the "instigators of terror" have become captives of their own policy, that bureaucracy tends to give itself status and permanence by persecuting the vulnerable minority, and that totalitarian government gains absolute power only by "casting out 'enemy groups' from society."

Following is a list of studies published by the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, 4 West 57th Street, New York, N. Y., and available upon request:

The Industrialization of Peasant Europe, by Branko M. Peselj. An Agrarian Party member considers the impact of the Communist industrialization program on the East European agrarian system, and how a solution to the resulting problems could be found in a rational industrial program. 50¢. . . **A Literature in Crisis: Czech Literature 1938-1950**, by Milada Souckova. A Czech literary critic discusses the political, social and economic forces that have shaped Czech literature today. \$1.00. . . **The Hungarian Oil Industry**, by members of the MESC staff. This study presents the history of oil exploration and exploitation, a survey of the refining industry and a discussion of the changes since the Communist seizure of power. \$1.00. . .

Population Changes in Poland 1939-1950, by Henryk Zielinski. This monograph reviews certain changes in Poland's demographic structure due to war and occupation. \$1.00. . . **Land Reform and Ownership in Yugoslavia 1919-1953**, by Ranko M. Brashich. The present agrarian program against the background of early land ownership structure, the reforms of 1919 and 1945, and the situation from the Tito-Cominform break to the present. \$1.25. . . **Agricultural Laws and Regulations in Yugoslavia 1945-1953**, edited by members of the Mid-European Law Project. Brief descriptions, titles and locations of the laws. 50¢. . . **The Paris Peace Conference of 1946: The Role of the Hungarian Communists and of the Soviet Union**, by Michael Hoguey. This study deals with those issues discussed at the conference on which the Soviet Union, to the detriment of Hungary, disagreed with the Western powers. 75¢. . . **Water Supply in Hungary**, by George Ladik. Development of Hungarian water supply through cooperative and municipal waterworks. Domestic and industrial supply are discussed in relation to pre-Communist and Communist regimes. 75¢.



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